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Abstract
The United Arab Emirates is located on the south-eastern flank of the Arabian
Peninsula, between latitudes 22° and 26° north and longitudes 51° and 57° east. It is
bordered to the north by the Arabian Gulf, to the west by Saudi Arabia, to the south
by the Sultanate of Oman and Saudi Arabia, and to the east by the Gulf of Oman.
These international boundaries form the framework on which the internal boundaries
between the Emirates have emerged.
The federation of the U.A.E. is yet stifi young. The six former Trucial States joined
together in federation on 2 December 1971, while the seventh Emirate, Ras al
Khaimah joined on 10 February 1972.
This thesis concentrates on the internal boundaries demarcation history, and on the
settlement of territorial disputes in the U.A.E. and provides a general analysis of a
future strategy for an acceptable settlement to the inter-Emirates territorial disputes.
The study has concentrated on five points:
1. Discussion and analysis of the most important factors affecting the demarcation
of the inter-Emirate boundaries. The study argues that the main reason for the
creation of inter-Emirate boundaries was the arrival of the oil companies in the
region and the concomniitant granting of oil concessions.
2. Describing the individual Emirate's boundaries, which necessarily have a his-
tory of development. The study highlights, amongst other historical documents,
the first Trucial States boundaries map which was drawn up by the Research
Department at the Foreign Office in February 1963.
3. Identification and discussion of the major boundary dispute problems.
4. The study examines some of the area's problems as a result of the territorial
disputes and methods used in the inter-Emirate boundaries settlement. The
study also examines the future of the inter-Emirate boundaries.
5. Also highlighted is the 1974 agreement between Saudi Arabia and the U.A.E.,
and the agreement's articles are examined accurately for the first time, and the
text of the original agreement text is reproduced in the appendix.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The United Arab Emirates (U.A.E.) was formed 0112 December 1971. There have been
three changes in the area it occupies: on 10 February 1972, when Ras Al Khaimah joined
the Union; on2l August 1974 when almost 6,000 km 2 were ceded to Saudi Arabia as a
means of demarcating the boundary between them; and 01130 November 1971 when Iran
occupied Abu Musa island and the Tunbs islands. Including the islands, occupying about
5,900km2, the U.A.E. currently occupies a total area of 77,700km 2. Before 1974, the total
area of the country had been 83,600 km2.
The U.A.E. is made up of seven Emirates: Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah, Ajman, Umm
al-Quwain, Ras Al Khaimah and Fujairah. Uniting these Emirates are a common
language, a common culture, a common religion and a common currency. Unique in
their complexity, the Emirates lie fragmented across the Musandam Peninsula and
the northern fringe of the Empty Quarter, like a bizarre jigsaw puzzle: in place of the
expected seven pieces, there are twenty (see Figure 1.1).
Internally, as can be seen from the folded map attached to the thesis of the boundaries
of the U.A.E. (formerly the Trucial States) which was prepared and drawn by the
British Foreign Office in 1963, and which is still used as the official map of the U.A.E.,
only Abu Dhabi and Umm al-Quwain form integral areas. The other five Emirates
comprise many units: Dubai, two; Ras Al Khaimah, two; Fujairah, five; Ajman, three;
and Sharjah, six. It is evident, therefore, that to travel to every part of most of the
Emirates requires transit across neighbouring Emirates.
The map is even more complex than this, for there are three parts of neighbouring
Oman (which is an independent state, not an Emirate of the U.A.E.) separated by
land from the main part of Oman by U.A.E. territory: the northern tip of the
Chapter 1	 18
Figure 1.1 Map of the internal boundaries of the United Arab Emirates
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Musandain Peninsula, Wadi Madha (located within the enclave of Sharjah: Khur
Fakkan), and Walaya Mahadha. In brief, the broad reason behind the patchwork
arrangement is that sovereignty was originally based on tribal allegiance to a Shaikh,
rather than to a tract of land. The potential for oil revenue, subsequent to the
discovery of oil in the region, precipitated the need to demarcate territorial
boundaries. This process required the existing patchwork of tribal allegiances to be
mapped onto the land.
The details of the mosaic of enclaves and neutral zones which dominates the political
geography of the U.A.E. today is the result of many factors relating to the area's
history. It may be that the demarcation of international boundaries between the
Trucial States and the Sultanate of Muscat were easier to define than the internal
boundaries between the Trucial States themselves.
Historically, the earliest boundary delimitation of the area was devised by the
Government of India, and was officially recorded in Lorimer's Gazetteer in 1905.
However, no boundary lines are shown on the map which Hunter made for it.
The most important single influence on the changing shape of inter-Emirate
boundaries was the signing of treaties between the British government and the
Shaikhs of the Trucial Coast during the nineteenth century. There has been a
fluctuating number of Shaikhdoms: the number reduced from 8 in 1820, to 6 by 1835,
to 5 in 1914, and finally increased to 7 in 1952 until federation in 1971.' These
changes inevitably resulted in the reduction or enlargement of the size of some
Emirates, such as Sharjah.
The emergence of inter-state boundaries came after the 1930s. Prior to this time,
there was little need for boundary lines to exist in the region. The development of oil
resources changed everything. Before the 1930s the idea of a state with defined
boundaries was largely confined to the political belief of the colonial rulers. The tribes
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of the area had quite different perceptions of the political organisation of space.
Historically, tribal affiliation was the main determinant of political allegiance, and
political boundaries were dependent on tribal loyalties to individual Shaikhs and
consequently were subject to frequent change. Geographical features were rarely
significant determinants of tribal areas.
Inter-state boundaries in the Trucial States changed frequently during the nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries. Allegiance to a state was based on tribal loyalties and
tribal dirah (tribal grazing grounds). In Arabia, dirah was a flexibly defined area,
changing in size according to the strength of the tribe which wandered within it.2
In the mid-1950s, the British Government sent a diplomat, Julian Walker, to the
Trucial States with the difficult task of drawing up a plan for the definition and
demarcation of inter-state boundaries. Even after six years of surveys and
negotiations, Walker was able to settle only some of the conflicting territorial claims,
with the rest remaining unresolved. In January 1955 the Trucial Shaikhs agreed to
accept the adjudication of the Political Officer. In May 1955, Julian Walker presented
the boundaries report, including his recommendations on disputed boundary
settlements. Subsequently, during 1956 and 1957, Mr P.Tripp, the Political Officer in
Dubai, sent official letters to the Shaikhs of the Trucial Coast informing them of their
boundaries. Between 1963 and 1967 the Foreign Office sent the the Right Honorable
Lord Martin Buckmaster to the region to find a solution to the unresolved areas, the
most important of which was the Omani enclave of Wadi Madha. 3)
In 1968 the British government announced that it was to withdraw from east of Suez
by 1971. Britain's announcement to withdraw came as a shock to the rulers of the
Emirates because they found themselves confronted with a responsibility with which
they could not possibly cope. The gravity of the situation was exacerbated by the need
for protection and stability in order to be able to use the oil wealth for development
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programmes. The rulers also faced other serious local and regional problems: the
Buraimi dispute was still unresolved; disputes between Saudi Arabia, Abu Dhabi and
the Sultanate of Oman were still active; and there were disputes amongst the
Emirates, and between the Emirates and Oman.
Britain's withdrawal aimouncement precipitated armed conflict between certain
Emirates. Julian Walker had found it impossible to make any recommendation in the case
of 9 unresolved boundaries, such as that between Dubai and Sharjah, and between Ras
al-Khaimah and Fujairah which remains unresolved even today. Despite the formation,
in 1971, of a federation in which these seven units united into one state, civil conflicts still
break out between them. Short conflicts have occurred between members of the Union,
even since federation, such as the conflicts between Dubai and Sharjàh (1973 and 1975);
between Sharjah and Fujairah (1972 and 1974) in the eastern province of the U.A.E.
where Sharjah has three enclaves: Dibba Al-Husn, Khur Fakkan and Kalba; and between
Ras al-Khaimah and Fujairah (1974). However, the proposal for a federation among the
Gulf States was put forward to reduce as far as possible the tension of the boundaiy
disputes. The first attempt to establish a union of nine including Qatar and Bahrain failed
and the result was a union of seven (Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Shai:jah, Ajman, Umm al-Quwain,
Ras al Khaimah and Fujairah). Britainleft the area after a century and a half (1820-1971)
of protection, leaving behind many serious unresolved border disputes.
In the 22 years since the establishment of the U.A.E., the federation has survived
despite its territorial disputes. In some cases, the federation has succeeded in
resolving boundary disputes between federal members, whereas in others it has failed
to settle its internal border and territorial disputes pennanently.
The internal boundaries map of the U.A.E. (Figure 1.1) shows the geographical
distribution of each Emirate's territories and enclaves and illustrates the main
problems, which can be summarised as follows:
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a. The modern political map of the United Arab Emirates is a unique mixture of
large coastal expanses whose territorial definition is reasonably clear, and a
maze of tiny enclaves within the mountainous interior south of the Musandam
peninsula where sovereignty is greatly fragmented.
b. As a result of tribal distribution, the territories of Dubai and Ras al Khaimah
are each made up of two parts, Ajman three parts, Fujairah five parts, and
Sharjah six parts. Abu Dhabi and Umm Al-Quwain are comprised of single
territorial units. (See Table 1.1.)
c. Some small territories belong to more than one Emirate. For example: the
village of Dibba on the Oman coast, with a population no more than 3000, is
divided between Oman, Sharjah and Fujairah (see Chapter 6).
d. However the most surprising fact about the geographical distribution of the
Emirates is that some of them have within their own borders an area of land
belonging to another Emirate. For example, the Emirate of Fujairah has within
it a piece of land that belongs to Ajman. This curious situation of one part of a
territory within another territory came about when some Shaikhs bought land
within the territory of another Shaikh.4
The division of the border of the Emirates on a tribal basis has caused many political
and some military clashes between the Emirates (see chapter 6).
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67,350
3,900
2,600
I-khajmah	 1,700
1,500
jjpj Al-Quwain	 750
Ajrnan	 250
Total	 77,700
Table 1.1 The total area of each Emirate and coastal lengths:
tal	 Coast	 No.of Territorial Units
Length/
__ kni ____________________
86.7	 480 One linked section from Ras Kumais east to Ras
Hasian west.
5	 72	 2 sections:
1. Dubai city on the Arabian Gulf.
2. The enclave of Hatta close to Oman border
3.3	 55 6 sections:
1. Shaijah city.
2. Khur Fakkan.
3. Kalba.
4. Dibba Al Husn.
5. Wadi Al-Helu.
6. A part of Oman's Madha enclave (Nahwa
_______	 and Shis)
2.2	 64	 2 sections:
1. City of Ras al-Khaimah to Oman border in
Musandam.
2. The south section: Wadi al-Our, Huwailat
15	 71	 5 sections:
1. The city of Fujairah.
2. North Section.
3. Dibba al- Gurfa.
4. Wahalah and Ahfarah.
________ 5. Am Al-Samali.
24	 1 section:
A single contiguous unit from the coast to Falag
______ al-Mualla.
03	 15 3 Sections:
1. Ajman city, as semi enclave of Sharjah.
2. the enclave of Manamah.
3. the enclave of Masfut near Hatta of Dubai.
100	 781
Source: The Author.
A. Significance of the study
In spite of many superb studies concerned with international boundary disputes and
territorial disputes, the internal boundaries of the U.A.E. have usually appeared only
briefly in general articles and surveys of the boundary disputes in the Arabian
Peninsula.
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No previous study has specifically examined in depth the main concern of this study.
Boundaries have played an important part in the recent history of the U.A.E. Two
boundaiy disputes in particular have been of sufficient magnitude as to rock the
structure of the U.A.E. as a state. One was the internal border dispute in 1985 between
Dubai and Sbarjah. During this dispute, Shaikh Zayed bin Sultan al-Nahayyan
threatened to resign as President of the federation if the dispute was not settled
peacefully. 5 Once the boundary dispute was settled in 1985, the way was paved for
more development projects to take place in the country (see Chapter 7). The other
major, this time external, boundary dispute, was between the U.A.E. and Saudi
Arabia. The 1974 agreement finally ended Saudi claims to al-Buraimi Oasis and left
six Al-Buraimi villages in Abu Dhabi, (U.A.E. ) namely Al-Jaheli, Al-Qataarah,
Al-Muwaijee, Al-Hill, Al-Masoodi, Al-Muhtaredh and three in the Sultanate of
Oman, namely Hamasa, Sa'ara and Buraimi (6) (see Chapter 4).
The geographical location of the Emirates added impetus to the need to bring peace
to the region. This idea was well illustrated by Sir Alec Douglas Home, the British
Foreign Secretary, in a statement to the House of Commons on6 July 1970, when he
said that Britain might contemplate maintaining small units and permanent bases
there. He continued:
"The urgent tasks now are, first to create a climate favourable to the
settlement of the local disputes, some of them far reaching and important.
The second is to consult the leaders of the Gulf as to how Britain can best
contribute to the pattern of stability in the area. We shall go into such
consultations with a completely open mincl....I am setting in motion the
diplomatic machineiy necesswy to t,y and help in the settlement of disputes
and find out from the rulers and leaders in that area how they think that
Britain can best help them create the stability which all of them want and
need."
The federation of the U.A.E. is a member of the Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC)
and one of the Gulf oil producing countries. It has a strategic location at the entrance
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of the Strait of Hormuz, and two coasts; the eastern on the Gulf of Oman and the
western on the Arabian Gulf.
From these geographical characteristics of the U.A.E. it can be concluded that the
stability of the U.A.E. is connected to the stability of the Gulf region as a whole, and
any threats to this stability might tempt outside powers, such as Saudi Arabia or Iran,
to intervene. In other words, boundary conflicts in the Emirates are potentially more
than local affairs.
Another, if less critical, point is that internal problems emerging from boundary
disputes tend to delay the process of development of the U.A.E. This in turn could
weaken the Gulf states which are seeking to co-operate in different fields for greater
strength.
The internal boundary of each Emirate is the identification of the individual
boundaries of the Emirate which together form its shape. Sometimes, boundary
disputes can be pacified by resolving other issues, but leaving the issue of the boundary
unresolved. It is important to future stability, however, that boundary disputes are
resolved by identifying border lines, which should be marked after the signing of a
formal agreement between the Emirates concerned. This process helps to guarantee
the stability of the region and the federal government should mark the internal and
the external border lines in a clearly defined way in order to reduce the likelihood of
a new Gulf crisis. A principal reason for the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait 0112 August 1990
was that the boundary lines between the two countries was never fixed and clearly
demarcated until after Kuwait was liberated in February 1991, when a United Nations
committee demarcated the boundary in April 1992 (according to MEES, 27 April
1992, P.D1) and marked its line with pillars.
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The significance of this study
This study offers some explanation for the internal boundary disputes which may arise
from time to time between federal members of the U.A.E.. The people of the U.A.E.
do not fully understand the meaning and the importance of the boundaries.
Therefore, the study examines the function of the internal boundary with respect to
the construction, expansion and master planning of the economic development of
some parts of the country. This is an important theme because there has been little
discussion of these internal boundaries by officials, academics and commentators.
Discussion with officials on this topic are problematic, as boundaries are considered
an extremely sensitive subject for discussion.
This thesis draws on the report concerning the Trucial Coast boundary settlement
prepared by Julian Walker in March 1955. This report, with only one or two
exceptions, provided the basis for the internal divisions of the contemporary U.A.E.
when the various Shaikhdoms agreed to a political federation in 1968. In this
agreement (the Semaih Agreement, 18 February 1968), Abu Dhabi and Dubai agreed
to resolve their boundary disputes, thus clearing the way for federation of 1971.
B. Aims of the study:
To understand the present geographical distribution of the territories and enclaves
among the U.A.E. members, it is necessary to uncover the historical facts through
historical documents: the present situation is the result of the past.
The aims of this study are:
a. To examine and analyse the geographical distribution of the Emirates' tern-
tories.
b. To examine the internal boundaries of the U.A.E. from a geopolitical point of view.
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c. To identify and discuss the major problems caused by boundary disputes in the
U.A.E., and especially the difficulties of boundary demarcation which faced
Julian Walker through his survey in the early part of the 195 Os.
d. To focus on problems of territorial dispute settlement in the U.A.E..
e. The study aims to plug a gap in the literature concerning the internal boundaries
of the U.A.E.. The U.A.E. internal boundaries have usually been included only
briefly, and most previous studies included inter-Emirates' boundaries as a
small section within the larger context of the U.A.E.
The thesis is structured to answer the following questions:
1. When were the different internal boundaries recognized in the region?
2. What are the factors which contributed to the emergence of inter-Emirate
boundaries, and what effect did they have on the current shape of the Emirate?
3. What are the effects, if any, of boundary disputes on the social and economic
life of the U.A.E.?
4. What is the future strategy for the settlement of internal boundary problems?
The study also examines documentary maps prepared by the British Foreign Office.
C. Previous Studies
Most studies mention the internal boundaries of the U.A.E. as a small section of a
larger study of the U.A.E. Until now, the internal boundaries of the U.A.E. have never
been taken as a subject on their own. The literature available on the U.A.E. in general
is not extensive, and the geographical literature of the U.A.E. is particularly scanty.
This study, from a political geographical perspective, is the first comprehensive study
concerned solely with the internal boundaries of the U.A.E..
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The other principal studies which contain information about the internal boundaries
of the U.A.E. include Arabian Boundaries, Prima'y Documents 1 853-1 957 (1988),
edited by Richard Schofield and Gerald Blake 8 . The complete set of this publication
is 30 volumes. These selections of documents relevant to the boundary issue have
been reproduced by Archive Editions. Three volumes are concerned with the
boundary between Saudi Arabia and the Trucial States (U.A.E): volumes 15, 16 and
17. However volumes 23 to 25 contain maps.
Volume 14 is on Trucial Coast internal boundaries 1902-1957. This is the first
publication which provides valuable documents on the internal boundaries of the
Trucial States (U.A.E). The documents published have been reproduced from
originals in the Public Record Office and the India Office Library and Records in
London. This volume contains 755 pages and includes interesting documents on
recognition of the Emirate of Fujairah as independent from 1939-1950.
J.G. Lorimer, Gazetteer of the Persian Gulf, Oman and CentralArabia (1908-1 915),
London, Gregg Reprint (1970)(). This is a rich source for the history and geography
of the Gulf. In some parts there are useful descriptions of the Trucial Coast's
territories, in particular a boundary description between the Trucial Coast and Oman
in the Musandam area.
Two studies have recently been published. One is by Bernard Burrows, Footnotes in
the Sand, the Gulf in Transition 1953-1958 (1990)(b0), which gives some insights into
the Buraimi dispute and boundary demarcation in the area. The second is by John
Wilkinson, Arabia's Frontiers, The Story of Britain's Boundary Drawing in the Desert
(1991)(h1). Although this book contains 399 pages, the internal boundaries of the
U.A.E. (Trucial States) is dealt with on page 275 when it highlights the Abu
Dhabi-Dubai War, and on page 327 there are two paragraphs on the internal
boundaries of the U.A.E. The majority of the book examines the main boundary
Chapter 1	 29
claims of Saudi Arabia with its neghbours: Abu Dhabi, Oman, Qatar and Yemen, and
in particular the boundary dispute between Abu Dhabi-Qatar and Saudi Arabia. An
older book is The Trucial States (1970) by Donald Hawley 12 , who spent three years,
(1958-61) as the British Political Agent in the Trucial States. Sir Donald Hawley
exhibited a deep interest in tracing the history of the Emirates, and his book was the
first to take the seven States of Trucial Coast as a subject on their own historically.
His research was undertaken largely in the Department of Geography and the Middle
East Centre, University of Durham, during a period of sabbatical leave from the
Diplomatic Service in 1967-68. His book discuss the developments under British
administration, and also provide helpful information, mainly in the appendices.
Internal boundaries of the U.A.E. are, however, mentioned on only three pages
(289-29 1) of Geographical Appendix 6 titled 'Frontiers.'
Eastern Arabian Frontiers (1964), by J.B. Kelly 13 , about 304 pages, contains useful
background to the Saudi Arabia-Abu Dhabi border dispute. Also by the same author
is Arabia, the Gulf and the West (1980)(14), which is 504 pages in length. However, the
author described the book's main purpose as to offer another interpretation of the
recent history of Arabia and the Gulf, and of Western relations with the area. Again
very little is to be found on the internal boundaries of the U.A.E., amounting to no
more than a page. Other volumes of particular value to scholars of the U.A.E. include
the work of M.M. Abdulla, who concentrates on the modern history of the U.A.E. in
his book The UnitedArab Emirates, A Modern Hitoiy (1978) (' ); From Trucial States
to United Arab Emirates (1982) by Frauke Heard-Bey 16 , which provides useful
information on the more recent historical background; and Sir Rupert Hay's The
Pe,yian Gulf States (1957)(17). Hay was another British official who served in Bahrain as
Political Resident for the Gulf from 1953 to 1958. Whereas Hawley's book deals only
with the Trucial States, Hay's book deals with all the Gulf Shaikhdoms.
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The UnitedArab Emirates.An InsightAndA Guide (1975), by Michael Tomkinsont:18)
is a good introduction to the country with general information.
Another valuable work is that contributed by John Duke Anthony, Arab States of the
Lower Gulf (1975)(19), which is a good guide to the dynamics of the federal and the
individual Emirate politics.
A valuable study is contributed by Husain Mohammed Al-Bahama The Legal Status
of the Arabian Gulf States: A study of their treaty relations and their international
problems (1968)(20). The book deals with political and constitutional affairs.
A very useful series published by Gower for the International Institute for Strategic
Studies is entitled Security in the Persian Gulf, in four volumes. The two volumes which
deal fleetingly with political disputes within the U.A.E. are:
1. Domestic Political Factors (1982), edited by Shahram Chubin(21),
2. Sources of Inter-State Conflict (1981), edited by Robert Litwak22.
One of the most substantial works dealing with security issues in the Gulf is Anthony
H. Cordesman's The Gulf and the Search for Strategic Stability: Saudi Arabia, the
Militaiy Balance in the Gulf, and Trends in theArab-Israeli Militwy Balance (1984).
This substantial book (985 pages) offers some shrewd geostrategic perspectives,
especially relating to boundary disputes between the Gulf States, and in particular,
the boundary dispute between the U.A.E. with its two neighbours, Saudi Arabia and
Oman. Finally, Mushkilat Al-Hudud Al-Seyasiyyah fi-Sahel Al-Gharbi Lil-Khaleej
Al-A rabi, [Political Boundaiy Problems in the West Coast of the Arabian Gulf (1975),
M.A. thesis by Abdul Hameed Gunaim, University of Cairo must be mentioned.
All the studies mentioned above have dealt with the history of boundary demarcation
far too briefly. Whilst some provide a valuable description of the internal boundaries
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of the U.A.E., none offers any recommendations, particularly with regard to boundary
dispute settlements.
D. Study Methods
The main sources for this thesis come from the official archives and records of the
Public Record Office at Kew in England. The maps have largely been collected from
the Cartographic and Map Section of the British Foreign Office.
Data collection was based on the following:
1.	 Written library materials
Materials such as books, articles and maps relating to this study were collected from
various sources in both Arabic and English language.
(a) Public Record Office
In 1947 the British Foreign Office replaced the Indian Government in handling British
interests in the Gulf area, and in 1949 a British Political Agent was appointed to Sharjah
for the first time, replacing the local representative who had looked after British interests
since 1823. After three years the Political Agency was transferred to Dubai.
The granting of oil concessions between the two World Wars created an awareness
of the internal boundary demarcation in the Trucial States and these became crucial
after 1947. Since the 1950s, and because of the security needs of the oil exploration
teams in the interior and to define the limits of the territory of each Shaikhdom, the
British became involved in demarcation the boundaries between these Shaikhdoms.
The Public Record Office is in Kew, near Richmond in Surrey. It houses collected
volumes relating to the Gulf region in general, and to the Trucial States in particular.
Huge quantities of documents on a myriad of subjects, such as oil concessions, Trucial
Oman Scouts, political Annual Reports, and boundaries of the Trucial States, are
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available in the Public Record Office, especially file numbers FO 3710/1 14648, FO
371/1016 and FO 371/126932.
These documents are gathered under the category of the Trucial States. The
abbreviation P0 refers to the Foreign Office. The Eastern Department's general
correspondence series is numbered 371. Every document bears a special code.
It is important to note that every available document is at least 30 years old from the
time of issue.
(b) Other official reports
1. Municipality of Dubai.
2. Shaijah Ruler's Court.
3. Municipality of Fujairah.
4. Ministry of Housing and Public Works, Dubai, U.A.E.
5. Ministry of Electricity and Water, Dubai, U.A.E.
6. Centre for Documentation and Cultural Studies, Abu Dhabi.
7. Foreign Office, London.
8. Sir William Haicrow Consultants, Reports (1991).
9. British Petroleum Company (BP), Middle East, Dubai Office.
10. Dubai Petroleum Company.
(c) Newspapeic and periodicaLs also used in this study
1. MEED, Middle East Economic Digest.
2. MEES, Middle East Economic Survey.
3. ARR, Arab Report and Record.
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4. Parliamentaiy Debates, House of Commons.
5. A1-Khaleej, (Arabic) newspaper published in Sharjah, U.A.E.
6. Al-Bajyan, (Arabic) newspaper published in Dubai, U.A.E.
7. Al-SharqAl-Awsat, (Arabic) newspaper published in London.
2. Fieldwork
Books and articles could not provide all the data required for this study, therefore the
researcher carried out a number of fieldwork trips in order to answer some of the
questions thrown up by this study. Three trips were carried out between 1991 and
1993; (20 March 1991- 20-May 1991), (23 February 1992 to 29 April 1992), (1 January
1993 to 15 May 1993). The researcher interviewed local farmers, some bedouins and
officials, and took photographs.
3. Interviews
The researcher interviewed many informative experts in the U.A.E., as well as British
officials who had worked in the area:
a. In the UA.E.
The researcher interviewed Mr Duncan Watkins, the director of Planning Section,
Survey Department of Dubai Municipality; Mr Edward F. Henderson, an expert on
boundary questions, particularly regarding the Buraimi dispute; Mr Jack Briggs,
Adviser to Dubai Police Force; His Excellency Essa Saleh A1-Gurg, C.B.E, the U.A.E.
Ambassador to the United Kingdom (Director of Development Office, Trucial States
Council).
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b. In the United Kingdom
In Durham, the researcher interview His Highness Shaikh Dr Sultan bin Mohammed
Al-Qasemi, Ruler of Sharjahon 22 October 1992. In London, the researcher had the
opportunity to interview Mr Julian F. Walker, (Foreign and Commonwealth Office);
Julian Walker was Assistant Political Agent (1953-55, Dubai) and demarcated the
inter-Emirates boundaries. A second interview with Mr Walker was carried out on
21 July 1991 in Durham.
Also in London the researcher interviewed the R.H. Lord Martin Buckmaster in the
House of Lords on 16 January 1991.
In Reading, the researcher interviewed Sir Donald Hawley, on 26 July 1991. He was
a Political Agent in Dubai from 1958-6 1. Hawley was one of those who exhibited a
deep interest in tracing the history of the Emirates.
E. Research Problems
There have been difficulties in obtaining information concerning the agreements of
boundary dispute settlements between the Emirates. Not only have most treaties not
been published, but also border and territorial disputes in the entire Gulf region are
considered to be classified information, and access to the relevant documents is highly
restricted. Boundary disputes in the region are highly sensitive issues which are live
to the present day, and seldom will a government official talk about this matter or
even comment on this topic. Many of the people interviewed considered the topic to
be of interest, but also highly sensitive, being in the Gulf. There was extreme
reluctance to disclose anything, even with the consent of their manager.
Only two agreements have been collected by the researcher which are:
a. The Dubai-Sharjah boundary agreement of April 1985.
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b. The U.A.E-Saudi Arabia agreement of 21 August 1974 of Al-Buraimi dispute
settlement (see Appendix A and B).
Another difficulty is that as there are seven Emirates, there are seven Municipalities, each
with their own archives for papers and reports. For example, in tiying to collect some
official reports on the geographical situation of the villages, it is necessary first to find out
to which Emirates these villages belong. The Municipality of each Emirate has to be
visited separately, and the director of each Municipality contacted. Seven Emirates means
there are seven Municipalities, situated in seven Emirates each with its own local laws,
regulations and procedures. The Director of each Municipality is likely to decline an
interview on boundary matters if they recognize the subject of the research. Many
government officials refused to assist or even co-operate claiming that they knew nothing
about this subject even though they may have much information.
F. Structure of the thesis
The thesis has been divided into eight chapters.
Chapter 1 gives an introduction to the study, a brief geographical and historical
picture of each Emirate, and the establishment of the federation of the U.A.E., as
well as describing objectives and methodology followed in the study.
Chapter 2 is concerned with the political geography of federalism and definitions of
federation and confederation. It concludes with a comparative study between the
U.A.E. as a federal state and contemporary examples of other federal countries.
In Chapter 3, the protectorate treaties from 1820-1892, and the tribal areas are
discussed. It also examines the internal boundary agreements and the emergence of
some Shaikhdoms and the disappearance of other Shaikhdoms as a factor in shaping
the internal boundaries.
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Chapter 4 poses the question, what are the factors which affect boundary demarcation
in the Trucial States? In addressing this question, Chapter 4 examines the relationship
between the discovery of oil and the emergence of the political concept of territorial
sovereignty.
Many writers who have written about Saudi Arabia's boundaries with the U.A.E., such as
Abdulla, M.M (1978, pp200-2l2), refer to a satisfactory boundary agreement between
Saudi Arabia and the UAE. in 1974, but without providing details. The lack of
information is made good in this chapter, according to the text of the original agreement.
The chapter also briefly examines the international boundaries of the U.A.E. with its
neighbours, Saudi Arabia and the Sultanate of Oman, concentrating on the boundary
agreements which have been signed recently after the establishment of the federation.
The chapter also examines the recent (1992) dispute on Abu Musa island between
the U.A.E. and Iran.
Chapter 5 gives a comparison between the 1937 map of the internal boundaries of
the Trucial Coast with the 1963 map which was prepared by the Research
Department, Foreign Office, London. It also discusses the methods used by Julian
Walker.
Chapter 6 focuses on some selected boundary disputes such as the Abu Dhabi-Dubai
internal boundary, and the Dubai-Shaijah internal boundary and the 1981 settlement
of the dispute. The chapter focuses also on the enclaves of Hatta in Dubai, Masfut in
Ajman, and Madha in Oman. The partition of Dibba is also discussed in this chapter.
Chapter 7 provides some selected examples of projects which have been cancelled
due to boundary disputes in the U.A.E.. This chapter also explores the benefits of
boundary dispute settlement and examines the Dubai-Sharjah border settlement as
an example.
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Chapter 8, concluding the thesis, includes recommendations to solve the remaining
disputes regarding boundaries in the U.A.E. This chapter also provides a general
analysis of a possible future strategy for settlement of the inter-Emirates territorial
disputes.
Endnotes
1. Melamid, A., 'Political Geography of Trucial Oman and Qatar', Geography Review, January 1970,
p.289.
2. Abdullah, M.M., The UnitedArab Emirates.A Modern History, Croom Helm, London, 1978, p.291.
3. The researcher interviewed the Right Honorable Lord Martin Buckmaster in the House of Lords
in London, Wednesday 16 January 1991.
4. Taryani, A.O., The Establishment of the United Arab Emirates 1950-1985, Croom Helm, London,
1987, p.230.
5. Arab Report and Record, 1-15 October 1976, pp.612-613.
6. Beaumont, P., Blake, G.H. and Wagstaff, J.M., The Middle East A Geographical Study, Fulton,
London, 1988, p318.
7. Hansard's Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, Vol.803, 6 July 1970, pp.348-349.
8. Schofield,R. and Blake, G.H. (eds.),ArabianBoundaries, Prim aryDocuments 1853-1957, 3OVols.,
1988.
Selections of documents relevant to the boundary issue have been reproduced by Archive Editions
from originals in the Public Record Office and the India Office Library and Records in London.
Three volumes are concerned with the boundary between Saudi Arabia and the Trucial States
(U.A.E): volumes 15, 16 and 17. However volumes 23 to 25 contain maps.
Volume 14 concerns Trucial Coast internal boundaries 1902-1 957.
9. Lorimer, J.G., Gazetteer of the Persian Gulf Oman and CentralArabia (1908-1915), Gregg Reprint,
London, 1970.
10. Burrows, Sir B., Footnotes in the Santh the Gulf in Transition 1953-1958, Russell, London, 1990.
11. Wilkinson, J., Arabia's Frontiers: The Story of Britain's Boundary Drawing in the Desert, Tauris,
London, 1991, pp.275, 327.
12. Hawley, D., The Trucial States, Allen & Unwin, London, 1970.
13. Kelly, J.B., Eastern Arabian Frontiers, Faber and Faber, London, 30'4pp., 1964.
14. Kelly, J.B.,Arabia, the Gulf and the West, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 504 pp., 1980.
15. Abdulla, M.M., The UnitedArab Emirates, a Modern History, Croom Helm, London, 1978.
16. Heard-Bey, F., From Trucial States to United Arab Emirates, Longman, London, 1982.
17. Hay, Sir R., The Persian Gulf States, The Middle East Institute, Washington D.C., 154 pp., 1959.
18. Tomkinson, M., The UnitedArab Emirates:An InsightAndA Guide, Tomkinson, London, 1975.
19. Anthony, J.D., Arab States of the Lower Gulft People, Politics, Petroleum, The Middle East Institute,
Washington D.C., 1975.
Chapter 1	 38
20. Al-Bahama, H.M., The Legal Status of the Arabian Gulf States:A study of their treaty relations and
their intern ational problems, Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1968.
21. Chubin, S. (ed.), Domestic Political Factors, in series Security in the Persian Gulf, Gower for the
International Institute for Strategic Studies, U.K., 1982.
22. Litwak, R. (ed.), Sources of Inter-State Conflict, in series Security in the Persian Gulf, Gower for the
International Institute for Strategic Studies, UK, 1981.
23. Cordesman,A.H., The Gulf; andthe Seaith for Strategic Stability: SaudiArabia, the MilitwyBalance
in the Gulf; and Trends in the Arab-Israeli Military Balance, Mansell, London, 1984, pp.411-425,
987.
24. Gunaim, A.H., Mushkilat Al-Hudud Al-Seyasiyyah fi-Sahel Al-Gharbi Lil-Khaleej Al-Arabi,
[Political Boundary Problems in the West Coast of the Arabian Gulf, unpublished MA. thesis,
University of Cairo, 1975 (in Arabic).
Chapter 1
	
39
Chapter 2
The Political Geography of Federalism
2.1 Introduction
Political geographers are interested in how states are organized. Such organization
tends to be the result of a long process of evolution. A federal state, by definition, is
made up of several administrative units, each of which may have different
characteristics. Each administrative unit has a government responsible for
administering local matters. In some federal states a central authority controls these
local governments. In the U.AE. the situation is different.
The purpose of this chapter is to subject the political system of the United Arab
Emirates to a geographical analysis in order to compare and contrast the political
patterns, responsibilities and organisation of the federal member states with the
United Arab Emirates as a whole.
The problems of 'federalism' are reflected in the variety of definitions of the term
that have been suggested by political scientists. Distinctions between countries which
operate a federal system tend to cloud or blur any definition of federalism, and make
it difficult to measure the strength of federalism.
A federation is usually born when a number of separate or autonomous political units
agree to combine together to create a state with a single sovereign central
government, whilst retaining for themselves some degree of guaranteed regional
autonomy. However, it can also happen in the opposite direction, when a unitary state
decides to become federal (e.g. Yugoslavia in the 1940s). In a very simple way, a
federation can be defined as a group of units such as states, emirates, republics,
provinces, lands or territories, united with one government which decides foreign
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affairs, defence, etc., but in which each state has its own government to determine
those of its own domestic affairs which the 'central' federal government has devolved
to it, or which has never been handed over to the central authorities.
In a model federal system, central government has responsibility for matters affecting the
federation, such as foreign policy, tariffs and immigration control, whilst local
governments administer affairs concerning the individual state. 1 In Modem Political
Ideologies, Riff defines federalism as "a constitutional device for securing the
decentralization of authority within a state by regulating the distribution of power on a
territorial basis." 2 Yet that need be no more than a 'county council arrangement'. A
constitution invariably seeks to clarify the relationship between the government with the
responsibility for the whole of a state's territory, and that concerned with only part of it,
i.e. central government and localized government. Some, but not all, of the powers of
central government are devolved upon the member bodies. Central government's
functions cannot be assumed by the local government, nor the local governments' by the
central government. Whilst neither is subordinate to the other, sometimes local
government is expected to carry out the requests of central government.3
2.1.1 Federation and confederation
The question arises as to the line of demarcation between a federation and
confederation. The term 'confederation' implies that the power and functions of the
central government are limited by the member states, which is the case in both Canada
and Switzerland, although in the case of Switzerland, the term 'confederation' does
not in reality produce all these confederal traits. The term 'federation' suggests much
greater power at the centre than distributed amongst the units of local government.
This situation describes the United States of America, where the federal government,
the President and the Supreme Court have progressively expanded their powers.4
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In a confederation, the central government is theoretically looser and weaker than in
a federation. Local government in a confederation tends to influence the functions
of central government, whereas a federal central government is likely to be in
autonomous control of the military, foreign affairs and diplomatic relations with other
states and will involve itself in foreign policy issues including declaring war and suing
for peace. In a federation, there is a direct relationship between the central
government and the people who share in the task of constitution, but in a
confederation the member states retain their sovereignties and therefore, the central
authority cannot force its decisions on any of the constituents. 5 . Confederations have
normally limited their concern to defence, foreign affairs and economics, but have
not become involved in the control of the internal affairs of the member states.
Confederation can be seen as little more than a treaty arrangement, and depends on
a continuing joint interest between the member states.'6
A confederation is an association between states in which the central government is
dependent upon the local or regional governments. The purpose of a federation is to
strengthen the ties between its member units, promoting co-operation between them
in all fields.
However, bearing in mind the foregoing, many commentators use the terms
interchangeably, and except where specific distinctions are being made, it is not helpful
to be over-concerned about the use of one or other term regarding any one country.
2.1.2 Reasons for federation
A basic question underlying federalism is why specific states have adopted federal
constitutions. In theory, the federal framework should be suitable for all states which
are neither small nor homogeneousP Federalism has proved itself to be the best way
for diverse political units to share the rule of a large united country. Federal state
government has evolved in this century holding out the promise of political
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integration in place of fragmentation. It can offer a flexible structure capable, as part
of a democratic system, of accommodating the social and regional differences which
exist in any country. Conversely, some say that federalism exacerbates these
differences, and the purpose of central government having strong authority is to
protect state unity. Whilst individual members seek to enlarge their autonomy, they
need to be willing to acquiesce to federal power in order to make workable this larger
economic and political unit.
Federal structures thus offer one type of solution to the problems of government in
diverse societies. In any situation, one or more of a number of factors may be
motivating the establishment of a federal state:
a. Establishing military security and strong defence.
b. Need for independence, particularly from a colonial power for which union may
be necessary.
c. The wish of a departing colonial power not to leave fragmentation behind it
(Southern Africa, West Indies).
d. Potential economic advantages such as the larger markets which exist within a
federation, and which are required for greater economic security.
e. Political leadership.
f. A more forceful influence in foreign affairs.
g. Geographical contiguity.
h. Similarity of political institutions.8
One or more of the factors listed above are usually needed before the desire for union
can be pursued. It is worth noting that, in particular cases, factors which could be
thought to operate against the formation of a federation, may in fact be irrelevant,
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such as: language, religion, race, separation by great distance, differences in historical
background, and nationality. For example, the union of the United States of America was
established before any sense of common nationality had come into being; and whereas in
some regions language demarcates borders between different groups of people, in other
regions the desire for union surpasses language barriers. For instance, in Canada, the
desire for union has, until recently, outbalanced the problems associated with having two
official languages (French and English), two Christian cultures (Roman Catholic and
Protestant) and a plethora of indigenous peoples who are now finding their political voice
and will shortly be recognised as constituting a new Territory within the union. In
Switzerland, the advantages of federation are sufficiently strong to overcome the
problems associated with four languages: German, French, Italian and Romance, and two
Christian cultures, Roman Catholic and Protestant.
There are, however, factors which may strengthen the desire to be separate. There
may be a divergence of economic interests, such that union might mean economic
advantage for some units, but economic loss for others; therefore, they remain, or
may become, independent for economic purposes. There maybe geographical factors
which amplify the desire to be separate: great distance, mountain ranges or maritime
features, serving to isolate communities and prevent economic development from
reaching all parts of the country or state. Divergence of nationality can be enough to
pull a country apart, such as in the former Yugoslavia. This point is developed further
below. Differences of language, race or religion may be enough to precipitate
secession. In Switzerland and Canada the desire for union grew up in spite of these
differences, but the desire for separation within the federal union was directly
produced by these differences. Dissimilarity of social and political institutions had its
effect in the United States of America, where slave states were anxious to keep under
their own control decisions about the future of the institution of slavery within their
own borders. Civil war ensued, but did not result in the break up of the federation.
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2.1.3 The geography of federalism
A question arises here regarding the geography of federalism. Federal government
has to be organized on a regional basis. The term 'federalism' is made meaningless if
it is used to embrace too wide an assortment of arrangements that are not primarily
groupings of territories. The socio-political life of any region needs to be sufficiently
strong to allow federalism its regional dimension. 9 Different states will differ in
warmth towards the federal arrangements, in composition, in interests and in
function. For example, were there no functional differences there might be no need
for federalism. The important point is that those characteristics which are different
are territorially grouped, and because of that they provide a reason for a federal
system of government. Federalism, unlike a unitary system, does not force unity out
of diversity, but allows diversity by legalising it, through the one constitution.
One of the important functions of federalism is to identify and resolve questions of
government which exist in a complicated interaction of spatial differences and
similarities. Therefore, federalism may owe a great deal to geography. In this respect,
federalism depends less on constitutions and more on the spacial distribution of
society. 10 It is possible to examine any country or state and classify it as a federal
system or otherwise, not through its constitution but through its people and their
activities. The legal constitution may be a poor guide to reveal the extent to which a
society is federal. Federalism is not determined by legal and constitutional technical
expression alone, but involves economic, social, political, and cultural forces that have
made the exterior forms of federalism crucial. Federalism is a solution to certain kinds
of political organization problems.
The fact that the importance of federalism does not lie exclusively in the constitutional
structure but in the society itself underlines the importance of demonstrating the
relationship between federalism and the geography of the area. Geographical
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influences can promote unity as well as being a main factor of encouraging states
towards the union. This argument is examined in greater detail in the following
discussion. The degree of integration in any society or nation depends on unique
historical, cultural, economic, and political determinants. Each society creates
circumstances which allow them to feel differentiated from other societies. These
diversities are connected with factors which may be economic, religious, ethnic or
historical. Any of these factors can be taken up by one or other group within the
population in a quest for self expression. These diversities may be located in specific
territorial areas, in which case the result can be a federal society. Where they are not
grouped territorially, then the society cannot be said to be federal. A sensitive point
in the political geography of federalism is that the geographical diversities may not
always follow the boundary lines of the component units of the state. 11 This can easily
be demonstrated by focusing analysis on any one of a variety of countries, for instance
the United States of America and the former Yugoslavia.
To found and maintain a federal system in any state requires a convergence of social
structure and geographical factors such as population, area and several units or
territories. Federalism provides co-operation in the face of diversity. The type or the
size of population and territories are unimportant. Federalism is based on regional
loyalties which is incompatible with what Robinson describes as: "Countries of large
area and small population, or even of rather large populations concentrated in widely
scattered areas, which are obviously 'suitable' for this kind of system." 12 According
to Robinson, New Zealand, for example, is unsuitable for federalism because the
qualifications of the population distribution and the large land area are both absent.
However, the past few decades have seen the formation of number of small federal
states. For example, the Comoros (1,860 km2), St. Kitts-Nevis (270 km2) and the
United Arab Emirates (77,700 2) each became united in one federal country even
though the area of each of these countries is relatively small.
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Federalism can be interesting to the social geographer in examining the phenomena
of social integration and diversity. It may also be of interest to an economic
geographer engaged in the study of distribution of the federal budget to local units.
Yet federalism is primarily interesting to a political scientist, whose study is focused
on. factors which arise from a federated state, analysing its relationship with area,
population, territorial questions and its federal boundaries as a new nation of today.
A political geographer also studies territories containing different cultural groups,
which the federal constitution helps to bind together whilst allowing them to remain
apart.
These points are illustrated below by means of case study material. In general, all
modem federal states owe something to the United States Constitution of 1787 when
the 13 original states found themselves with more common interests to unite them
than conflicting ideas to divide them. A federation emerged, and the United States
today consists of 50 states which exercise a measure of internal self-government.
However, defence, foreign affairs, the higher levels of justice, and internal security
are the responsibility of the federal government. 13 After the U.S. constitution, other
states emerged as a political federal system notably Canada in 1867, Australia in 1901,
and post Second World War West Germany. Consequently, these older federations
were frequently selected as models to be followed in the search for political and
economic success.
2.1.4 The viability of federations
A common feature of all existing federal states is that they have been seen as viable
federations. When a federation is no longer viable, it breaks up. In the three years
1990-1992, three European or part-European federations collapsed: the Soviet
Union (U.S.S.R.), Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia. These three federations had been
to a greater, or in the case of Yugoslavia lesser, extent within the ambit of the Soviet
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Union's geo-political hegemony. Table 2.1 gives details of federations around the
world in 1989, just prior to the political earthquakes in central and eastern Europe.
Table 2.1: Federal States in 1989
uild	 Area	 World	 Number of
iiking	 km2	 r4nking	 federal units
Pon	 iArea
1	 .Arrnimi	 31.20	 28	 2,780,092	 8	 22
2	 AuraIi.i	 15.76	 48	 7,686,848	 6	 6
3	 AutrLi	 7.55	 73	 83,853	 109	 9
4	 Brai.iI	 143.30	 6	 8,511,965	 5	 23
	
25.63	 31	 9,976,139	 2	 10
r s	 -	 0.47	 147	 2,236	 160	 3
7	 *c .Ii .1uvzikia	 15.50	 50	 127,899	 93	 2
8	 *West Geinunv	 60.73	 12	 248,229	 73	 10
9	 India	 785.00	 2	 3,287,590	 7	 25
10 Malaysia	 15.82	 49	 329,749	 60	 13
11 Mexico	 81.70	 11	 1,972,546	 14	 31
12 Nigeria	 105.45	 9	 923,768	 31	 19
13 Paki'.Ln	 101.90	 10	 803,942	 35	 4
14 SLKILLS-Nevis	 0.04	 163	 49,000	 163	 2
	
_____	
280.00	 3	 22,274,90	 1	 15
16 SwitzrLiiid	 6.47	 80	 41,293	 121	 26
17 U.AE.	 1.60	 127	 77,700	 110	 7
18 U.S.A.	 241.00	 4	 9,372,614	 4	 50
19 VeneiiiJa	 17.80	 43	 912,050	 32	 20
20	 Yugoslavia'	 23.20	 32	 255,804	 72	 6
*These federal states no longer exist
1 As of 1993, The name 'Yugoslavia' is officially applied to a federation of two states: Serbia and
Montenegro, with a combined population of 10,400,000.
Source: Political Systems of the World, Chambers, 1989. pp.18-22.
On 3 October 1990, the German Democratic Republic was united with the Federal
Republic of Germany. The following year, Czechoslovakia began to dissolve as a
federation, and on 1 January 1993 two new independent states were born: the Czech
Republic and the Slovak Republic.
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In August 1991, the greatest political collapse imaginable occurred: the Soviet Union
(Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) dissolved into 15 separate sovereign states. On
21 December 1991, the former Russian Federated Socialist Republic (the core of the
Soviet Union, stretching from the Baltic to the Bering Strait) was renamed the
Russian Federation, and became a member of the Commonwealth of Independent
States (C.I.S.), which was an attempt by most of the 15 former Soviet states to retain
a measure of economic co-operation.
The death of Yugoslavia's long-standing leader, General Tito, prefigured and
precipitated, albeit ten years later, the death of the European federal state of
Yugoslavia (Table 2.2). Whilst the dissolution in itself may prove to be less significant
historically than the collapse of the Soviet Union, its effect on the United Nations
makes it geo-politically potentially catastrophic. Six federated states diminished to
two: Serbia and Montenegro. Between September and December 1991, Croatia,
Slovenia, Bosnia-Hercegovina and Macedonia, all resigned from the former
federation. The new, diminished, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, was declared on
27 April 1992. Its borders remain provisional. In the meantime, two of the newly
independent states, Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina, have formed a
confederation.'14
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Table 2.2 The Former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (1991)
Sources: Serbia: The Europa World Year Book 1993, Vol.11, 1993, p3232; Croatia: Ibid, p.861; Bosnia-
Hercegovina: Ibid, p.556; Macedonia: thid, p.3250; Slovenia: Thid, p.2539; Montenegro: Ibid, p.3232.
Whilst viability may be a function of some political processes, there is no one political
system from which federations naturally or more successfully spring. Whilst the
U.S.A., Canada and Switzerland are western democracies, political power in the
U.A.E. and Malaysia is much more concentrated. The short-lived C.I.S. operated
from a different basis again. Economically, federations exist in a variety of
circumstances. Whilst the U.S.A., Canada and Switzerland are rich western nations,
many federations, such as India, Pakistan and Mexico are poor Third World
(economically developing) countries.
An ongoing factor relating to the viability of a federal state is whether the federation
continues to serve the purpose for which it was formed. In the case of the collapse of
the Soviet Union and its satellite countries, the thawing of the Cold War, and
therefore the removal of military threat, broke the bond which had maintained those
federations since and before the Second World War. In the case of the U.A.E., the
military threats remain.
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2.1.5 Other failed federations
Some federations have been proposed resulting from the breakup of empires,
federation being seen as a way of managing or solving many different problems. For
example, a united, independent Maghreb was proposed by some Arab nationalist
leaders in the early 1950s, to be composed of Morocco, Tangier, Algeria, Tunisia and
Libya. However, many differences of opinion arose among them. France granted
independence to Morocco and Tunisia in 1956, and Tangier joined Morocco. After a
long, bloody war between France and the Algerian F.L.N., the latter won
independence in 1962, and the chance for federation was lost. Another example
of a proposed federation that failed was in East Africa. Since the 1920s, the British
territories of Kenya, Uganda, and Tanganyika had been co-operating and governed
in increasingly close association and the movement toward a federation was growing.
Ordinary people, however, had little enthusiasm for federation, which was echoed by
their black African leaders. Then Tanganyika won independence in 1961, followed
by Uganda in 1962. Kenya became an independent state in December 1963.(16)
Another four federations were promoted by Britain: the West Indies, Central Africa,
South Arabia, and Malaysia. The first three of these failed to come to fruition.
Malaysia alone succeeded, and even then failed to incorporate Singapore. The West
Indies and Central Africa federal proposals disintegrated before independence, and
each unit went its own way toward independence. Civil war broke Out in Aden and
southern Arabia. In 1958, Egypt and Syria, followed by North Yemen, joined to form
what was called the United Arab Republic, but after an unhappy marriage they were
divorced in 1961. Indonesia's federal period lasted less than 8 months after
independence, ending in August 1950. During 1989-91, the solid rock of the Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics was shattered, the underlying reason being economic
collapse, although President Gorbachev's political policies are generally seen as
facilitating the events which precipitated these changes. 17 Yugoslavia similarly
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disintegrated at the same time and for similar economic reasons.(' 8) (for former
Yugoslavia, see Table 2.2).
At the beginning of 1990, twenty states in the world had federal constitutions. As with
most other aspects of political systems, history, geography and culture are the
strongest factors behind the choice of a federal structure. It is for this reason that,
despite their small numbers, forty per cent of the world's population lived in states
with federal constitutions. However, by the beginning of 1994, the number of federal
states had shrunk to seventeen, listed in Table 2.1, which also gives details of
population, area and the number of federated units.
2.2 The Federal System of the United Arab Emirates
A contemporary example of a state created with a federal system is the United Arab
Emirates, which was formed of six Gulf Emirates in December 1971, and shortly
joined by a seventh (Table 2.3). Since then, only two tiny countries have emerged with
a federal government: the Comoros in 1975, and St. Kitts-Nevis in 1983.
Table 2.3: Area and Population of the UA.E., 1991
Source: The Middle East and North Africa 1993,39th edition, 1993, p.933.
The purposes of this section are to examine the experience of the working of
federalism in the United Arab Emirates; to compare the U.A.E. experience with that
in some other federal states; and to evaluate the success or failure of the federal
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system in dealing with the economic and social diversities in those states. The
establishment of the United Arab Emirates as a federal government is explored in
detail in Chapter 3, section four.
After three years of discussion, the governments of various Emirates agreed to
establish the new federal government as a union of their respective Emirates. Initially,
at independence on 2 December 1971, there were six Emirates, namely: Abu Dhabi,
Dubai, Shaijah, Ajman, Umm al-Quwain and Fujairah. In the same year the United
Arab Emirates became a new member of both the Arab League and the United
Nations.'9
 On 10 February 1972 a seventh Emirate joined the federation: Ras
al-Khaimah. 20 The union thus consists of the seven Arab shaikhdoms formerly
known as the Trucial States. Although a federal state requires a federal capital, the
case of the U.A.E. is a little different, as mentioned in Article 9 of the U.A.E.
provisional Constitution:'21
"The capital of the union shall be established in an area allotted to the union
by the emirates ofAbu Dhabi and Dubai on the borders between them and
it shall be given the name 'Al-Karwna'. There shall be allocated in the budget
for the first year the amount necessaiy to cover the erpenses of technical
studies and planning for the construction of the capital. However,
construction work shall begin as soon as possible and shall be completed in
not more than seven yearsfrom the date ofentiy into force of this constitution.
Until the construction of the union is complete, Abu Dhabi shall be
provisional headquarters of the union."
A general comment about the above article is that the federal capital of the U.A.E.
is Abu Dhabi, in the westernmost Emirate and the largest member in the union, and
the richest oil producter since the establishment of the federation on 2 December
1971 to the present day. Construction of Al-Karama as the federal capital is still not
underway on the site mentioned in the constitution. East and Prescott comment that,
to avoid friction and internal jealousies, it is important that the federal government
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chooses as capital territory a free, convenient, and above all 'neutral', site to be a
token of political unity and a centre which can play a significant role in unifying the
state. The failure to construct this important symbol of federation is a measure of
the pervading lack of motivation regarding the development of federal (as distinct
from local) projects which the U.A.E. has experienced.
To examine the ideas above more deeply, several federal states will be targetted. The
choice of site for the capital city constitutes a clear political statement. Washington
D.C. and Canberra were built on neutral ground, whilst Ottawa, the capital of Canada
was built at the interface between the English and French speaking regions. Another
example, Brasilia, the capital of Brazil, was built within a newly established federal
district, the site of which was chosen to avoid the two dominating cities of Rio de
Janeiro and Sao Paulo, to establish the economic development of the interior. After
the Second World War, the choice of capital of the Federal Republic of Germany
was Bonn, a small and relatively unimportant university town. Canberra lies in one
of two enclaves of federal territory known as the Australian Capital Territory. The
capital itself is not a member state of the federation. The same rule applies to other
federal countries such as India with its capital New Delhi, Malaysia's capital Kuala
Lumpur, and similarly, if less strongly, for Mexico, Argentina and Venezuela.
It can be concluded from the foregoing that Abu Dhabi as the federal capital of the United
Arab Emirates and the most powerful Emirate in the union, is unusual, although not
unique: Belgrade, capital of the former Yugoslavia, had long been capital of Serbia.
However, most federal countries choose their capital city to be separate from any other
political unit in order to avoid problems. The UAE. would benefit were the decision to
implement the article which stipulates that the federal capital of the union should be
established on the border between Abu Dhabi and Dubai to be taken. The benefit would
be significant for UAE. citizens, in that the distance to the capital city from any other
part of the UAE. would be shortened, especially from the northern Emirates. A great
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many people work in the federal ministries of the U.A.E. in Abu Dhabi and in the oil
companies which are situated in the federal capital (even though some of them are
staff in the maritime oil field which belongs to the Emirate of Abu Dhabi).
2.2.1 The Federal Government of the U.A.E.
The chief organs of the federal government (see Figure 2.1) are:
a. The Federal Supreme Council.
b. The President of the Union and a Vice-President.
c. The Federal Council of Ministers.
d. The Federal National Assembly.
e. The Federal Judiciary.
a.	 The Supreme Council
The highest federal authority is the Supreme Council of the Union (SCU). It consists
of all the rulers, or their deputies, of the member Emirates. Decisions of the SCU
require the presence of at least five of its seven members, including the rulers of both
Abu Dhabi and Dubai. It has the power to decide policy, elect the president and his
deputy, admit new members to the federation and appoint the prime minister and the
judges of the Federal Supreme Court. It also ratifies all federal laws, although the
president has the right to approve and fulfill themP The SCU seldom meets more
than once a year, but the rulers often meet informally on a more regular basis. Each
Emirate has one vote in the council. Decisions by the SCU must be approved by a
majority of five out of seven. The SCU has the final decision in all matters concerning
the union's general policies, the ratification of international treaties, agreements and
the declaration of war. The SCU plans the general policy of the Union, and approves
all federal laws including the general annual budget. The SCU is the fundamental
body of the federal structure, supervising all union affairs, internal and externalP
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Figure 2.1	 THE FEDERAL STRUCTURE OF THE U.A.E.
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b. The President
The President of the Union and his Deputy are both elected by the SCU for a period
of five years, subject to renewal. Since the foundation of the federation in December
1971, the president of the U.A.E. has been H.H. Shaikh Zayed bin Sultan
A1-Nehayyan, who is the ruler of the Emirate of Abu Dhabi. Thanks largely to him,
the U.A.E. federation has survived for 22 years: according to Kelly he was, and
remains, the moving force behind the federation. Shaikh Zayed has from the start
been the most dedicated champion of the federation, a dedication which has been
resisted by Dubai and Ras al-Khaimah, and interpreted by the other rulers as
indicative not so much of a federal spirit but of Shaikh Zayed's recognition that Abu
Dhabi has the most to gain from federatiouP
The President represents the federal union both domestically and internationally, and
it is the President who signs and issues all federal laws. In addition, the President
appoints the Prime Minister of the federal government. The head of state also acts
as commander-in-chief of the armed forces. 2'7 Further, he appoints the president and
member-judges of the Supreme Court.
c. The Council of Ministers
The Council of Ministers is in a better position then the Supreme Council to benefit
the union, especially in the sector of social services. The Council of Ministers consists
of the following portfolios:
a. Foreign affairs.
b. Federal defence and the armed forces.
c. Protection of the Union's security.
d. Drafting federal laws.
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e. Annual general budget and the final accounts.
f. Affairs of federal employees and the federal judiciary.
g. Federal nationality, passports, residence permits and immigration.
h. Communication services: postal, telegraph, telephone and radio services.
i. Education and universities.
j. Public health and medical services.
k. Electricity services.
1.	 Air traffic control.
m. Union finance and Union taxes, duties and fees.
n. Union Information.
At the beginning of every financial year the Council of Ministers shall
"Submit to the President of the Union for presentation to the Supreme
Council a detailed statement of internal achievements, the union's relations
with other states and international organizations, accompanied by the
Cabinet's recommendations on the best method to consolidate the union."
In the U.A.E. it has become accepted practice that the President, Deputy Prime
Minister and Ministers of the Interior, Foreign Affairs and Information are from Abu
Dhabi, whilst the Vice-President, the Prime Minister, and Ministers of Finance and
Defence are from Dubai. However, the Provisional Constitution does not specify
from which Emirate federal ministers should be drawn. In 1971 the ministries of
foreign affairs, interior and information were allocated to Abu Dhabi; and the
ministries of defence, finance and economy and industry to Dubai. Alongside this
federal government, each Emirate runs its own civil service which takes the form of
departments attached to the Ruler's office. For example, the Emirate of Abu Dhabi
has a 16 member formal executive council made up of its heads of government
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departments most of whom are members of the Al-Nahhayyan ruling family and other
families allied to them such as the Al-Suwaidi. Abu Dhabi also has its own national
consultative council and created the Abu Dhabi Supreme Petroleum Council outside
the federal oil ministry. The oil affairs of the Emirate of Dubai are controlled directly
by the ruler of Dubai's office, and are not under the authority of the federal oil
ministry. These local departments illustrate the point that the Emirates place greater
emphasis on federal co-ordination in areas such as education and health, but in the
fields of sovereignty, natural resources, defence and internal security, they remain
independent of federal authority. For example, the Emirate of Dubai has its own
defence force, police force, and oil affairs ministry outside the federal oil ministry
(which therefore places it outside the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
[OPEC]), and its own independent health department.
In fact, under the U.A.E. federal constitution, each of the seven member Emirates
retains total responsibility in respect of its own oil affairs. Oil policy, therefore,
remains in the hands of the individual Emirate. Only three Emirates export significant
quantities of oil. In order of volume, these are Abu Dhabi, Dubai and Sharjah. This
means that the (federal) Minister for Petroleum and Mineral Resources has little
power, and his principal function often appears to be to represent the federation at
meetings of international oil organisations, such as OPEC. The lack of control and
authority are likely to have been what prompted the minister, Yousef Omair bin
Yousef, to resign on 18 February 1994.(29) This is the first time since the establishment
of the federation that a federal government minister has chosen to resign.
d.	 The Federal National Assembly (or Council)
The U.A.E. parliament, established on 13 February 1972, is known as the Federal
National Council. The total membership of this body (appointed by the ruling body
in each Emirate) is fixed at 40 seats, allocated between the Emirates as follows: eight
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seats each for Abu Dhabi and Dubai; six seats each for Sharjab and Ras al-Khaimah;
and four seats each for Ajman, Umm al-Quwain and Fujairah. Whilst this
parliamentary distribution loosely reflects approximate ranking of the Emirates, in
terms of population and economic strength, it weights representation heavily in
favour of the smaller, weaker Emirates. This weighting may explain why the powers
of the Assembly are limited, and its role confined to consultation and making
recommendations.
e.	 The Federal Supreme Court
The Judiciary is the fifth pillar of government in a federal state. Article 94 of the
Provisional Constitution of the U.A.E. stipulates
"Justice is the basis of rule. In performing their duties judges shall be
independent and not subject to influence except by the Law and their
conscience. ,,(30)
The federal judiciary consist of a Supreme Court and a number of federal Courts.
These courts deal with federal bodies and Union affairs. The federal Supreme Court
is the highest judicial authority in the Union. It is made up of five judges who, on
formal request adjudicate disputes on the constitutionality of federal laws, between
individual Emirates in the Union and the federal government or between
Emirates. 31 Such disputes can relate to internal boundaries between one Emirate
and another, as happened between the Emirates of Dubai and Sharjah in 1980s. The
four justices are led by a President who is appointed by the President of the federal
Union, arid approved of by the SCU.
The seven member Emirates of the federation are extremely different in terms of
their territorial size, populations and material resources. 32 The most privileged of
the Emirates are Abu Dhabi and Dubai, by virtue of their relatively large areas and
financial resources. Abu Dhabi and Dubai, the most powerful of the seven states,
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came together as a result of the joint wisdom of their rulers, Shaikh Zayed Bin Sultan
Al Nahayan and Shaikh Rashid Bin Said Al Maktum. It is not unimportant that the
families of both rulers originated from the same basic tribal group, the Barn Yas,
whereas the rulers of the other Emirates belong to different tribal network. Tribal
affiliations remain strong in this balance of power.
A major weakness of the federal system in the U.A.E. is that the central government
does not have sufficient independent financial resources and must therefore depend
on contributions from the richest and largest of the seven Emirates, namely Abu
Dhabi and Dubai. These two Emirates control the two major sources of income:
mineral resources (largely oil) and trade. As a result, the main executive and
legislative powers in the federal government are concentrated into the hands of Abu
Dhabi and Dubai. These two Emirates control the resources on which the federation
survives, and both Abu Dhabi and Dubai have pledged to contribute 50 per cent of
their revenues from petroleum to the federal budget. However, in practice only Abu
Dhabi does this. Dubai justifies not doing so on the grounds that it directly finances
many projects in Umm al- Quwain, Ras al-Khaimah and Fujairah.
There are, as in any federal state, strong competitive tendencies at work in the union's
projects. The fundamental reason for the dissipation of socio-economic energy in the
U.A.E. is the absence of a strategic master plan even to approach dealing with the
structural characteristics of the state's economy, and its social, political, and
geographical attributes. The absence of an overall strategy has resulted in various
examples which demonstrate the weakness of planning in the U.A.E.. For example,
each Emirate had a cement plant, and between 1973 and 1979, five international
airports were built, for Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah, Ras al-Khaimah, and Fujairah.33
A further international airport, scheduled to open in 1994, is currently under
construction at Al Ain? Several high-capacity seaports were established along only
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600 km of western coastline in Abu Dhabi (Zayed port), in Dubai (Rashid and Jabal
Au ports), in Sharjah and in Ras al-Kliaimah. Two seaports were built on the east
coast not more than 100 km apart: one in Khur Fakkan and the other in Fujairah. This
unco-ordinated distribution reflects the evident weakness of central government, and
how the individual ruler of each Emirate can prepare an economic plan for his own
Emirate by generating a kind of competition between them in development projects.
The situation perpetuates serious fragmentation, and it is unlikely to change until the
nature of relations between the federal authority and the individual Emirates is first
changed. Moreover, the weakness of the federal administration on the Union can be
obvious through federal services provided by the federal government, such as
electricity and water. These services were provided by the federal ministry only to
Ajman and Umm al-Quwain. Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Shaijah, Ras al-Khaimah and
Fujairah cities maintained their own independent systems.
It can be concluded from the foregoing that these structural weaknesses reflect the
superiority of the local government of some Emirates over the federal government.
A further example is the Ministry of Petroleum and Mineral Resources which acts in
respect only of Abu Dhabi's resources. Dubai and Sharjah are completely
autonomous in their petroleum policies, and the other four Emirates are not oil
producers.
Another symbol of the weakness of federal authority is the flying of individual flags.
According to Article 5 of the Provisional Constitution:
"The union shall have a Fla& an Emblem and a NationalAnthem. The flag
and the Emblem shall be prescribed by Law. Each Emirate shall retain its
own flag for use within its territories".
The constitution thus authorizes each Emirate to runup its local flag. This local loyalty
exists in local departments of police, public security, justice, and communications and
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radio and television stations in the Emirates of Dubai and Ras al-Khaimah. The
Sharjah flag was abolished by the Ruler of Sharjah, and replaced by the union flag to
demonstrate his commitment to the federal cause. The Emirates of Abu Dhabi, the
federal capital of the state, Ajman, Umm al-Quwain, and Fujairah followed suit.
However, Dubai and Ras al-Khaimah still run up their local flags alongside the federal
or the Union flag on buildings of non-federal departments, such as local health
services departments, sport clubs, local municipalities and police stations. To
facilitate further integration, this Article could be amended to require Emirates to
run up the federal flag alone. This kind of amendment can be made very easily,
because of the flexibility of the still-provisional constitution.
2.2.2 Obstacles and dangers facing the federal system of the U.A.E.
The federal system of the U.A.E. faces a number of obstacles and dangers: the struggle
for power within Emirates, the assertion of tribalism, different visions of Federation,
and the tension between the autonomy of the Emirates against the authority of the
Federation.
2.2.2.1 Struggle for power within Emirates
The struggle for power within the Emirates was more obvious prior to 1971. Several
Trucial States rulers had come to power by deposing or assassinating their
predecessors. 37
 The present ruler of Ras al-Khairnah, for example, deposed his uncle
Shaikh Sultan Bin Salim in 1948. Shaikh Shakbout ruled Abu Dhabi from 1928 to
1966. He was, however, unwilling to use oil revenues for modernisation and
development. He was, therefore, peacefully removed and replaced by his brother,
Shaikh Zayed Bin Sultan, who has been ruler of Abu Dhabi ever since, and President
of the U.A.E. since 1971.
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Unlike in some other Gulf states, transfer of power takes place using the principle of
male primogeniture: the Shaikh must designate his eldest son to succeed him. If the
eldest son is too young to assume the reins of power, a regent is appointed to act as a
deputy ruler.
Subsequent to 1971, the same intra-family rivalries have persisted, and indeed have
blown up into inter-Emirate rivalries. The most recent example of this was on 17 June
1987 when Shaikh Abdul Aziz al-Qasemi, commander of Shaijah's armed forces, led
a coup against the ruler, his brother, Shaikh Sultan al-Qasemi. Shaikh Abdul Aziz
al-Qasemi announced through the official U.A.E. news agency (WAM), which is
controlled by Abu Dhabi, that his brother was abdicating at the request of his family,
having mismanaged the Emirate's economy. However, the ruling family of Dubai took
a different view. In a statement, they insisted that Shaikh Sultan was the legitimate
ruler, and asked the Federal Government to "correct the situation and restore
legitimacy." The Federal Government responded: "Security of the Federation is
indivisible, and the basic procedure of succession is of concern to all [Emirates]. The
situation should be handled with decisiveness and flrmness." On 21 June 1987 the
U.A.E. Supreme Council reinstated Shaikh Sultan as ruler, and Shaikh Abdul Aziz
was appointed Crown Prince. 39 Shaikh Sultan was seen as possibly the most 'liberal'
of the seven ruling shaikhs, which did not best please Abu Dhabi, which preferred to
see a stronger ruler, and thus supported Abdul Aziz.° Dubai's support for Shaikh
Sultan strengthened because of the boundary agreement between Dubai and Sharjah,
which had been settled in April 1985 by H.H. Shaikh Sultan bin Mohammed
al-Qasemi and H.H. Shaikh Maktum bin Rashid al-Maktum.
From Sharjah's coup, it can be seen how the integration and stability of the union can
be affected by dynastic rivalries. It can also be seen that Abu Dhabi and Dubai took
different attitudes towards the coup: Abu Dhabi supported Abdul Aziz, and it was
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Abu Dhabi which permitted the transmission of Abdul Aziz's broadcast; Dubai
supported Sultan, and insisted on his rights as a ruler. This difference in response and
perception could easily be exploited by unfriendly countries. Moreover, the lack of
political stability revealed by the coup, and the difference of opinion between Abu
Dhabi and Dubai could act as an enticement for unfriendly countries to intervene in
the internal affairs of the U.A.E.. This is the spectre which faced the Supreme Council,
threatening the integration of the U.AE. as a whole. While the international military
threat to the U.A.E. remains strong, then the U.A.E. Supreme Council has little
choice but to agree a common policy on ruling internal affairs.
2.2.2.2 Assertion of tribalism
Tribes were the basic political unit of traditional society in the Trucial States, as
throughout the entire Arabian Peninsula. The interposition of British political
officers, and the diplomacy of the British political agents in the lower Gulf in the
nineteenth century to control conflicts, failed to prevent tribal clashes occurring. Even
after independence in 1971, inter-tribal conflict has occurred, although fixed internal
boundaries have now replaced the traditional dirah (a term explored in detail below)
on which tribal loyalties were based.
By the 1980s about 85 percent of the Bedouin people of the Arabian Peninsula had
been settled, 41
 although this assault on a long-standing cultural lifestyle and identity
has not expunged the tribal system from the U.A.E.. Bedouin people represent
between 5 and 15 percent of the legal population of each Emirate. 42
 Modernisation
of the economy has not resulted in the departure of tribal ways of thinking. 43 Beneath
the veneer of the modern state and its concommitant environmental changes, the lives
of the people and their social attitudes remain tribal.
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Although the world regards the U.A.E. as a federal state, effective political authority
in each Emirate lies with the respective ruling families, who are, by definition, part
of the most powerful elite within the dominant tribal group in each Emirate.
Tribalism is a principal factor slowing down the process of settling internal U.A.E.
boundary disputes. It has been one of the main causes of political friction in the region
(Trucial Oman), and the cause of many wars. Rather than identify themselves as
Emirati, many Bedouin and other tribal people in the U.A.E. identify themselves as
Amri (of the Awamir tribe) or Mansoori (of the Manasir tribe). Similarly, people
from Abu Dhabi, Dubai and Umm al-Quwain identify themselves respectively as
Dhabiani, Dabawi and Quwaini, rather than Emarati.
Abu Dhabi has the greatest number of tribal groups, and had a private National
Consultative Council of fifty members appointed by the ruler, Shaikh Zayed Bin
Sultan Al-Nahayyan. The fifty members were divided between the four Abu Dhabi
tribes: Dhwahir, Awamir, Manasir and Remaithat.
One of the ways in which tribalism is a serious obstacle to the strengthening of the
federation is that tribal loyalty is to a ruler as a person: the tribal shaikh. In modern
times the tribal shaikh has also become the ruler over a tract of land, and that land
has become joined in federation with the land of other tribal shaikhs. However, tribal
loyalty has not been transferred away from loyalty to the ruler to a tract of land, to
land joined in federation, or to the abstract concept of a political federation. Tribal
loyalty remains faithful to the tribal shaikh, and this, through the concept of communal
tribal land ownership, is fundamental to the whole issue of internal boundaries within
the U.A.E..
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2.2.2.3 Different visions of Federation
Most of the seven Emirates have their own unique view of federation. Abu Dhabi is
strongly unitarist, wanting to be as integrated and unitary a federal state as possible.
Dubai and Ras al-Khaimah take a local separatist position. Accordingly, Shaikh
Zayed of Abu Dhabi, who is also the President of the Federation, makes affirmative
statements about a strong federation, whereas Shaikh Rashid Bin Said Al-Maktum,
ruler of Dubai from 1958 to 1990, desired a loose federation in which Dubai could
enjoy a high degree of autonomy. This difference was described by a Middle East
commentator:
"Shaikh Rashid was content to concentrate on his phenomenally successful
business enterprises, and leave the conduct of the U.A.E. 'sforeign affairs to
Shaikh Zayed, who represented a strong collective U.A.E. personality to the
outside world ii(44)
"Shaikh Rashid was an Arab tribal Shaikh who happened to be a business
genius, and he was quite content to allow Abu Dhabi to conduct the foreign
policy of the U.A.E., provided he could continue to pursue his own interest
of making Dubai a major financial and trading centre.'45
The Emirate of Ras al-Khaimah has traditionally taken an independent view, and,
significantly, was the last Emirate to join the Federation, albeit only two months later,
on 10 February 1972 (see Chapter 3).
These differences between Emirates are illustrated in the following:
"Characteristically, owing to their conflicting territorial claims, they have had
poor relations with their immediate neighbors [sic], and good relations with
the ruler just beyond This leapfrog patteFn of good and bad relations has
resulted in a sense of mutual animosity penneating both sides of nearlty eveiy
frontier within the U.A.A. [sic] down to the present day. In tenns of
intra-regional political alignments, this pattern tends to put Abu Dhabi,
Sharjah, Umm al-Qaywayn [sic] and Fujayrah [sic] in one group, and
Dubay [sic], Ajman and Ra's al-Khaymah [sic] in another."
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In Chapter 6, it will be shown how the boundary dispute between Dubai and Sharjah
ran into settlement difficulties when Dubai refused to refer the dispute to the Federal
Supreme Court, and was only settled on the signing of a border agreement in April
1985. The relationship between Dubai and Sharjah improved first when Shaikh
Maktum, the eldest son of Dubai's ruler, took full charge of the Emirate's affairs, and
then in June 1987 when Dubai supported Shaikh Sultan during the attempted coup,
rather than his brother, Shaikh Abdul Aziz. Shaikh Maktum was Crown Prince of
Dubai until the death of his father in 1990, at which point he became ruler of Dubai,
and both Vice-President and Prime Minister of the U.A.E..
The boundary dispute between Ras al-Khaimali and Fujairah remains unresolved due
to the cool relations between the ruler of Ras al-Khaimah and the ruler of Fujairah.
The ruler of Ras al-Kliaimah, who has ruled since 1948, remains proud of his family
history, and still considers that Fujairah is part of Qawasim territory, of whom he is
the tribal leader (see Chapters 3 and 7).
2.2.2.4 Tension between the Emirates and the Federal Government
There is tension between the Emirates (the local level) and the Federal Government
(the centre).
Article 127 of the Provisional Constitution stipulates:
"The member Emirates of the Union shall contribute a specz:fied proportion
of their annual revenues to cover the annual general budget expenditure of
the Union ...
However, Abu Dliabi contributes the lion's share of this: 98 percent of the U.A.E.
annual budget. 4 The main reason given why Dubai contributes less than one per
cent of the federal budget is that the Dubai government, which is not under Federal
Government jurisdiction, pays for most of Dubai's domestic budget. In contrast to
the other Emirates, Dubai's military, police force, health department, etc., are paid
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for by the Dubai government. This degree of financial autonomy draws comparisons
between Dubai and Singapore, which left the Malaysian Federation.
The oil companies in Abu Dhabi are under the authority of the Federal Ministry of
Petroleum (which is a member of O.P.E.C.). However, this Federal Ministry has no
power or authority over the oil affairs of the other oil-rich Emirates: Dubai, Shaijah
and Ras al-Khaimah. These latter Emirates operate outside O.P.E.C., selling their
oil on the open market.
2.3 Comparison between the U.A.E. and other federal states
The aim of this section is to identify and examine the respects in which the United
Arab Emirates as a federal state differs from several selected contemporary federal
states, such as the United States, Canada, Malaysia and India (see Figure 2.1).
The United Arab Emirates is a unique example of a federation from two broad
viewpoints: (a) the background of the Union and the experience of the region in which
the Union took its shape; (b) the characteristics of the Union which contains the
nature of the federation and the political nature of its existence.
According to educational method programmes in the U.A.E. schools illustrate the
loyalties to the Union or to the Federation, and not to the individual Emirate.
However, the socio-political environment of the U.A.E. is the traditional tribal life
that depends on several groups of tribes with traditional leaders. The head of the tribe
could be the elder, and the tribal confederation is provided by the ruling family
deriving from tribal loyalty. The loyalty of a tribesman extends from the family to the
tribe, and only then to the state. The important point here is that a tribesman's loyalty
to the state is accorded to the ruler as a person, not to the state as territory. During
the eighteenth century the tribal influence stretched along the Gulf coast, establishing
new ways of life involving new models of economic activity such as fishing and
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pearling, as well as involvement in agriculture. Afterwards, a number of city states
emerged along tribal lines. Next, the discoveiy and exploitation of oil in the area gave
the greatest motivation for the development of the region claimed by each tribe.
Tribalism is a fact of life in Eastern Arabia, and particularly in the United Arab
Emirates. In this respect, the U.A.E. differs from the other federal states around the
world. The tribal nature of U.A.E. society is examined in detail in Chapter 3.
Another distinguishing feature between some federal states and the U.A.E. as a
federal state, is the role of political parties as an element of federal structure. The
party structure of the political system in the United States incorporates two parties;
in the former Czechoslovakia, one party; in the former Yugoslavia, one party;
Malaysia and Pakistan are tentatively multi-party states. In several small federal states
the picture is the same. The Comoros Islands is made up of three islands; its political
structure is federal with one political party. St. Kitts and Nevis is a federal state of two
islands in which two parties operate. However, in the U.A.E. there are no political
parties, and the highest authority is the Supreme Council of Rulers which includes
the Shaikhs of all the Emirates.
A third dissimilarity between the U.A.E. and other federal states is its size. A majority
of federal states occupy large areas. In contrast, as shown in Table 2.3, the total area
of the United Arab Emirates is a mere 77,700 km2, and the largest state of the Union
is Abu Dhabi (67,350 km2). The largest federal state in Australia is Western Australia
occupying 2,525,500 km2 India occupies a total area 3,287,263 km 2, in which the
largest federal unit is Madhya Pradesh the area of which is 443,446 km2. The total
area of Canada is 9,215,430 km2, the largest Province of which is Quebec: 1,356,790
km2 The former Yugoslavia occupied an area 255,804 km2, the largest republic of
which was Serbia 88,361 km2. Malaysia occupies an area of 329,758 km2, the largest
federal state of which is Sarawak the area of which is 124,449 km2, twice the area of
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Abu Dhabi, and larger even than the total area of the U.A.E.. For a federation, the
U.A.E. is thus small in population, and in area.
Every federal state is unique, and differs from other federal states in a variety of ways:
the number of units, the size and area of each unit, socio-cultural factors such as
demography, economic factors such as the natural resources and productive wealth
of each unit. It is possible, however, to recognise that some federal states are not so
dissimilar to others. The federal state possibly most similar to the U.A.E. is Malaysia.
Malyasia is a federation of eleven states of peninsular Malaysia and the two states of
Sarawak and Sabali (Table 2.4). Formerly under British protection, the eleven states
were united as the Malayan Union in April 1946, transforming into the Federation
of Malaya in February 1948. Malaysia was established on 16 September 1963. Less
than two years later, on 9 August 1965, Singapore seceded from the Federation
claiming irreconcilable differences with the Malaysian central government. As an
independent country, Singapore was admitted to the United Nations in September
1965, and in the following month became a member of the Commonwealth. There
are parallels between Singapore and both Qatar and Bahrain. The two Gulf states
were originally part of the process forming a federation of Gulf states. However, their
oil revenues allowed them to achieve independence from the other Gulf states and
not be tied into a federation which would limit their sovereignty. Neither Gulf state
has a land boundary with what became the U.A.E. (although the two countries have
disputed maritime boundaries). Whilst there are also parallels between Singapore
and Dubai, not least the reluctance of the Dubai government to see eye to eye with
the U.A.E. presidency, there are also differences. In spatial terms, Dubai is
contiguous with, and central to, much of the U.A.E., and this would make secession
for Dubai more problematic.
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In Malaysia, every five years, a supreme head of state is elected by the nine princely
rulers from among their own number. This situation is parallelled in the U.A.E. in
that overall authority is vested in the Supreme Council of the seven Emirate rulers
(each of whom is monarch in his own state), and the President and Vice-President
are elected by the Supreme Council from among its members. The U.A.E. Prime
Minister and Council of Ministers are appointed by the U.A.E. President. In Malaysia,
the head of state appoints a cabinet of ministers headed by a Prime Minister.
Table 2.4: Malaysia's States, Area and Population, 1993
Source: The Europa World Year Book 1993, Vol.11. 1993, p.1851.
The federal states of the U.A.E. and Malaysia share similar histories of formation.
They both experienced periods of British protection, having formerly been
self-governing.
On withdrawal of British protection, each of the Trucial Shaikhdoms and the
Malaysian states were too small to be forming independent political units alone: the
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total area of Ajman is a mere 250 km2; Umm al-Quwain, 750 km2; and Fujairab, 1150
Military threat has been a potent factor in the rise and maintenance of both federal
states. Malaya was granted independence within the Commonwealth on 31 August
1957, after the British departure from Malaya in the mid-1950s. Formerly, the eleven
states of Malaya under British protection were united as the Malayan Union in April
1946, and became the Malayan Federation in February 1948. It is not insignificant
that Singapore and Brunei opted out of the Malaysian Federation (as did Qatar and
Bahrain from the nascent U.A.E.), and that Sarawak and Sabah were taken in. For
the U.A.E., neighbouring Gulf states (e.g. Iran and Saudi Arabia) had shown their
ambitions regarding the Trucial Coast. Even after federation on 2 December 1971,
there remained regional claims with threatened the small Emirates (explored in detail
below).
The final section of this chapter provides detail regarding the life and development
of the Union in order to understand the background to its integrative nature.
Federalism is stronger in some countries than others. The strongest federal states are
arguably Australia, Canada, Switzerland and the United States, with India and
Germany following closely behind. The Mexican, Venezuelan and Argentinian
federal systems are weak and in many respects nominal. From Table 2.1 two points
can be concluded: the United Arab Emirates remains unique in the Arab world,
notwithstanding the 'official' line in several Arab states to move towards
union/federation (e.g. Yemen, Syria-Lebanon, U.A.R., Libya, et a!). Compared to
other federal states, the U.A.E. is amongst the world's smallest in terms of area and
population.
Chapter 2	 74
Table 2.5: Small Federal States, Area and Population
Source: The Europa World Year Book 1993, Vol.11. 1993.
More detailed comparisons are possible by comparing more detailed information
regarding a few federal states and their constituent parts. Data regarding population
and the area of the states' constituent units are compared between the United Arab
Emirates, the former Yugoslavia and Malaysia.
The total legal population of the U.A.E. was 1.6 million in 1985 (according to the
most recent official National Census), and 1,909,000 in 1991 (official estimate),
ranking the U.A.E. 125th in the world. In 1994, the total population of the U.A.E. has
been estimated at 2,083,000 (see Figure
Table 2.3 shows the population percentage of each Emirate. The diagram shows that the
population of Abu Dhabi is nearly double that of Dubai, the second Emirate. Indeed, the
population of Abu Dhabi is greater than the population of the five Emirates of Ajman,
Shaijah, Umm al-Quwain, Ras al-Khaimah and Fujairah put together. The population of
the Emirate of Umm al-Quwain is a mere two percent of the total population of the
U.A.E.. Such disparities are not unique in the federal world.
2.4 Some other federal countries
This section will briefly examine two functioning federal states, looking in general at some
differences between them, and focusing on common factors that are found in states
organised according to federal principles. On the basis of geographical and systematic
diversity, two federal systems are chosen for analysis: the U.S.A. and Switzerland.
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2.4.1 The United States of America (U.S.A.)
Most of the U.S.A. lies in the North American continent between Canada to the north
and Mexico to the south. Two additional states, Alaska to the west of Canada, and
Hawaii, in the central Pacific Ocean, bring the number of U.S. states to fifty, the area
of the U.S.A. to 9,373,000 km2 (ranking fourth in the world), and the population to
249,975,000 (ranking third in the world). Alaska is the largest state, with a total area
of 1,530,700 km2. The District of Columbia is a federal territory, with a total area of
178 km2 The state with the greatest population is California, with a total population
of 30,867,000. The state with the smallest population is Wyoming, with a total
population of 466,000.
Each of the existing fifty U.S. states has its own constitution, assembly and elected
Governor. There have been scores of boundary disputes between not only the U.S.A.
and its neighbours, but also between U.S. states. This has to do with the fact that much
U.S. territory was acquired over a long period of time by various means including
purchases, royal grants and annexation. The situation was exacerbated by the sparse
population, a dearth of information about the population, and because states retain
considerable sovereignty in territorial matters. Although most of these disputes have
been settled by negotiation, arbitration or by decision of the Supreme Court, some
persist todayP° (The U.S. is not unique in the Americas for protracted boundary
negotiations between federated states. In Brazil, where the federated states have less
sovereignty than in the U.S., a boundary dispute between Espirito Santo and Minas
Gerais was not settled until 1963, when the Governors of the two states signed a treaty
incorporating the suggestions of a joint commission.'51)
After 1787, the U.S. adopted a federal system because there was no practical
alternative. The country was too vast for the contemporary communication systems
to maintain as an indivisible political unit. Besides, the people had become too fond
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of state government to relinquish all to government by men far away. The federal
government took responsibility for defence, foreign affairs and the authority to
co-ordinate and regulate inter-state commerce. Even today, state governments
remain influential bodies, and there remain many legal differences between states.
2.4.2 Switzerland
The Swiss Confederation lies in central Europe, bounded to the north by Germany,
to the south by Italy, to the east by Austria and to the west by France. The Swiss
federation has deep historical roots, stretching back into the Middle Ages (1291). The
modem federation was set up under the 1848 constitution, in part to be economically
sufficiently viable to exploit the advantage of a central location in Europe, and in part
for self-protection from more powerful surrounding countries. (This latter was also
a principal motivation for the federation of the Trucial States into the U.A.E.. The
proximity and ambitions of the much more powerful states of Iran and Saudi Arabia
encouraged the Emirates' Shaikhs to bond themselves together.)
The largest canton in Switzerland is Bern, with a total area of 6,049 km2 and a
population of 952,595. The smallest canton is Basel-Stadt, with a total area of 37 km2.
The canton with the greatest population is Zurich, with a total population of
1,159,080. The canton with the smallest population is Innerhoden, with a total
population of 13,714 which to complicate matters, is legally a half canton.
Switzerland, with 26 cantons, is a shining example of a plural society that has welded
itself into a nation-state. There are four main languages: German, French, Italian and
Romansch. The religion is divided nearly equally between the two principal (and
historically antagonistic) Christian denominations: in 1980 50.4% of the population
were Protestants, and 43.6% were Roman Catholics. Despite these and other cultural
differences, Switzerland is not now a country of strife and divisions. The people of
the cantons, whilst celebrating their political and cultural independence from each
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other, also identify themselves as Swiss, and therefore as different from those who,
despite sharing a language or religious affiliation, live the other side of their
international boundaries.52
2.5 Conclusion
The only successful example of a federal country to date in the Arab world is the
United Arab Emirates. The Moslem world's tendency is to federate federal state
rulers (e.g. Shaikhs) rather than populations and their elected representatives (e.g.
U.S. Senators as distinct, perhaps, from U.S. State Governors), which is reflected in
the more successful Malaysian and the United Arab Emirates experiences as
compared with the less successful Pakistani effort. 53 The United Arab Emirates'
federal system, which primarily offers the Emirates a system of security, also offers
the U.A.E. citizens a wider choice of employment and a better quality of services.
Wealth in the U.A.E. is directly associated with the government which distributes the
benefits of oil to the people through various channels: projects for building houses,
schools, hospitals and a modern road network linking the Emirates with each other.
The federal government also runs all sorts of services in the main cities and in small
towns.
The most important features of the federal system of the United Arab Emirates have
been identified, and the comparative study has shown the characteristics of unity and
fragmentation. It may be further deduced from Tables 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3 that the
geographical elements of the United Arab Emirates differ markedly from most other
federal states, both in terms of area and of population. By elucidating the federal
structure of the United Arab Emirates, it has been possible to see the significance of
the political power which still plays a major role in the smaller units.
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The formation of the United Arab Emirates was made feasible by many factors such
as the history, geography, ethnic similarity, language, culture and religion shared by
all the people of the area. Its chief motivation was political expediency. It can only be
hoped that the Union will achieve its goals and improve on its existing achievements
of closer co-operation between the Emirates for their common benefit, promoting
progress in all fields. Success is not, however, guaranteed. The federation of the
U.A.E. is still young, it has a small population and a weak federal spirit (especially
seen in Dubai and Ras al-Khaimah). There are unsettled boundary disputes between
the Emirates of Ras al-Khaimah and Fujairah and their more powerful neighbours,
Saudi Arabia and Iran. There have been internal disputes between the ruling families
in the U.A.E., such as that between Shaikh Sultan of Sharjali and his brother Shaikh
Abdul-Aziz in 1987. This incident, between members of the ruling family of Sharjah,
elevated existing tensions between Abu Dhabi and Dubai, which to some degree
shocked the Union. The dispute was finally resolved initially by Dubai and then by
the Supreme Council. The U.A.E. needs to maintain its policy of keeping as many
friends as possible in the Gulf, and in the Arab world as a whole. The Union's
President, Shaikh Zayed, has played an important role in shaping the U.A.E's foreign
policy and in seeking to promote Gulf security and Arab unity. The U.A.E. has looked
to Britain and the U.S.A. for protection, when, for instance, in mid-1992 Iran anexed
Sharjah's part of Abu Musa island. Iran, formerly seen by some, though not by all, of
the Emirates as a dependable Gulf ally, sought to take over the whole of Abu Musa
island. This incident alone should convince each Emirate member in the federation
that in the contemporary world there are serious risks for a state which is weak, in the
case of the U.A.E. Emirates an apparent failing manifested in being small both in
area and in population. The strength and the protection of the state and its people
lies within the federation and the Union, especially in such a sensitive conflict area
like the Middle East, and the Gulf in particular.
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The Emirates have shown over the past two decades that they can co-operate
reasonably, to their mutual benefit, and there are numerous instances which prove
this. In January 1978, Shaikh Zayed appointed his son, Sultan, commander-in-chief
of the armed forces, about which Shaikh Rashid the Vice-president of the Union and
ruler of Dubai became very angry. The situation was very tense, and was poised on a
knife-edge. However, diplomacy was used to resolve the issue.(M) When the boundary
dispute between Dubai and Sharjah blew up in 1975, the U.A.E. President announced
that, until the two Emirates had settled their differences peacefully, he would refuse
to step down as President and would prevent candidates from standing for election
(see Chapter 6). Boundary disputes are examined in detail in the following chapters.
The U.A.E. has succeeded, to date, in achieving varying degrees of viability as a
federation. Thanks to oil revenues, the government has been able to expand the base
of current and development expenditure, and has thus funded most of the economic
and social development projects in the poorer Emirates, particularly in Fujairah,
Ajman and Umm al-Quwain.
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Chapter Three
Historical background, with special reference to
relations between the U.AUE. and Great Britain
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter, the historical background to the establishment of the United Arab
Emirates is presented, with special reference, for reasons outlined below, to the
period between 1937 and 1985. The aim is to show how historical factors shaped the
dynamics of the independent state which emerged, creating a politically fragmented
territory.
This chapter in the history of what would become the U.A.E. begins 01122 May 1937
when Shaikh Sa'id bin Maktum, ruler of Dubai, became the first of the Trucial States
rulers to sign a concession agreement with the Petroleum Development (Trucial
Coast) Company Ltd.. Other Trucial States rulers later followed suit.'
The establishment of petroleum interests led, also in 1937, to the posting of the British
Political Officer, albeit only during the winter months, to Sharjah, but with
responsibility for all the Shaikhdoms. It can be seen from the list of British
representatives in Hawley's book that the first resident political officer in 1937 was
Captain J.B. Howes. 2
 On the arrival of the oil companies in the area, the granting of
oil concessions raised the question of boundaries between the Shaikhdoms and with
their neighbouring countries.
Prior to the mid-1930s, according to Sir Donald Hawley, the Trucial States had been
unaffected by concessional competition. However, between 1935 and 1936 the
D'Arcy Oil Company initiated oil exploration operations in most of the Trucial States.
Furthermore, in 1936 a representative of the Iraq Petroleum Company visited the
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area and in 1937 the rulers of Dubai and Sharjah granted concessions to this
company.(3) The internal history of the Trucial Shaikdoms during the early twentieth
century bad been described as of "no general interest or importance"; the majority of
the eight pages of Mr J.G. Laithwaite's memorandum on the Trucial Chiefs4
emphasized only the external threats posed by Saudi Arabia and Persia. This positioji
changed dramatically in the niid-1930s as two developments greatly increased the
strategic importance of the Trucial coast:
a. Air agreements were signed with the various Shaikhdoms for the landing arid
refuelling of British civil and military aircraft.
b. The granting of oil concessions by local rulers began in 1937 as explained
above.5
Thereafter, territorial definition of each Shaikhdom became urgent, and the rulers
of each Shaikhdom, with no clearly defined territory, were compelled to adjust to
European concepts of territorial sovereignty.
Although it would be impractical to attempt to give here a comprehensive historical
survey of the area, the key events which have links with boundary demarcation will
be identified. This material will elucidate the relationship between the historical
background of the area and the shape of the inter-state boundaries.
3.2 Location
The United Arab Emirates is located at the south-eastern end of the Arabian
Peninsula. It is bordered by Saudi Arabia to the west and south, and by the Sultanate
of Oman to the east and by an isolated outcrop of the Sultanate of Oman which bounds
the United Arab Emirates from the north. The coastline of the seven U.A.E. emirates
extends for nearly 650 km (400 miles) from the border with the Sultanate of Oman,
to Khur al-Odaid which is close to the Qatar peninsula. The total length of the
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international borders is 1,173 km (729 miles): the border with the Sultanate of Oman
runs 513 km (319 miles), and that with Saudi Arabia, 650 km (400 miles) Six of the
Emirates lie on the west coast namely: Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah, Ajman, Umin
al-Quwain, and Ras al-Khaimah, whilst the seventh, Fujairah is situated on the eastern
coast and has direct access to the Gulf of Oman. The climate is arid with high
temperatures the year round apart from a few weeks in the winter. Air humidity is
also very high.
The total area of the U.A.E. has been estimated at 77,700 km2. According to the last
official census held in 1985, the total population of the U.A.E. was 1,622,464. More
recent official estimates show population growth: 1,909,000 in 1991, and 2,083,000 in
1994 (see Chapter 2). The population is concentrated in the main coastal towns.
The coast which extends from the base of the Qatarpeninsula eastward to the Musandam
peninsula was usually known in English as the Trucial Coast or the Trucial States or the
Trucial Shaikhdoms. By Arabs it was called the Oman Coast because the name Oman
historically covered the whole southeastern corner of the Arabian Peninsula.
3.3 Early History
European powers had pursued an interest in the area long before the advent of the
oil era. The first Europeans to appear were the Portuguese, who arrived at the
beginning of the sixteenth century. 6
 Their objective was to dominate trade between
Europe and the areas bordering the Indian Ocean. The first significant Portuguese
voyage into the area was made by Vasco da Gama in 1497. By 1650 the Portuguese
had evacuated Oman, losing their entire hold on the Arabian shore. Despite their
strong forts, some of which are still to be seen on the top of the mountains,
step-by-step the Portuguese lost their hold and they were forced to leave the Gulf in
1650. There followed a period of commercial and political rivalry between the Dutch
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and the French, and the British after the British established their empire in India.
The East India Company was founded in 1600 by a group of London merchants who
soon established trading centers in India. By the mid-eighteenth century, Britain had
become the foremost European power in the area after the collapse of the
Portuguese, Dutch and French positions. Thus began a period of British political
domination lasting about 200 yearsP. British interests in the Gulf were commercial
and strategic, trade and naval stations for security of the maritime route to India. In
support of this assertion, Sir William Luce states:
'our interests in the coast were to exclude otherforeign powers whose ambitions
might threaten the security of our Indian Empire or our communications with it
through the Gu1f and after the British withdrawal in 1947from India where our
imperial interests had been the sole reason for the growth of our long connection
with the Trucial Coast, that a new interest - oil - began to draw us into that closer
involvement with the landward and internal affairs of the Trucial States which
ourforebears had so studiously avoided "
3.3.1 The Treaties with Britain
Britain engaged in special treaty relationships with each of the rulers of the area.
These treaties became the cornerstone of Britain's political, strategic, military,
economic, commercial, and administrative presence in the area for 150 years.
In the early nineteenth century, the Gulf had attained strategic importance. In
November 1819 the Bombay government instructed Sir William Grant Keir to launch
a maritime attack against the al-Qawasim of Ras al-Khaimah with the aim of
destroying their defences, to sink and set fire to all the ships and local dhows and
destroy their military power. The attack succeeded. A treaty was subsequently signed
in January of 1820 between the British Government and the rulers of all the
Shaikhdoms on the coast. This treaty bound the Shaikhs to keep the peace at sea. In
exchange the British guaranteed them protection against aggression by others. The
treaty was signed by some of the Shaikhs in the old fort of Falaya, just outside Ras
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al-Khaimah. It laid the basis for a close and continuing relationship between the
British and the whole region for the following century and a half.
In 1820, the first treaty was signed with Shaikhs of Jazirat al Hamra (the Red Island,
which now belongs to the Emirate of Ras al- Khaim ) (9) The Shaikhs of Abu Dhabi,
Dubai, Ajman and Umm al Quwain also signed. Shaikh Sultan Bin Saqr signed as
chief of Sharjah, and Hasan Bin Rahmah as Shaikh of Khatt and Falaiyah. It was
agreed that the Shaikh of Ras al-Khaimah should be the first to sign the treaty
followed by the other Shaikhs. Shaikh Qadhib Bin Ahmed as chief of Jazirah
al-Hanira signed the peace treaty on 8 January 1820, Shaikh Shakbut of Abu Dhabi
on 11 January; Shaikh Zaid Bin Saif on behalf of his nephew the Shaikh of Dubai, by
Sultan Bin Saqr of Sharjah on4 February, and finally, by Rashid Bin Hamaid of Ajman
and Abdullah Bin Rashid of Umni al-Quwain 01115 March 1820.(b0)
Separate signature of this treaty, shows that the Shaikhs of Ajman and Umm
al-Quwain were considered to be independent rulers, alongside the rulers of Abu
Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjali, and Ras al-Khaimah. Jazirat al-Hamra no longer enjoys
independence, and is now a part of Ras al-Khaimah. The Emirate of Fujairali, was
not, in 1820, an independent Shaikhdom, but a part of the Qawasim Shaikhdom. It
lies on the eastern coast of the Musandam Peninsula and consists of a handful of
Sharqiyyin villages: Murbah, Qidfah, Ghurfa. Fujairah's independence was
recognized by the British Government in 1952.(h1)
The General Treaty of Peace constituted the genesis of the Gulf states as separate
political units, and of their Shaikhs as independent rulers. The extent of these separate
political units, and how far the authority of their rulers extended was not considered
until over a century later when oil companies developed their interest in the region.
The principal objective of this general treaty was to secure maritime peace and safety
in the region. Article 4, stating that, the British Government entertained no political
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or territorial ambitions in the Persian Gulf and would not interfere in ordinary local
disputes.'2 The treaty marked the beginning of a period of unbroken British
involvement with what was known in Europe as the Pirate Coast. British involvement
was extended during the nineteenth century in other treaties.
The 1820 treaty contains 11 articles. Articles 2, 7, 8 and 9 define the crime of piracy
and outline the number of sanctions. Articles 3,4,5,6 and 10 regularise local maritime
activities.
Article 3 is essential to the treaty. It stipulates:13
"The friendly Arabs shall carry by land and sea a red flag with or without
letters on it. The whole forming the flag known in the British Navy by the title
of white pierced recL"
The last sentence of the article stipulates:
"This shall be the flag of the friendlyArabs, and they shall use it and no other."
Some rulers of the Trucial States adopted flags in other designs but the colour was
restricted to red and white. The Abu Dhabi flag was red with a small white square in
the upper corner. The Dubai and Ajman flags were white about one-third the length
of the flag. The Sharjah and Ras al-Khaimah flags were a red square in the centre of
a white background. Fujairah has a plain red flag. The Umm al-Quwain flag was
similar to that of Dubai and Ajman, but its design was changed in 1960 and the new
one differed from that of Dubai and Ajman in that it had a crescent and star in white
in the middle of the red area of the flag.14
It may therefore be concluded that, between 1820 and 1960, the Emirates became
formally separate political entities, each with its own flag, passport and geographical
boundaries. When the United Arab Emirates came into being, with the exceptions of
L)ubai and Ras al-Khaimah, five of the seven Emirates abolished their local flags and
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replaced them with the federal flag. In Dubal and Ras al-Khaimah, the local flag is flown
on government departments alongside the federal flag (see photograph, Figure 3.1).
Another treaty concluded, in 1853, between all the Shaikhs of the Trucial Coast to
put an end to the maritime conflicts was a 'Treaty of Maritime Peace in Perpetuity'.
This perpetual truce gave rise to the name adopted for the region as a whole (the
Trucial Coast), the coast's name being changed from the Pirate Coast to the Trucial
Coast in 1853. Lorimer says:
'1t is' in vin'ue of this' treaty that the Shaikhs' of the principalfties are styled Trucial
Shailths and that their count'y may appropriately be styled Trucia,l Oman
The states of the rulers who had signed the Perpetual Maritime Truce of 1853 became
known as the Trucial States, a name which persisted until being renamed on
Federation in 1971.
There is strong disagreement between various writers as to whether Great Britain's
policies were to reduce the influence of the Qawasim whose maritime interests were
directly opposed to Britain, and whether such a policy encouraged the growth of the
Barn Yas, particularly in the south of the region in the Shaikhdoms of Abu Dhabi and
of Dubai. This argument is mentioned by Rosemarie Zahian:
"The ascendancy of the Bani Yas in the twentieth centu,y can thus be regarded
both as a result of the treaty relations with Britain that curbed the sea power
of the Qawasim, their main rivals' and as the natural outcome of the evolution
of Abu Dhabi and Dubai, coupled with the decline of Sharjah and Ras
al-Khaimah." (16)
One of the U.A.E. Minister's writes:
"Sharjah, for &wnple, had once been a vast Emirate, but it had been stripped
by the British athninistration of some of iLs territories which had been added
to other Emirates with the purpose of weakening Sharjah... ,,(17)
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Figure 3.1: Masafi Sports Club, Ras al-Khaimah. The photograph shows that the club
raised the federal flag of the UA.E. with the local flag of Ras al-Khaimah (top).
Dubai Police Station in Hatta raised the federal flag of the UA.E. with the local
flag of Dubai ('bottom). Both flags are red and white.
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One of the main arguments against Zahian is that the principal reason for the rise of the
Bani Yas (Abu Dhabi and Dubai) was the discovery of oil in commercial quantities in
these two Shaikhdoms, elevating their importance. Conversely, the oil companies failed
to discover oil in Sharjah and Ras al-Khaimah which consequently became less important.
Another reason for the decline of the Qawasini was the independence movement
within the Qawasim. The second writer continues thus:
"Moreover, the Emirate's ndingfamily had disintegrate4 and accordinglv it had
been divided among the members. As a result, the Emirate of Ras al-Khaimah
emerged and had been recognised as a distinct Emirate in 1921.11(18)
It can be concluded from the quotation that there are many reasons behind the
weakening and the reduction of Qawasim territory, including the growth of Dubai as
the major trading port on the Trucial Coast due to the stability of the political situation
in the Shaikhdom. It could also be argued that the British administration removed
some of Sharjah's territories as a result of the independence movement in the
Qawasim federation.
In 1892, Britain had obtained new agreements with the Shaikhs to forbid them to have
any involvement with anyone except the person appointed by the High British
Government, and the Trucial Shaikhs bound themselves not to permit the residence
within their territories of the agent of any other government and not to cede, sell, mortgage
or otherwise give for occupation any part of their territories save to the British
Government. Between February and May 1922 each Trucial Shaikh gave a written
undertaking to Colonel A.P. Trevor, the Political Resident in the Gulf (1922-24) as stated
in a letter dated 2 May 1922 from the Shaikh of Dubai to Colonel Trevor:
"We agree, if oil is expected to be found in our territory, not to grant any
concession in this connection to any one except to the person appointed by
the High British Government".
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In addition to that letter, similar undertakings were given by the other Shaikhs:19
Chief of Sharjah
Chief of Ras al-Khaimah
Shaikh of Abu Dhabi
Shaikh of Ajman
Shaikh of Umm al-Qaiwain
17 February 1922.
22 February 1922.
3 May 1922.
4 May 1922.
8 May 1922.
It can be seen from the above information both that these agreements were concluded
with each of the Trucial Shaikhs individually; and that the title Shaikh was accorded
to the rulers of Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Ajman, and Umm al-Quwain, whereas the rulers
of Sharjah and Ras al-Khaimah were addressed as Chief, rather than Shaikh. The
Shaikhdom of Fujairah had not yet emerged.
The British Government restriction on the Shaikhs' activities came to cover
commercial as well as political and diplomatic matters, and at the end of the century
the external relations of Trucial Oman were handled through the Government of
British India, due to the fact that the Indian rupee was the local currency and Indian
merchants were the largest foreign communityP°
Sir Donald Hawley, may be correct in saying that the treaty of 1820 is more comprehensive
than any other made with the Trucial rulers, in view of the fact that its most important
result was the political realignment of the various states of the Trucial Coast, making
distinctions between them, and granting the tribal chiefs an individual identity sufficiently
distinct so as to permit the signing of treaties with each separately, and the appointment
of an Agent to each. Whilst boundaries between these Shaikhdoms were never clear at
that time, the idea of a boundary became important and the idea of identity of oneself
as belonging to the loyalty of a specified ruler created something that had not
previously been evident.
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The treaty of 1820 is, therefore, more important than the others. It is clear that in the
72 years between the treaty of 1820 and 1892, British policy was to leave the internal
structures untouched while at the same time taking responsibility for their external
relationships. Britain established a political balance which stabilised relationships
between the local rulers, and the political Agent's role was to maintain this situation
as far as possible.
It would be unnecessary to list all the political officers who represented the British
Government in the Trucial States, but it is worth identifying those who played key
roles in the matter of boundaries.
Political Officers (permanently resident)
1948	 P.D.Stobart
1951
	
A.J.Wilton
1952
	
M.S.Weir
01120 May 1953, the post was raised to the status of a Political Agency.
Political Agents for all the Trucial States (resident in Dubal)
1954-5 5
1955-5 8
1958-61
For all the states except Abu Dhabi
1961-64
1965-66
1966-68
1968-70
1970-71
C.M.Pirie Gordon, OBE
J.P.Tripp
D.F.Hawley, MBE
A.J.M.Craig
H.G.Balfour-Paul, CMG
D.A.Roberts
J.L.Bullard
Julian. F. Walker
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Abu Dhabi Political Officers
1957-58
1958-59
1959-61
1961
Abu Dhabi Political Agents
1961-65
1965-68
1968-71
Hon. M. Buckmaster
E.R.Worsnop
E.F. Henderson
O.R.Miles (acting)
Colonel Sir Hugh Boustead, CMG,
OBE, DSO, MC
A.T.Lamb, MBE, DFC
C.J.Treadwell21
The last Political Agents in Abu Dhabi and Dubai, not mentioned in Hawley's book,
were C.J. Treadwell in Abu Dhabi until 1971, and Julian Walker in Dubai until 1971,
who was also one of the main negotiators for the formation of the federation.
3.4 Geographical Background
3.4.1 Climate
The climate of the Emirates as a whole is characterised by scanty rainfall and high
temperatures in summer (May to September) with average maximum temperature
of 45°C and a high level of humidity at 90% on the coast, which is much higher than
inland. Winter (October to April) is mild, with temperatures ranging from 17°C to
20°C. Annual rainfall occurs during the winter months and is very low, ranging
between 100 mm and 200 mm.
3.4.2 Physical Geography of the United Arab Emirates:
The U.A.E may be broadly divided into two contrasting regions: an eastern mountain
region with a sub-montane zone of outwash plains, and a western desert region (see
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Figure 3.2 and Figure 5.2). The latter may be divided into a coastal region, and an
inland region of desert and upland plains. The coastal region is characterised by a
Sabkha coast, with a number of islands along the west coast of Abu Dhabi, while
Dubai's coasts have no islands. Along the coast from Abu Dhabi to Ras al-Khaimah
there are number of lagoons, of which the important ones are, from south to north:
KEur Ghanadha of Abu Dhabi, Khur Dubai of Dubai, Khur Al-Manizar (see Chapter
7), Khur Al-B aidha of Umm al-Quwain, and Khur Khuwair in Ras al-Khaimah.
1.	 The Eastern Mountain Region:
This mountain region is called the Hajar, the most prominent physical feature of the
whole area rising to more than 200 metres. The Hajar range is magnificent in its
ruggedness, forming a physical barrier between the west and east coasts. The plain
on the east coast side of the range is called the Batinah, meaning 'the stomach', and
the plain to the west is called Dhahirah, meaning 'the back'. There are also many
Wadis which provide good routes through the mountains between east and west,
notably Wadi Ham and Wadi Sijji in Fujairah, Wadi Al-Qur in Ras al-Khaimah's
southern-territory and Wadi Hatta in Dubai's enclave of Hatta. There are many oases
in the U.A.E., the most populous of which are Al-Am oasis in the eastern region of
Abu Dhabi 150 km from Abu Dhabi city and 130 km from Dubai city, and Al-Dhaid
oasis in Sharjah territory about 65 km from Sharjah city, and Falaj al-Mualla in Umm
al-Quwain.
It is interesting to note that all the political outliers belonging to different Emirates
lie within the eastern mountain region; none of them is within the western desert
region. This suggests that most of the enclaves were created as a result of the
independent movement within the Qawasim confederation which was split up into
three Shaikhdoms, Ras al-Khaimah in 1921, Kalba, which was acknowledged to be
independent in 1936 by the British government, and Fujairah, which was the last to
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become independent in 1952. The Shaikh of Fujairah's main object was to put himself
on the same status as other Trucial Shaikhs and have the freedom to deal with the
British government as a free Shaikh 2 ". These enclaves tend to lie in remote and
mountainous areas. The process of secession and re-absorption, active during the
middle of the twentieth century in response to the scramble for oil revenues, is now
largely ended. Whilst secessionist claims may be made from time to time, the foremost
process within the U.A.E. is towards greater integration rather than fragmentation.
For this reason the richer Emirates in general, and Abu Dhabi in particular, make
significant financial contributions to ensure the continued cohesion of the federal
state. Most of these enclaves, lying in narrow wadis between the mountains, have been
cultivated as can be seen from Figure 3.2.
2.	 The Western Desert Region:
The western desert region stretches from the coast on the Arabian Gulf inland to the
Hajar range. For convenience, the 200 metre contour is used to define the limits of
mountain and desert in Figure 3.2. The western region is largely desert and without
dramatic features. Classified as salt marsh, the coastal Sabkha graduate inland into
arrestingly beautiful dunes reaching a height of about 45 metres in the southern part
of Al-Am region and beyond in the Empty Quarter.
3.4.3 Political Geography
Abu Dhabi: Abu Dhabi is the largest of the seven Emirates, stretching in the west
from Khur al Udaid which lies east of the base of the Qatar peninsula, to Dubai in
the north east. It is the most westerly of the Emirates, bordering Saudi Arabia. Abu
Dhabi city is the capital of the United Arab Emirates. Abu Dhabi has witnessed more
spectacular growth over the past two decades than any other town in the region and
possibly more than any other town in the wor1d. Most of the Emirate is arid desert
and salt flats apart from the cultivated areas around the Al-Am and Liwa oases. The
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400 km coast of Abu Dhabi is without dramatic features. Although the sandy desert
zone forms about two thirds of the total area of the U.A.E, Abu Dhabi seems to have
more than its fair share of this somewhat desolate terrain. The coastal zone between
Abu Dhabi and Khur al-Udaid consists of an extensive flat sandy plain between the
coastal sabkha and inland dunes. Along the Emirate's southern border lies the edge
of the great sandy desert, the Rub al-Khali (or Empty Quarter) (see Figure 3.3).
In the western part of Abu Dhabi are the largest of the coastal salt flats (Sabkhat
Matti). Further east the coastline breaks into a series of islands, one of which is
occupied by Abu Dhabi city, whose location enhances its role as the principal centre
of offshore oil production. Towards Dubai, apart from the new harbour west of Dubai
at Jabel All, the coast follows a flat and unbroken course until Dubai creek. The fairly
wide coastal plain extends from the western border of Abu Dbabi to Ras al-Khaimah
narrowing progressively from west to east. Here approaching Oman's Musandam
Peninsula, the flat coastal plain gives way to cliffs, and rocky mountains reaching
elevations of the order of a thousand metres form a looming backdrop.
The total area of Abu Dhabi is 67,350 km2 which is 86.6 per cent of the total area of
the U.A.E. (77,700 km2). Abu Dhabi comprises a single unit, as can be seen from
Figure 3.3.
The population of the Emirate of Abu Dhabi was estimated in 1994 to be 870,694 -
41.8 per cent of the total population of the U.A.E.. In Al-Am, which is the eastern
region of Abu Dhabi and the main settlement city after Abu Dhabi, the population
was estimated at 150,000 in 1994.(2
Dubai: Dubai lies on the Arabian Gulf coast around 160 km to the north east of Abu
Dhabi, and is situated between Abu Dhabi and Sharjah. Since 1870, when it was ceded
to the Ruler of Dubai by the Sultan of Muscat and Oman, the oasis village of Hatta
in the Oman Mountains has been an enclave of Dubai (see Figure 3.3). Dubai is the
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second largest Emirate, and the most active in trade and commerce. It has one of the
best natural harbours in the Gulf, in the 16 km long Khur Dubai (Dubal Creek).
Dubai's newest and largest industrial district was established in 1984 at Jabal All, 35
km to the south west of Dubai City, not far from the Abu Dhabi border. Jab a! All is
also a major commercial shipping port.
On the instruction of H.H. Shaikh Rasbid bin Said al-Maktuni, ruler of Dubai, John
R. Harris prepared the first master plan for Dubai in 195 9-60. During an interview in
his office 0112 December 1992, Harris informed the researcher about the 1960 master
plan's planning goals:
• Provision of a road system.
• Zoning of Dubai City into areas suitable for industry, commerce and public
buildings.
• Selection of areas for new residential quarters.
• Selection of sites for school buildings, open spaces and local centres within the
new residential units.
• Creation of a city centre in Dubai.
The city of Dubai is divided in two by its creek which is the main feature of the city.
The modern, northern, part of the city is known as Deira. The traditional architecture
of the houses with their wind-towers in the older, southern side town of Dubai attracts
many visitors. The total area of Dubai is 3,900 1cm2, 5 per cent of the total area of the
U.AJ3.. The total population of the Emirate of Dubai is estimated at 545,746 in
l994.' The only other town of any size is Hatta (about 111 km from Dubal City)
which has about 2,500 inhabitants (see chapters 6 & 7). With the exception of the
Dubai enclave of Hatta which is in a mountainous region, Dubai is semi-desert.
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Sharjah: Sharjah ranks third among the U.A.E. Emirates in area, population and
economic development. The total area of Sharjah is 2,600 km2. 3.3% of the total area
of the U.A.E. Its population according to the 1994 estimate is 343,695', or 16.5%
of the total population of the U.A.E. It is the only Emirate to have access to the sea
on both sides of the Musandam peninsula and it is the only Emirate to have a common
boundary with each of the six others.
The Emirate of Sharjah has five interesting territorial enclaves lying on the eastern
coast on the Gulf of Oman, 100 km from Sharjah town: Khur Fakkan, Dibba Al-Husn,
Kalba, Am Al-Ghamur (which is uninhabited), and Nahwa in the Omani enclave of
Madha. There are a number of oases, such as Dhaid, Mudam and Milaiha on the
coastal plain.
. Khur Fakkan: Khur Fakkan in Arabic means 'the creek of two jaws', because the
town lies on a curved creek embraced by mountains that look like two jaws. Khur
Fakkan, like the other towns of the eastern area of the U.A.E. is linked with
Sharjah by a highway running across the area between the Arabian Gulf coast and
the Gulf of Oman. The total area of Khur Fakkan is 9 km2. The present (1994)
population of Khur Fakkan is around 6,900.
• Dibba Al-Husn: The total area of this enclave of Sharjah is 3.4 km 2. Residential
and industrial areas occupy 44 per cent of Dibba Al-Husn (1.4km2) and cultivated
areas occupy 56 per cent (2 kin2). The total population of Dibba Al-Husn in 1994
is 1,890.
• Kalba: Wadi al-Helu administratively falls under Kalba and the total population
is 6,250. The total area of Kalba town is approximately 50 km2. Residential areas
occupy 15 km2 only of the town while cultivation areas occupy 12 km 2. The rest of
Kalba is semi-desert and salt marsh.
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. The Enclave of Nahwa: The village of Nahwa lies toward the highest point of the
Madha enclave of Oman. Nahwa occupies about 4 kin2. There is no direct route
from Sharjah to Nahwa. From Shaijah's enclave of Khur Fakkan the road turns
onto a rocky road to Madha. Within Madha territory (Oman) another rocky road
turns into the hills to reach Nahwa. (see Chapter 6).
Ajman: This smallest member of the U.A.E. covers 250 km 2. Its landward border is
entirely with Sharjah. There are two remote and completely landlocked enclaves:
Manamah and Masfut. The main communication between the Emirate of Ajman and
with its two enclaves is from Ajman city to Sharjah, then the road from Sharjah to
Dhaid and from Dhaid to the first enclave of Ajman which is Manamah.
Communication from Ajman to its enclave of Masfut, involves the main road from
Ajman to Sharjah then to Dhaid oasis and then the road turns south to Masfut (see
Figure 3.3). The total population of Manamah is 1,000 while the total population of
Masfut is 680, mainly from Bedaiwat tribe.
The total population of Ajman is 83,320,' according to the 1994 estimation, which
is 4 per cent of the total population of the U.A.E. Like the other Emirates, the
heartland of Ajman is focused on a coastal city.
Umm al-Quwain: The capital city of Umm al-Quwain is built on a creek. The Emirate
itself occupies roughly 750 km 2 comprising only one territorial unit which is the main
Emirate with no enclaves (Figure 3.3). The total population of Umm al-Quwain
according to the 1994 estimation is 29,162, making it the smallest of the Emirates in
terms of population: a mere 1.4 per cent of the total population of the U.A.E.. It
extends 32 km inland, incorporating an important and productive agricultural belt at
Falaj Al-Mualla, south-east of the city.
Ras al-Khaimah: The northernmost Emirate, Ras al-Khaimah lies at the foot of the
northern reaches of the Hajar Mountains which divide the Musandam peninsula. This
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Emirate comprises two parts, the northern part where Ras al-Khaimah the capital
city lies, built on a creek, and the southern part which extends to the Omarn border
at Aswad. The main settlement in this latter region is the village of Huwailat, with
800 inhabitants of the Dahaminah tribe. Ras al-Khaimah is the fourth largest of the
Emirates covering an area of 1,700 km2, which is 23% of the area of the U.A.E., and
with a total population of 141,644 according to the 1994 estimation giving it 6.8
per cent of the total population of the U.A.E (fourth in population). Ras al-Khaimah
is the main farming area of the Emirates with a favourable climate and fertile plains.
The Hajar mountains to the east descend into surprisingly green vegetation.
Fujairah: Fujairah is the only Emirate which lies entirely on the Batinah coast of the
Gulf of Oman. It has an area of 1,150 km2 and a population of 68,739 (3.3 per cent
of the U.A.E. population). Fujairah was until a decade ago almost cut off from the
rest of the other Emirates by the barrier of the Hajar mountains which presented a
considerable barrier to land travel between the Batinah coast on the Gulf of Oman
and the Emirates to the west on the Arabian Gulf. Construction of a circular road
from Masafi of Fujairah through Fujairah and Dibba al-Ghurfawas completed in 1972
(see Figure 3.3), and Fujairah is rapidly developing along similar lines to Emirates on
the Gulf coast with its expanding port and impressive new Trade Centre.
Fujairah comprises five main settlements: Fujairab, the capital city, Dibba al-Ghurfa
with 2,000 inhabitants, the enclave of Wahalah with just 39 inhabitants, Ahfarah 60
inhabitants, and the north sectionwhich includes the villages of A1-Bithnah about 640
inhabitants, Bidyyah 2,000 inhabitants, Masafi of Hafittat 1,200 inhabitants, and Sijji
1,780 inhabitants.
Geographically, Fujairah is different from the other Emirates, being partly mountainous
with a fertile coastal plain; it has no true desert. On the other hand its territory is divided
into two main separate segments by a wedge of Sharjah land (see Figure 3.3).
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Figure 3.3 LOCATION MAPS OF THE EMIRATES SHOWING ROAD LINKS
1. The Emirate of Abu Dhabi
2. The Emirate of Dubai
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3.5 The Creation of Each Emirate
3.5.1 Abu Dhabi
Situated on an island, Abu Dhabi City was founded in 1761 by the al-bu-Falah, a
leading Bani Yas tribe from Liwa, in occupation of the island when fresh water was
discovered. The island is an elongated wedge-shape, tapering south east towards the
mainland. The city is now joined to the mainland by al-Maqtah Bridge.
The ruling families of both Abu Dhabi and Dubai were of the Barn Yas tribe of the
Liwa region south of Abu Dhabi, whereas the ruling families of Sharjah and Ras
al-Khaimah were of the Qasimi tribe.
During the second half of the nineteenth century, under the leadership of Shaikh
Zayed bin Khalifa (Shaikh Zayed the Great), who ruled from 1855 to 1909, Abu Dhabi
grew to become one of the major land powers in south eastern Arabia. However, in
1869 the Qubaisaat tribe removed themselves to the Khur al-Udaid where they
claimed independence from Abu Dhabi. The westward migration of Barn Yas tribes
from the Liwa oasis was restricted by the poor quality of the desert territory, and
therefore most migration was from Liwa to the coast, particularly to Dalma island the
main pearling centre of the western coast.
In the quarter century since oil exports began, Abu Dhabi's oil revenues have been
used to fund not only its own growth but also that of the other Emirates. Shaikh Zayed,
ruler of Abu Dhabi since 1966, and President of the U.A.E. since 1971, has ensured
that the good fortune enjoyed by his Emirate is shared with the others which are less
fortunate.
Outside Abu Dhabi City, the main centre of population is Al-Am oasis, close to the
al-Burainii border with Oman.
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3.5.2 Dubal
Dubai existed as a settlement in 1799. Although the General Treaty of Peace in 1820
was signed on behalf of its chief Hazza Bin Za'al, Dubai appears to have been a
dependency of Abu Dhabi Shaikhdom until 1833, at which point some 800 men of Al
bu Falasah section of the Bani Yas tribe quit the island of Abu Dhabi where they
settled and moved to Dubai. They settled beside the Creek which divides the city into
two parts: Dubai and Deira. This migration marks the beginning of Dubai as an
independent Shaikhdom. An early local name associated with the town is al-Wasi.
The rise of Dubal was reinforced in 1904 when the steamship service from Bombay
started on the Trucial coast. Afterwards an agreement was made with the Ruler of
Dubai in 1937 to use Dubai Creek as a flying boat landing base on the route to India.
The roots of Dubai's success are in four factors: a favourable geographical location,
the political farsightedness of its rulers, the astuteness of its merchants, and the
financial mentality of its people.
The British Political Agency of the Trucial States was transferred from Sharjah to
Dubai in 1954.
3.5.3 Sharjah
All the territory in the Trucial States east of Dubai, with the exception of the two small
Shaikhdoms of Ajman and Umm al-Qawian was ruled over by the famous Qasimi,
Sultan bin Saqr. Before his death in 1866 he divided up his territory between his four
sons; one of them ruled over the whole area of Sharjah, while the other branches
became virtually independent namely: Ras al-Khaimah, Kalba, and Dibba.
Historically, Sharjah has been the headquarters of the Trucial Oman Scouts and the
British military base in the area. Furthermore, the Royal Air Force arrived in 1942
and established a base in this Emirate.
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3.5.4 Independent Kalba
In 1932, the British Government decided that it wanted civil and military air links
between Egypt and India. The route passed over several countries including the
Trucial Coast. A first stage was to involve the political resident in the Gulf. The head
man at Kalba at that time, Sa'id bin Hamad al-Qasimi was unwilling to discuss the
matter before consulting his fellow Qawasim, Sultan bin Saqr of Shaijah and Sultan
bin Salim of Ras al-Khaimah. Later that same year, the political resident, SirT. Fowle,
suspecting that Sultan bin Salim the ruler of Ras al-Khaimah had dissuaded Sa'id
from signing the agreement, told Sa'id in a letter that he "... would be well rewarded
if an aeroplane was permitted to land at Kalba."' Fowle was unable to make Sa'id
flexible in this question. In May 1936 Mr. T. Hickinbotham, the political officer in
Bahrain was on a visit to Kalba, at this time, Shaikh Sa'id stated that he would sign an
agreement provided Kalba was independent of Sharjah. Fowle saw that Kalba should
be recognised as independent from Sharjah to benefit from the opportunity of landing
rights, and the importance of Kalba to imperial communications. Later, Shaikh Sa'id
agreed to grant emergency landing facilities for Imperial Airways in Kalba, and
received a letter from Hickinbotham regarding the newly independent state of
Ka1ba. This means that Kalba was recognized by the British Government as an
independent Shaikhdom in 1936 but in 1951 the Kalba Shaikhdom was
re-incorporated with Sharjah. The main reason for the British Government
decision against continued recognition of Kalba was because the ruling Shaikh was
assassinated by a cousin, which left the Kalba branch of the family without an heir: it
had become extinct.
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3.5.5 Ajman
The ruler who signed the General Treaty of Peace in 1820 was Shaikh Rashid bin
Humaid. The ruling family is of the Naim tribe, related to the Naim of al Buraimi
oasis.
3.5.6 Umm al-Quwain
This Shaikhdom consists of the coastal town of that name and includes a small oasis
called Falag al All. Lorimer mentioned that this Shaikhdom had not played a great
part in the Trucial States history. At the time of the general treaty of peace, Abdulla
bin Rashid was ruling the state and subscribed to the treaty in 1820. In 1853, he was
able to accept on behalf of his Shaikhdom the perpetual treaty of peace, which means
that the state existed at that time and was recognized by the British Government
through these treaties. A later Shaikli, Shaikh Rashid, wrote to the British Political
Resident in 1904 announcing his peaceful accession and accepting the existing
treaties.
3.5.7 Ras aI-Khaimah
An early local name associated with the town of Ras al-Khaimah is Julfar. The history
of Ras al-Khaimah is bound up with the other Qasimi state, Sharjah. Lorimer always
described Ras al-Khaimah as a region of Sharjah. For example, of Fashrah town in
wadi Al-Qur, in the southern part of Ras al-Khaimah territory, Lorimer said: "This
place aLso is considered to pertain to the Ras al-Khaimah district of Sharjah"?
Furthermore, Sir Donald Hawley (27) stresses that the state is one of the Qasimi states
and is ruled to the present day by the Qawasim family. Shaikh Saqr bin Mohammed,
who became Ruler in February 1948, succeeded in 1952 in bringing under his rule
two villages, Jazirat al-Hanirah and Rams which were previously independent.
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3.5.8 Fujairah
The history of Fujairah as an independent state started from 1866. To understand the
history of this Emirate, the geographical description of the area needs to be given.
Shamailiyyah district is a tract of land bordering the Gulf of Oman and extending
from Dibba in the north to Khur Kalba in the south and including Khur Fakkan and
Fujairak The place has been defended chiefly by the Sharqiyyin and Naqbiyin
tribes. This area was controlled by the Qawasim in the latter part of the eighteenth
century. In 1952 Fujairah was recognized by the British Government as an
independent Shaikhdom.
In 1955, several years after British recognition of Fujairah, when Julian Walker began
to carry out his boundary delimitation survey, he obtained written undertakings from
each of the rulers that they would accept British arbitration and decisions on the
demarcation of their territories. Regarding Fujairali, however, neither the Ruler of
Sharjah nor the Ruler of Ras al-Khaimah would recognise even the existence of
Fujairah, and therefore declined to accord the Political Agent in Dubai, C.M. Pine
Gordon, the power to delineate their boundaries with Fujairah State (see Appendix
C):29
"I, Saqr bin Sultan al-Qasimi, Ruler of Sharjah and its dependencies
undertake on behalf of myself and my successors that we will not dispute any
boundaries which the PoliticalAgent for the Trucial States may lay down in
the coastal areas excepting Fujairah which we consider part of Sharjah
State."
An amplification of this is offered in the following passage which is a quotation about
the feelings of Shaikh Saqr bin Mohammed Al-Qasemi, Ruler of Ras al-Khaimah
regarding the independence of Fujairah:°
"Saqr, who is not emotionally veiy stable or mature, proved veiy difficult,
demanding that the whole territoiy be given to him; blwning H.M. G. for the
fact that Fujairah existed at all; saying that he wanted no settlement and
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would not require one as he could settle Fujairah himself if H.M. G. did not
interfere; and warning Wa&er that on no account should H.M G. oppress
him by taldng away his territoiy and giving it to someone eLie."
However, the British administration carried out its task on boundary demarcation
between Sharjah and Fujairah.
3.6 The Trucial States Council
The Trucial States Council (TSC) was set up by the British Government in 1952 to
bring together the Trucial States Rulers in order to encourage them to think about
general problems affecting their states. It was one of the major developments which
encouraged the establishment of a federal unit of seven Emirates. The council
consists of the rulers of all seven Emirates:
. Shaikh Zayed Bin Sultan al Nahayyan ruler of Abu Dhabi (1966-).
. Shaikh Rashid Bin Said al Maktum ruler of Dubai (195 8-90).
. Shaikh Khalid Bin Mohammed al Qasimi ruler of Sharjah (1965-72).
. Shaikh Rashid Bin Humaid al Naimi ruler of Ajman (1928-8 1).
. Shaikh Ahmed Bin Rashid a! Mo'alla ruler of Umm al Quwain (1929-81).
. Shaikh Saqr Bin Mohammed al Qasimi ruler of Ras al Khaimah (1948-).
. Shaikh Mohammed Bin Hamad al Sharqi ruler of Fujairah (1952-1974)
The first elected chairman of the council was Shaikh Saqr, ruler of Ras al Khaimah,
who held office until October 1968 when Shaikh Khalid Bin Mohammed al Qasimi
ruler of Sharjah was elected to succeed. The TSC was the first unifying body to be
established within the territory, arid consequently was the first serious attempt to
bring some sort of unity to the area. 31
 In 1965 Bryan Kendall was appointed acting
director of the development office.
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Whilst the TSC was nothing like as unified as the U.A.E., it would be wrong to ignore
its role in drawing closer together these tiny politcal units as the precursor to the
establishment of a federal state. The TSC was a major forum for these seven
shaikdoms to exchange ideas and to find ways to tackle common problems.
The TSC met twice a year, with the rulers showing interest in co- operation on both
administrative and economic levels, such as traffic regulation and other common
issues. For three decades before the United Arab Emirates came into being, an
important level of communication and deliberation among the ruling Shaikhs was
established providing a modest yet important element of integrative nation building.
A development fund was established in 1965 with capital contributions as follows:
. Her Majesty's Government: £1,000,000 (see Appendix D).
. His Highness the Ruler of Qatar: £250,000.
. His Highness the Ruler of Abu Dhabi: £100,000.
. His Highness the Ruler of Balirain: £40,000.(32)
A report prepared by the TSC in 1969 included several projects, for instance:
1.	 The inter-State services of the development office:
a. Council headquarters.
b. Agricultural services based on Digdaga in Ras al Khaimah and an agricultural
school. (33)
c. Technical education with trade and technical school at Dubai and Sharjah.
d. Health services: Al-Maktum hospital was opened in 1950, and a number of
clinics were established in the seven capital towns of the Shaikhdoms, and also
at Kalba, Khur Fakkan, Buraimi and Dibba.
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2	 The capital program:
a. Inter-State roads: The 13.5 km road from Dubai to Sharjah was the first major
project financed by the development fund, the work being completed in 1966.
The second road, from Sharjah to Ras al- Khaimah, was finished in 1968, and
financed by the Saudi Arabian Government. Later, work moved to the east coast,
to the mountain area of Wadi Ham, and a coastal route between Dibba and Khur
Fakkan opened. Finally, a gift by H.H the Ruler of Abu Dhabi to Sharjah of a paved
road from Sharjah to Al-Dhaid, (district of Shaijah) was completed in 1969.
The folded map attached to the thesis shows that the Dubai - Sharjah road, Sharjah -
Ras al-Khaimah road and Sharjah - Dhaid road, paved in 1969, provide a tight linkage
between the main capital towns of the Shaikhdoms. By improving physical
communication, these roads for the first time supplied a fast transportation network
between the seven Emirates, as a fundamental step towards consolidating the new
federal state.
It can be concluded, therefore, that the TSC played a major role in creating the new
federal state, and was one of the main factors which helped to integrate these seven
Emirates. Sir William Luce has written:
"Regular meetings between the rulers themselves and between their
representatives, however inconclusive, at least build up the habit of mutual
consultation and discussion, out of which can grow co- operation; there has
been a marked improvement in the personal relations between some of the
rulers, which in turn has led to the settlement of boundaiyproblems...".
Dr. A.M. Khalifa contends that the TSC was a major development along the road to
a federation of the seven Emirates under British supervision and leadership.3
Moreover, Sir Bernard Burrows, who was the first Foreign Service Officer to be
Political Resident in the Gulf, also affirms the crucial role of the TSC:
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"Shortly before my arrival in 1953 we had set up a Trucial Council consisting
of the rulers of all the Trucial States which was designed to deal with matters
of common interest and in particular to advise about the distribution of the
technical and development aid which the British Government suppliecL This
council continued to operate during my time in the Gulf and subsequently
formed the basis for the establishment after the British departure from the
Gulf of the United Arab Emirates which exists toda'y as a federation
comprising all seven states."
3.7 The Trucial Oman Scouts (TOS)
A defence force, under the British Government's Foreign Office was created in 1951.
It headquarters were at the Royal Air Force base in Sharjah, with garrisons in the
regions of Al-Am, Masafi in Ras al-Khaimah and A1-Habhab in Fujairah.
According to Sir Bernard Burrows:
"Apart from any efforts by the rulers, it seemed essential to establish a small
local force under British command. The last recommendation was carried
out not long afterwards with the formation of the Trucial Oman Levies (later
Scouts).
Another writer, who was a political Agent in the Trucial States resident in Dubai said:
"The formation of the Trucial Oman Scouts brought peace between states
previously at war."°
It is generally agreed that the Trucial Oman Scouts were established for a number of
reasons. Among the principal reasons were: to maintain peace and order throughout
the skaikhdoms, and to serve as an escort for the British Political Agent. The
formation of the force reflected a desire for stability in the area as a primary step for
internal boundaries demarcation before the oil companies began their operations,
and also to protect the oil companies teams from hinterland attack. The Trucial Oman
Scouts played a significant role in keeping a peace throughout the Trucial States,
particularly when territorial disputes arose from the granting of oil concessions by
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different rulers. For example, the principal boundary dispute after World War II was
the Buraimi conflict.
In August 1952, a Saudi armed force headed by Amir Turki bin Ataishan arrived in
Hamasah in Buraimi and claimed that Buraimi was independent of any government.
The Trucial Oman Levies were called in, supported by the Royal Air Force. The result
was negotiation between the two sides, adjudicated by an international tribunal. As
a basis for a decision., tribal loyalties, past and present and their influence on the
jurisdiction of Buraimi were considered. When negotiations broke down in the later
part of 1955, the Trucial Oman Scouts were used successfully to dislodge the Saudi
force from Hamasa.41
The force was also given the specific role of defending the Trucial States against
external aggression, as well as maintaining internal security. The British Foreign
Secretary, Sir Alec Douglas Home the Secretary of State for Foreign and
Commonwealth Affairs, announced in the House of Commons that prior to the end
of 1971, before the U.A.E. was firmly established, the British Govermnent was
prepared to increase assistance in six ways. One of these was the handing over of the
Trucial Oman Scouts, which was staffed mainly from Britain, in order to constitute
the nucleus of a federal army, with Britain prepared to supply British officers and
equipment. He told the House of Commons that the political structure for the Arab
shore of the southern Gulf was now complete.'42
3.8 The Tribes and Geography
3.8.1 Introduction
The tribe was the unit of political organization and the principal point of identity for
both the settled and nomadic people in the Arabian Peninsula. The tribe has
traditionally served as a cultural frame for individual tribesman and provided him
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with a sense of identity and security in his environment. The political life of the area
was influenced by tribal movements and conflicts.
It is important to distinguish between two terms: diralz and haram. The term dirah
signifies an area or region in which a particular tribe roams. The term haram signifies
part of the residential area of a nearby town or settlement. Harwn (plural: ahram)
means 'forbidden', which indicates that the area is out of bounds for anyone but
members of that tribe. Much of the harwn would be owned by members of the tribe,
in particular: villages, oases and farming areas. However, it would be incorrect to
conceive of the tribal situation as static. There are changes between tribes and within
tribes. Occasionally, a section of a large tribe breaks away to become independent
with its own leadership and its own ahram. Thus the al-bu-Falasa broke away from
the Barn Yas in 1833, and settled in Dubai. The splits which take place mean that
there are members of the same tribe in more than one area, each section loyal to a
different authority, depending on location and Shaikh. This is why Julian Walker, in
his 1954 survey, for example found the al-Mezari tribe settled in Ras al-Khaimah,
Shaijah and Abu Dhabi, and why the internal boundaries shown on the Trucial States
map were based on tribal loyalties.43
The relationship between tribes and boundaries is crucial. Political boundaries are
defmed by tribal loyalties to specific Shaikhs. Those loyalties are conditional and
subject to change. Boundaries between the Tnicial States and its neighbours, and
boundaries between individual Trucial States, periodically shifted during the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries due to the boundaries being based on the dirah
of the tribes. Dirah in Eastern Arabia were flexibly defined areas, changing in size
according to tribal strength.
A good example of tribal loyalty that has been changed is the Barn Ka'ab tribe who
in the nineteenth century were originally part of the Qawasim confederation which
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is mentioned by Lorimer, but when Julian Walker studied the situation of the Trucial
States tribes and boundaries, he found that the Bani Ka'ab gave their allegiance to
the Sultan of Muscat.
The historical development of the tribes, along with the tribal propensity to change
and divide, greatly affects the political situation of the region, such as the formation
of new tribes like that of Al Bu Shaniis of the Buraimi region who recently broke away
from their parent, the Nu'aym tribe.
Of equal importance in tribal matters is the distinction between the terms bedu and
haddar. The term bedu carries the associated meaning of Bedouin, nomadic, rural, of
the desert, whereas haddar indicates a civilized region, the settled population.'45
Bedu tribes live in arid deserts and are frequently on the move in search of water and
grazing. Haddar tribes live in settlements such as oases, villages and coastal towns,
and involve themselves in location-specific activities, such as cultivation and fishing.
Being people of fixed location, the political structures of Haddar tribes are easier to
recognise than those of Bedu tribes. Visitors therefore find it easier to deal with
Haddar communities than with Bedu communities.
Three key characteristics of tribalism can be identified. First, the history of tribes
shows that tribes have been developed from the family, then the section, the clan, the
tribe, and finally the tribal confederation. Secondly, tribal authority is assigned to the
head of the tribe who is chosen by the tribal elders.
The loyalty of a tribesman was to the ruler as a person, not to the territory:
"The concept of tenitoria! sovereignty in the western sense did not exist in Eastern
ArabicL A ruler exercised jurisdiction over a tenitoiy by vinue of his jwisdiction
over the tribes inhabiting it. They, in turn, owed loyalty to him and not to the
Shaikhdom, wnirate or sultanate in which they dwelt. Political allegiance to a
territorial unit, such as is implicit in the European states .systern, is unknown to
theArabian tribesman. His loyalty ispersonalto his tribe, his Shaikh, or a leader
of greater consequence, and not to any abstract image of the state."
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It is clear that the tribes owed allegiance to a ruler or a Shaikh. Through this
allegiance, a ruler exercised sovereignty over a region in which tribesmen were
regularly moving from place to place. In other words, the ruler's control over his
territory was not directed by static officials, it was exercised through the tribes.
The important thing to be considered here is that the modern idea of territorial
sovereignty did not exist in this region until the twentieth century, when the awarding
of oil concessions necessitated the delineation of fixed boundaries.
The tribes in the Arabian Peninsula are divided into two principal political factions;
the Hinawi, who migrated originally from Yemen in southern Arabia; and the
Ghafiri. 4 Within and outside Greater Oman (the Trucial Coast, now the U.A.E.,
was also known as Trucial Oman), Arab tribesmen describe themselves from the early
eighteenth century onwards as belonging to one faction or the other. A political
conflict took place in 1817 over the rule between the bani Hinaa tribe and the bani
Gafir tribe which resulted in the collapse of the Al-Ya'ariba state in Oman. This
conflict left behind it a legacy of division between the Trucial States tribes. Opposition
between the Ghafiri and the Hinawi was manifested on the Trucial Coast between
the two main tribes, the Bani Yas and the Qawasim. The Bani Yas were Hinawi, and
the Qawasim, Ghaflri.
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Table 3.1 The Hinawi and the Ghafiri Factions in the Trucial States
Source: Author.
On the accession to the Sultanate in 1741 of al-bu Sa'ed, two new political powers
appeared on the Oman coast which became independent from al-bu-Sa'ed:
1. A maritime power formed of a tribal confederation headed by the Qawasim,
the chief of the Ghafiri faction. Its power base was Ras al-Khaimah, and their
control extended from the Al-Shemiliyya coast on the Gulf of Oman and on the
north coast to Sharjah.
2. A land power set up by the Bani Yas confederation and headed by Al-bu Falah
the chief of the Hinawi faction. Its headquarters was Al-Dhafrah and Abu
Dhabi. Their control extended from Dubai to Qatar.
The characteristic distinction between the two tribes was that the Bath Yas tribe of
Abu Dhabi and Dubai had not been involved widely in maritime activities because
their geographical situation offers them alternative options. There were sea activities,
such as fishing and pearling, but they had a large hinterland of desert behind them.
They also had the Liwa oasis and the Buraimi oasis, both of which they used regularly,
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moving between the coast, where they had a fishing settlement, and the date gardens
of the oasis. The geographical factor affecting the Qawasim tribe, pushing them
towards maritime activities, was the narrowness of their area, They concentrated their
activities on the sea. In other words, the power of the Qawasim was based on their
maritime activities, but the strength of the Bani Yas depended much upon their
movement in the interior of the region such as the desert oases as well as the coastal
areas.
Lorimer prepared an early census of population in the area in which he estimated the
total number of Bedouins in Trucial Oman at about 8,000 souls (Table 3.2).
Table 3.2: Lorimer's Population Census of the Trucial Coast in 1905
Source: Loriiner, Gazetteer....IIB, Geographical..p.1437.
In 1968, years after Lorimer had conducted his census, in order to see what had
happened to tribal populations in the United Arab Emirates (Trucial States) since
Lorimer's time, the Trucial States Council carried out its own census (Table 3.3)
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Table 3.3: Tribal Population in the Trucial States, 1968
Emirate (see key) ABD	 DUB	 SHR.J
	
AJM UMMQ RASK H FLJJ: TOTAL
Bani Yas
	
4597	 3913	 1424	 213	 1	 290	 27	 10465
aJ .-Sharqjyyn	 80	 65	 116	 69	 25	 82	 8372	 8809
Shihub-Habus	 147	 74	 74	 13	 -	 5845	 244	 6397
Al Au	 60	 155	 508	 85	 2862	 1445	 3	 5118
al-Qassirni	 101	 108	 3592	 8	 3	 1055	 14	 4881
al-Manasir	 3224	 275	 49	 21	 -	 38	 -	 3607
Zaah	 22	 27	 710	 7	 4	 2455	 -	 3225
al-U liawahir 	 2844	 42	 109	 41	 -	 9	 57	 3102
MaLari	 1287	 271	 293	 17	 38	 1062	 76	 3044	 -
al-hu Shamis	 370	 769	 689	 190	 12	 408	 -	 2438
Bani Kital '
	617	 156	 1458	 21	 6	 112	 -	 2370
al-Nuayrn -
	 325	 171	 219	 616	 25	 968	 10	 2334
ai-Nagbiyyin	 16	 -	 1345	 -	 -	 541	 3	 1905
al-Awarnir -- 1721
	 69	 37	 7	 19	 34	 5	 1892
Others	 2339	 1769	 2146	 303	 214	 3597	 327	 10695
TOTALS	 17750	 7864	 12769	 1611	 3209	 17941	 9138	 70282
Key	 ABD: Abu Dhabi
DUB: Dubai
SHRJ: Shaijah
MM: Ajman
UMMQ: Umm al-Quwain
RASK Ras al-Khaimah
FLJJ: Fujairah
Source: 1968 Trucial States Census (unpublished). ABD:Abu Dhabi, DUB:Dubai, SHR:Sharjah,
AJM:Ajman, UMMQ;Umm al-Quwain, RAKRas al-Khaimab, FUJ:Fujairah.
Table 3.3 shows that Abu Dhabi, as well as having the largest population, shares the
distinction of the greatest number of tribal groups with Sharjah and Ras al-Khaimah.
The Barn Yas confederation has for a long time dominated Abu Dhabi: the ruling
Al-Nahayyan family, also known as the Al-bu-Falah, is a small subsection of the Barn
Yas; and the Al-Manasir, Al-Awamir and Al-Dhawaliir are allied with Al-bu-Falah
in dominating Abu Dhabi.
The ruling family of Dubai, the Al-Maktum, or Al-Bu-Falasa, are also a subsection
of the main Bani Yas tribe, as are the ruling al-Qasinii families of Shaijah and Ras
Al-Khaimah.
Chapter Three	 121
The principal difference between the traditional society of the area and present day
society since federation, is that fixed territorial boundaries have now replaced the
traditional, and more elastic, dirah of the major tribes. (The dirah is an area over which
a tribal leader autonomously exercised authority.)
Tribal identity remains important in the Emirates, and some tribes play an essential
role in deciding the structure of authority in the U.A..E.. This fact is well ifiustrated
in the federal council or cabinet. The members of the cabinet (Prime Minister,
Deputy Prime Minister and some 15 other ministers) are all appointed by the
President. The composition of the cabinet reflects the predominance of Abu Dhabi
and Dubai in the federation. The Prime Minister, Deputy Prime Minister and the
ministers of finance, defence, foreign affairs and the interior all are members of the
ruling A1-Nahayyan family of Abu Dhabi and A1-Maktum family of Dubai.
3.9 The Establishment of the United Arab Emirates
3.9.1 Introduction
Stretching back over more than two decades, the United Arab Emirates is the longest
running and the most successful experiment to date in regional political integration
in the Middle East. Six previously independent Shaikhdoms agreed to form a federal
union on 2 December 1971. However, the federation of the Emirates was neither
spontaneous nor sudden. The local rulers desired unity as a solution to the external
surrounding dangers which threatened. The British Government supported the
concept, and played an important role in the creation of the Federation. This support
is well illustrated in Lord Home's autobiography in 1976. (Sir Alec Douglas Home
was Foreign Secretary in Edward Heath's Government of the early 1970s):
"We put into the minds of the Rulers that they should oiganize a Union of the
Sheikhdoms, with its own security force, and said that we would be willing to
supply the personnel and equzpment which would ensure that it had a
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favourable start. So it happened, and although the Union of the Sheikhdoms
is young, and there have been afew stresses and strains, the experiment ha
on the whole been successful.49
Julian Walker who demarcated the inter-Emirate boundaries between 1954-60 and
who later became the British Political Agent in Dubai in 1970-71, explained the
problem facing the area after the failure of the original nine Emirates federation
which included Qatar and Bahrain:
"Dubai andAbu Dhabi were about to be alone, but the others were too small
and if they became independent alone they will not stay long. Fujairah might
go to Oman, Sharjah and Ras al-Khaimah would follow SaudiArabia and
Dubai is friendly with Iran, that might have created problems. The British
role was to get the Council of the rulers to be strong enough to provide an
umbrella for them. ,,(50)
As soon as the Conservative Government announced that policy on 1 March 1971,
the Labour Opposition claimed credit for the federal initiative. Dennis Healey,
Shadow Foreign Secretary, told Sir Alec in the House of Commons on 1 March 1971:
"The Opposition share his desire for the establishment and success of a Union
ofArab Emirates. Indeed, we launched it on its way. ,,(51)
The 1968 announcement of British intention to withdraw from the Gulf in 1971 led
to two territorial disputes. The first of these was the longstanding border dispute
between Abu Dhabi and Saudi Arabia at Al-Buraimi Oasis (the dispute was resolved
in August 1974, see Chapter 4). The second was the Iranian occupation of several
strategic islands in the Gulf which included the Greater and Lesser Tumbs and Abu
Musa, and claiming that Iran would not recognize the United Arab Emirates until it
had obtained control over all the islands. This point will be explained in detail later.
The first moves toward a federal union began in 195 1-52 with the establishment for
security purposes of the Trucial Oman Levies (later 'Trucial Oman Scouts'). Further,
the British Government brought together all the Trucial States' Shaikhs in a federal
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council under its supervision namely, the Trucial States Council. This council played
a essential role in linking the Emirates together with a modern transportation network
and numerous other major projects. As a 'protecting power' Britain was in a position
to ask the Shaikhs of the Trucial Coast to unite their tiny principalities into a Trucial
Federation which would permit them to make more constructive use of their modest
resources, offering Abu Dhabi the opportunity to share its wealth with the poorer
Emirates.52
The desire to establish the United Arab Emirates was considerably strengthened in
reaction first to the British Government's announcement of its intention to close its
militaiy bases east of Suez, and then the following year when withdrawal from the
Gulf was confirmed. Reaction to the Labour Government's announcement came in
the form of an agreement, on 18 February 1968, between Shaikh Zayed bin Sultan
al-Nahayyan, ruler of Abu Dhabi and Shaikh Rashid bin Said al-Maktum, ruler of
Dubai, both from the Bath Yas tribe. This agreement laid the foundation for the
greater federation. The English version of the agreement is divided into three
chapters.
Chapter One: 'The Establishment of a Federation for Arab Emirates'.
Chapter Two: deals with the authority of the Supreme Council.
Chapter Three: focusses on general rules.
The rulers of both Abu Dhabi and Dubai invited the Rulers of Sharjah, Ajman, Umm
al Quwain, Ras al Khaimah and Fujairali to discuss a larger federation. An invitation
was also extended to Bahrain and Qatar to discuss the future of the region.53
One of the most important outcomes of the Abu Dhabi - Dubai agreement of 18
February 1968 was the establishment of a maritime boundary between the two
Emirates, a settlement of which Dubai was particularly enthusiastic. Indeed, Dubai
was able to enlarge the area surrounding its Fath oil field.
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Figure 3.4: The establishment of the Federation on 2 December 1971 by six Emirates, Ras
al-Khaimah joins the Federation on 10 Februaiy 1972
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The accord declared:
As the actual territorial water limit between Dubai andAbu Dhabi Emirates
starts at Ras Hussyan on the coast, and stretches in a straight line in a
northwest direction across the sea passing to the west of the Fath wells which
belong to Dubai Emirate; and as both parties wish to reconsider this limit for
the benefit of the two states and their peoples; agreement has been reached
between both parties on the following: First: this limit will be readjusted to
annex to the Emirate of Duba.i an area of the sea, lying west of the present
limit parallel horizontally (laige base) and equal to ten kilometres measured
along the coast from the west starting from Ras Hu&syan and along as its
main symmetiy (small base) to a length equal to the present mentioned limit
in a manner to include this area west of the Fatah welLs and stretching
southwest to the coast." (54)
The accord was signed in Simayh, a crossing point on the Abu Dhabi - Dubai border.
This agreement was the first practical demonstration in the area that border problems
could be solved by co-operation between the rulers. After the British announcement
of withdrawal from the Gulf at the end of 1971, the 150-year-old treaty with Britain
relating to the defence and foreign relations of the Trucial States was replaced on 2
December 1971 by a new treaty of friendship between Britain and the United Arab
Emirates. The treaty was similar to the treaties concluded by Britain with Bahrain and
Qatar. However, shortly before the new federal state was established, Iran occupied Abu
Musa Island (Shaijah) and the Greater and Lesser Tumbs (Ras al-Khaimah). Official
British reaction to the establishment of the United Arab Emirates was announced by Sir
Alec Douglas Home in the House of Commons on 6 December 1971:
"I am glad to tell the House that the United Arab Emirates was formed on
Dec 2. The Ruler ofAbu Dhabi was sworn in as President. H.M. Government
had on the previous day terminated their special treaty relationship with the
six Emirates who are members of the Union. As previously agreed with the
Ruler, H.M. Government also terminated the special relationship with Ras
al Khaimah, which had decided not to join the Union. Also on Dec.2 H.M.
Government concluded with the Union a Treaty of Friendship, on the same
lines as the treaties concluded recently with Bahrain and Qatar.... ,,(55)
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From the above information it can be concluded that the formation of the United
Arab Emirates was encouraged as much by regional factors as by local initiative and
with the British Government's support.56
3.10 Ras aI-Khaimah Joins the Federation
The announcement of the establishment of the federation on 2 December 1971 was
by six Emirates (see Figure 3.4). Ras al-Khaimah refused to join the federation for
several reasons. First, according to Shaikh Zayed, the President of the U.A.E., the
reason was that Shaikh Saqr bin Mohammed Al-Qasimi, the ruler of Ras al-Khaimah
opposed the idea that the Emirates of Abu Dhabi and Dubai should acquire veto
powers, and insisted both on the formula of equal voting for all members and on the
law of equal representation in the Federal National Council. Shaikh Saqr bin
Mohammed Al-Qasimi, the ruler of Ras al-Khaimah revealed these two demands in
a broadcast on 22 July In addition, it has been reported that, Shaikh Saqr of
Ras al-Khaimah (who has ruled the Shaikhdom since 1948), was and remains very
proud of his tribe's history, and remembers the days of Qasimi greatness. He regarded
himself as the representative of the Qawasim, the most senior family of the area, he
believes. Moreover, his family had a history of brave opposition to the British, and
for that reason alone he would not be treated as inferior to the rulers of Abu Dhabi
and Dubai, neither of whom had such a record of opposition. 58 Shaikh Saqr had been
the first ruler of the Trucial Coast to chair the Trucial States Council, while the present
President of the U.A.E. (the ruler of Abu Dhabi) and the Vice-President of the
U.A.E. (the ruler of Dubai) were (merely) members of the Council. It was
incongruous for him, therefore, to be under these two Shaikhs authority when he had
formerly been in a superior position to them.59
Moreover, there was a chance that oil might be discovered in Ras al-Khaimah in
commercial quantities. Shaikh Saqr stayed outside the federation waiting for
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indications of oil in order to promote the Emirate to equal status with Abu Dhabi and
Dubai. This possibility encouraged Shaikh Saqr to delay joining the federation.°
It is also reported that, in order to avoid angering fran, the other Emirates refused
Ras al-Khaimah permission to join the federation because of its refusal to sign an
agreement with Iran about the Greater and Lesser Tumbs.
It became clear that Abu Dhabi was the dominant element within the Union because
of its wealth and the size of its population. Saudi Arabia (which had a border dispute
with Abu Dhabi) was the only state with an interest in weakening the federation led
by Abu Dhabi. 61 For this reason, Ras al-Khaimah was encouraged by Saudi Arabia
to pursue an independent course. Related to this was the fact that the two most
powerful members of the federation, Abu Dhabi and Dubai, both had close ties with
Iran. 62 In contrast, the origins of the spiritual bond between Ras al-Khaimah and
Saudi Arabia go back as far as the first Saudi state and the Wahhabi alliance.
Nowadays, only the ruling family in Ras al-Khaimah and a very tiny minority of the
population still owe allegiance to Wahhabism.
Having determined that oil wealth was not imminent, on 10 February 1972 Ras
al-Khaimah joined the federation as a seventh member of the union andwas accorded
six seats in the Federal Supreme Council (see Figure 3.4)•(63)
3.11 Conclusion
Historically, the Emirates might be classified as protectorates rather than colonies,
because they came under the British Foreign Office, and not the Colonial Office.
They were independent states under British protection.
The formation of the United Arab Emirates on 2 December 1971 was encouraged by
many factors such as the history, geography, racial homogeneity, language, religion
and culture shared by all the Trucial Coast peoples, as well as similarities in the
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political and economic systems. A century and a half of British presence beginning in
1820 upto 1971 helped to bring a certain stability to the area, as well as in relation to
neighbouring countries. Only in the 1950s and 1960s did the creation of a modem
society begin. For example, we have seen that the first modem school was not opened
until 1955 and health services in the desert and mountain areas, had not existed before
that date. The basic road network was established in the 1960s by the Trucial States
Council, before which journeys from the two largest population centres, Abu Dhabi
and Dubai, on the Arabian Gulf to the smaller towns on the country's Gulf of Oman
coast, such as Fujairali, were more easily achieved by sea than through the rocky
defiles of the Hajar Mountains.
Kuwait and Saudi Arabia also played essential roles through the years of negotiations
prior to the establishment of the federation. When the flag of the new state was first
raised on 2 December 1971, the six, and later seven, individual Emirates moved into
a new period of their history, facing the future as one.
Endnotes
1. Zahlan, R., The Origins of the United Arab Emirates, Macmillan. London, 1978, pp.114-115. See
also: Schofield, R. and Blake, G., Arabian Boundaries, Primaiy Documents 1853-1957, Vol.14,
Archive Editions, 1988, p.xxi. For more details on oil concession in the Trucial States from 1937,
see: Hawley, The Tmcial States, pp.209-223.
2. Hawley, Sir D., The Trucia! States, Allen & Unwin, London, 1970, pp.328-329.
3. Hawley, Sir D., The Tnicial States, Allen & Unwin, London, 1970, pp.209-211.
4. Mr. J.G. Laithwaite's 1928 memorandum on the Trucial Chiefs, Section 2: Internal History,
1908-28, in Schofield, R. and Blake, G., 'Trucial Coast: Internal Boundaries',Arabian Boundaries,
Primary Documents 1853-1957, Vol.14, Archive Editions, England, 1988, p.67.
5. Peterson, J.E., DefendingArabia, Croom Helm, London, 1986, p3.
6. On the first page of Part 1 of his Gazetteer, the historical volume, Lorimer wrote: "The Persian
Gulf first became known to the nation of Europe through the efforts of the Portuguese in the
sixteenth century, to wrest from the Arabs of the Mediterranean and the Middle East a monopoly
which they enjoyed as middle-men in the trade between Asia and Europe."
7. Hawley, Sir D., The Trucial States, Allen & Unwin, 1970, pp.74-78.
8. Hawley, Sir D., The Trucial States, Allen & Unwin, 1970, p.7.
9. It means the Red Island, also known as Jazirat Za'ab. The name derives from the name of the tribe
which inhabits the island: Za'ab. Shaikh Saqr bin Mohammed the ruler of Ras al- Khaimali has
Chapter Three	 129
succeeded in bringing under his rule Jazirat al- Hamrah which was previously independent. That
happened when he took decisive action against Abdullah bin Hasan Shaikh of Za'ab, that he
occupied a watch tower situated opposite the island on 18 January 1951. (Schofield, R, and Blake,
G.,Arabian Boundaries. Primwy Documents 1853-1957, Vol. 14, Archive Editions, England, 1988,
p384. See also: Hay, R., The Persian Gulf States. p.128.
10. Lorimer, J.G., Gazetteer of the Persian Gulf Oman, and Central Arabia. Volume I Historical part
1. Calcutta Superintendent Government Printing, Calcutta, 1915. p.671.
11. Hay, Sir R., The Persian Gulf States, The Middle East Institute. Washington D.C., 1959, p.128.
12. Lorimer, J.G., Gazetteer of the Persian Gulf Oman, and Central Arabia, Vo1J Historical Part 1,
Calcutta, 1915, reprinted in 1970 by Gregg International, England.
13. Hurewitz, J.C., Diplomacy in the Near and Middle EaSL A Documentary Record. 1535-1914, Vol.1,
Van Nostrand, London. p.89.
14. Hawley, Sir D., The Trucial States, Allen & Unwin, 1970, pp326-327.
15. Loriiner, J.G., Gazetteer of the Persian Gulf Oman, and CentralArabia. Vol.IIB: Geographical and
Statistical, Gregg International, England, 1970, p.1450.
16. Zahlan, R.S., The Origins of the United Arab Emirates, Macmillan, London, 1978, p.xiii.
17. Taryam, A.O., The Establishment ofthe UnitedArab Emirates 1950-85, Croom Helm, London, 1987,
p.229.
18. Taryani, A.O., The Establishment of the UnitedArab Emirates, Croom Helm, 1987, London, p.229.
19. Albaharna, H.M., The Legal Status of the Arabian Gulf States. Manchester University Press, 1968,
pp316-17.
20. Zahlan, R.S., The Origins of the UnitedArab Emirates. Macmillan Press Ltd. London, 1978, p3.
21. Hawley, Sir D., The Trucial States, Allen & Unwin, London, 1970, pp328-329.
22. Letters from Mr C.J. Treadwell on 25 July 1991, Sussex, and another letter from Mr Julian Walker
14 July 1991.
22b. Schofield, R. and Blake, G., Arabian Boundaries: Primary Documents 1853-1957, volume 14,
Archive Editions, England, 1988, p.113.
22c. For more details about the physical geography of the U.A.E. see The Nation al Atlas of the United
Arab Emirates, published by U.A.E. University in 1984; see also The Physical Geography of the
United Arab Emirates: A Study in Regional Geography (Al-Jugraffijya Al-Tabi'iyyah), by Abdul
Hamid Ghunaim, Al-Qaral Ill Jamih, Dubai, 1991 (Arabic); see also UnitedArab Emirates: Heritage
and Modem Development by Peter Vine and Paula Casey, published by Immel Publishing, 1992.
23a. From 1960-1990 the percentage of urban population annual growth rate for the U.A.E. was 12.5%,
the second largest in the world after Botswana, which was 13.5%. See Human Development Report
1991, published for the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) by Oxford University
Press, New York/Oxford, 1991, p.158.
23b.Al-Khaleej, Friday 11 March 1994, Sharjah, U.A.E.
23c. Lorimer, J.G., Gazetteer of the Persian Gulf Oman and Central Arabia, Vol.1: Historical Part 1,
Calcutta Superintendent Government Printing, Calcutta, 1915, p.772, reprinted in 1970 by Gregg
International, England.
24a. Zahlan, R., The Origins of the United Arab Emirates, A Political and Social History of the Trucial
States, Macmillan, London, 1978, p.102.
24. Zahlan, R., The Origins of the UnitedArab Emirates, A Political and Social History of the Trucial
States, Macmillan, London, 1978, pp.92-103.
Chapter Three	 130
25. Hay, Sir R., The Persian Gulf States, The Middle East Institute, Washington,D.C., 1959, p.123.; See
also: Hawley, p.224.
26. Lorimer,J.G.,GazetteerofthePersian Gulf Oman, and CentralArabia. Vol.IIB: Geographical and
Statistical, Gregg International, England, 1970, p.1560.
27. Hawley, Sir D., The Trucial States, Allen & Unwin, 1970, p.344.
28. Lorinier, J.G., Gazetteer of the Persian Gulf Oman and Central Arabia. Vol:I Historical part 1,
Calcutta, 1915, reprinted in 1970 by Gregg International, England, p.777.
29. FO 371i114648, Report prepared by Julian Walker on the Trucial States boundary settlement,
March 1955.
30. F0371J126932, letter from A.R. Walmsley, M.B.E., Foreign Office, London, to British Residency
in Bahrain, 6 February 1957.
31. Zahlan, R., The Origins of the United Arab Emirates, Macmillan, London, 1978, pp..
32. Development Office, Dubai, Tnicial States CounciLAnnualRepot, Development Office, Dubai, p2.
33. With respect to the agricultural services programme which was prepared by the council, a soil
survey was carried out during the winter of 1966 by a team from the Geography Department of the
University of Durham for Sir William Haicrow and Partners. The geography team comprised
Professor H. B owen-Jones and Mr. J.H. Stevens, who were asked in 1967 to carry out the necessary
detailed investigations as consultants to Sir William Haicrow and Partners. The survey
concentrated on two areas: Tawi Mileiha, of Sharjah, and Tawi Hamranyali, of Ras al-Khaimah.
In their conclusion, the Durham University team laid out recommendations which included land
management and irrigation practice, which were taken into account for successful development.
Bowen-Jones, H. and Stevens, J.H., Mileiha Development Projec4 Hwnraniyah Development Area,
Department of Geography, University of Durham,, Durham, 1967.
34. FO/371 163025, Special Report on the Trucial States Council, 1962.
35. Sir William Luce: formerly a member of the Sudan Civil Service; 1956-60: Governor-General of
Aden; 1961-66: Political Resident in the Gulf; 1970-71: Personal Representative for Gulf Affairs
of the British Foreign Secretary, Sir Alec Douglas-Home. Kelly, J .B .,Arabia the Gulf and the West,
Weidenleld and Nicolson, London, 1980, p.80.
36. Luce, Sir W., Round Table, No.236, October 1969, p.350.
37. Khalifa, A.M The UnitedArab Emirates: Unity in Fragmentation. Croom Helm, London, 1979, p.25.
38. Burrows, B., Footnotes in The Sand The Gulf in Transition 1953-1958, Michael Russell, Salisbury,
1990, p33.
39. Burrows, B., Footnotes in The Sand. The Gulf in Transition 1953-1 958. Michael Russell, 1990, p.18.
40. Hawley, Sir D. The Trucial States. Allen & Unwin, London, 1970, p.23.
41. Zahlan, S.R., The Origins of the UnitedArab Emirates (1978), Macmillan, London, p.192.
42. Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), House of Commons, Vol.827, 6 December 1971, p. 946.
43. FO 371i114648, Report prepared by Jullan Walker on the Trucial States boundary settlement,
March 1955. Interview with Julian Walker, Thursday 9 July 1992, Foreign Office, London.
44. Abdulla, M.M., The UnitedArab Emirates:A Modern History, Croom Helm, London, 1978, p.291.
45. Peterson, J.E., 'Tribes and Politics in Eastern Arabia', The Middle East Journal, VoLxxxi, Middle
East Institute, Washington D.C., 1977, p.298.
46. Kelly, J.B., Eastern Arabian Frontiers, Faber and Faber, London, 1964, p.18.
Chapter Three	 131
47. The factions of Hinawi and Ghafiri were aggravated in the early eighteenth century when a civil
war broke out between tribal chiefs over the disputed succession to the immamate of Oman.
Thereafter, the war overwhelmed the whole of Oman and the Trucial Coast divided the tribes into
two factions, those who followed the Bath Hina and others followed the Bath Ghaflr. For more
details see Miles, The Countries and Tribes of the Persian Gulf, p. 247.
48. This table is based on information given in: Abdullali, M.M., The UnitedArab Emirates, A Modem
History, pp.221-223.
49. Lord Home, The Way the Wind Blows, An Autobiography, Collins, London, 1976, p.261.
50. The researcher interviewed Mr Julian Walker on Friday 19 July1991 in Durham, United Kingdom.
51. Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), House of Commons, Session 1970-71 comprising period from
22 February 1971 - 5 March 1971, Fifth Series-Volume 812, Her Majesty's Stationery Office,
London, p.1230.
52. FO/371 163025, Article in The Guardian, entitled 'Far from the deluge of Arab Nationalism Older
rhythms persist in the Trucial States.'
53. Taryam, A.O., The Establishment of the UnitedArab Emirates, Croom Helm, London, 1987, p.89.
54. Taryain, A.O., The Establishment of the UnitedArab Emirates, Croom Helm, London, 1987, p.90.
55. Keesing's Contemporaiy Archives, Vol.XVIII, 1971-72, p.25-lOU.
56. Khalifa, AM., The UnitedArab Emirates: Uniiy in Fragmentation ( 1979), Croom Helm, London, p.133.
57. Arab Record and Report, 1971, p374.
58. Kelly, J.B.,Arabia, the Gulf and the West, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1980, p.201. Also:
interview with Mr. Julian Walker (the last British Political Agent in Dubai 1970-71, and one of the
negotiators of the formation of the federation), Friday 19 July 1991, Durham, U.K..
59. Interview with His Excellency Mr. Essa Saleh Al-Gurg C.B.E, the U.A.E. Ambassador to the
United Kingdom (former Assistant Director of the Trucial States Council), 20 February 1993 in
Dubai.
60. ThaTha'i, A., Al Nidham Al-Itihady fi al-Imarat Al- Arabiyah Al Muttahidah: Dirasa Muqaranah
(The Federal System in the United Arab Emirates: A Comparative Study), Matba'at al- Gahrab,
Cairo. 1978, pp.69-70. See also: Heard-Bey, F.,From Trucial States to UnitedArab Emirates, Croom
Helm, London, 1982 pp.369-70.
61. The Times, Saturday 11 December 1971.
62. The Times, Saturday 11 December 1971.
63. Arab Report & Record, 1-14 February 1972, p.67.
Chapter Three	 132
Chapter 4
The Establishment of the U.A.E. Boundaries
4.1 Introduction
This chapter addresses the historical background to the emergence of the Emirates'
international boundaries.
The boundaries question in the Gulf area in general and in the Trucial States in
particular emerged with the discovery of oil in commercial quantities in different
areas between the two World Wars. It was the discovery of oil which made the inland
areas of Arabia so important. Consequently, it is difficult to approach questions of
boundaries between these Emirates without going back to historical records. The
following section of this chapter, therefore, highlights the history of boundary
demarcation in the Trucial States (later U.A.E.) because the demarcation of the
boundaries between these Shaikhdoms, as well as those between the Trucial States
and its neighbours, Saudi Arabia and the Sultanate of Oman, profoundly influenced
the transformation of these seven tiny Shaikhdoms into the United Arab Emirates.
This chapter also offers a rare description of the boundary between the U.A.E. and
Saudi Arabia based on the unpublished 1974 agreement, and the original text of the
1974 agreement is attached as an appendix. The aim of this chapter is to highlight the
international boundaries of the U.A.E. on which external framework hangs the
internal boundaries of the Emirates, giving shape, size, and area to the state. The
international boundaries of the U.A.E. mark the limits of protection and security.
4.2 The history of boundary demarcation in the States
The question to be addressed is why boundary lines have emerged in this part of the
Arabian Peninsula in which the desert is the prevailing element. Immediately after
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the First World War, Great Britain undertook to settle disputes between Emirates in
the region, such as the 1920 Seeb settlement between Muscat and Oman which
demarcated the boundaries on a tribal basis. The Al-Uqqair agreement in 1922
between Kuwait and Iraq and Najd was another example of British boundary-making.
The idea of creating neutral zones emerged at this time in response to tribal needs,
in which sovereignty was shared, and the tribes of the two sides could also share and
utilize the grazing land. The principle of neutral zones can be equally applied to oil
revenues when oil is discovered, such as in the Kuwait-Saudi Arabia Neutral Zone
(1923-1965), the Saudi Arabia-Iraq Neutral Zone (1923-1981) and the Abu
Dhabi-Dubai Neutral Zone (1969). Since the Trucial Oman Shaikhdom emerged
with its well-known shape after the 1820 treaty, neither Britain nor the Shaikhdoms
considered boundary delimitation a priority. In respect of the Shaikhdoms, their
rulers were uninterested because the geographical concept of the boundary was
undeveloped: the economic system of the desert land relies on grazing, and shepherds
do not recognize boundaries, their movement depending on seasonal rainfall. 1 The
desert environment is sometimes compared to the high seas. The free movement of
the Bedouin in the desert had known no limits in the past. The land had little value
other than for grazing. However, the shape of inter-emirate boundaries began to
evolve after the signing of the 1820 treaty. 2) First, in the same year, Britain had
concluded treaties with the rulers of the eight Emirates. This number was reduced to
five in 1914. In 1952 Britain recognized Fujairah as a Shaikhdom independent of
Sharjah. In the same year, Kalba became a dependency of Sharjah. Finally, the
number of Shaikhdoms was raised to seven 3 (see Chapter 3).
Throughout that period, Britain recognized no boundaries between the Shaikhdoms.
This gave a strong Shaikhdom the opportunity to expand its territory at the expense
of its neighbour. Alternatively, new Trucial Sbaikhdoms could emerge provided that
they agreed to the treaties' conditions. 4
 Under the Exclusive (Agreement) Treaty of
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1892, the Shaikhs of the coast undertook not to cede, sell, or mortgage any part of
their territory to any party but to the British government (see Chapter 3). These
treaties were, however, not concerned with the delimitation of political boundaries
between Shaikhdonis, not least because the British government recognised that to
demarcate these boundaries would be problematic, and would offer little gain.
Concern for inter-Emirate boundary demarcation began after the emergence of
Ottoman competition in the early part of the twentieth century. 5 This is clear from
the agreement which was signed on 20 July 1913 between Britain and the Ottoman
empire. 6 Britain's concern for internal boundaries between the Shaikhdoms began
in earnest when oil companies became interested in winning concessions to search
for oil in the Shaikhdoms in the 1930s.
4.2.1 The Discovery of Oil
The beginning of oil exploration prompted the Shaikhs to recognise the advantages
of demarcating where their Shaikhdom began and endedP The British authorities
did not initially become involved in the question of boundaries. However, after 1937,
the British geological teams began a survey in the interior. It was then that the British
were obliged to settle the vexed question of several tribal loyalties.8
The first attempt to define the boundaries of the Shaikhdoms was in fact made byJ.G.
Lorimer at the beginning of the twentieth century. He was collecting information for
his Gazetteer of the Periian Gulf, Oman and CentralArabia with the co-operation of
Hinter, who drew the map for this book in 1917. Lorimer's definition was approximate
and he acknowledges that: "Inland, [its] frontiers are more difficult to define".9
After that, in 1937, the first sketch map showing the boundaries of the Trucial
Shaikhdoms was drawn by Captain Hickinbothani, the Political Agent in the Gulf. To
draw his map, he depended on tribal loyalties because the geographical information
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of the interior, and the deficiency of an accurate physical map were the main problems
which faced the British authority in demarcating the boundaries.
When oil exploration concessions were being sought in 1935 and 1936 by D'Arcy
Exploration Company Ltd (a subsidiary of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company) to search
for oil in all the states of the Trucial Coast, 10 the boundary demarcation emerged as
a very significant matter and each Shaikh began to claim a larger territory for his
Shaikhdom regardless of whether it was inhabited. An enlarged area clearly means a
greater possibility of finding out oil. Thus the Shaikh's income would increase from
granting concessions for oil exploration, and potentially also from oil production.
Each Shaikh tried to encroach on the boundary of his neighbours and to extend his
territory. The territory of each Shaikhdom was not clear for petroleum concessions,
which needed to know the extent of the Shaikhdom, and its hinterland, that each
Shaikh effectively controlled. In wanting to explore the hinterland, access was needed
there. C.M. Pine-Gordon's letter (he was British Resident in Bahrain in 1952,
Political Agent in Dubai 1953-5) to the Foreign Office in London explained the
situation thus:
"The oil company suggested that the boundaries should be defined inland
from the coast for a distance greater than the 25-30 kilometres originally
envisaged - in fact, as far as the approximate dividing line between Oman
and the Trucial Coast Shaikhdoms. They (the oil company) also want the
Ras al-Khaimah: Umm al-Qaiwain and Sharjah Dubai boundaries
demarcated, and say they may later ask for the Dubai : Abu Dhabi boundary
to be carried beyond alAshush.' 11 (See Appendix El and E2).
When Christopher Pine-Gordon became Political Agent in Dubai in 1953, he
arbitrated over the Shaikhdoms' boundaries and the rulers agreed that they would
not dispute the results of his arbitration. 12 Pine-Gordon started the arbitration work
by touring the boundary between the two Shaikhdoms of Umm al-Quwain and Ras
al-Khaimah, but he was so disillusioned by his first day's experience in the field that
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he decided to delegate the boundary work to his assistant in the Political Agency,
Julian Walker. 13 According to Julian Walker, the pressure to demarcate the
boundaries between the Trucial Shaikhdoms was due to oil:
"Oilprospecting on the Trucial Coast made the local oil company, Petroleum
Development Trucial Coast (PDTC), keen that the boundaries between the
various Shailthdoms there should be definecL"14
The rulers themselves were anxious to encourage exploration by the oil company in
the hopes that it could foreshadow the end of the poverty which had affected the area
after the collapse of the pearl trade.'
It seems clear that the major reason behind the emergence of the boundaries between
these Shaikhdoms was the discovery of oil and then the treaties and the independence
movements within the Barn Yas tribe (1833, the independence of Dubai from Abu
Dhabi) the independence movements within the Qawasim (Ras al-Khaimah, Kalba,
Himriyya, Fujairah, from 1891-1971).
Thus, it was important to know the extent of each Shaikhdom and the hinterland area
that each Shaikh controlled. The oil companies also needed to be granted access
either by the rulers (Shaikhs) who controlled the area or by direct authority of the
local tribes who inhabited the hinterland. In 1937, land which had little value other
than to the handful of people in the area, began to have greater value in the eyes of
the rulers to the extent that the Shaikhs became aware of every square inch of land.'6
To each Shaikh, boundary delimitation became an important issue in 1935 with the
arrival of oil concessions. These were described by Captain Hickinbotham, the
Political Agent in Bahrain on 10 July 1937:
"Petroleum Concessions Limited quite naturally are anxious to know exactly
for what amount of territoiy they are buying concessions and at the same time
the Trucial Shaikh Ls anxious, especially in the event of oil being discovered,
to claim as much te,ritoiy as he possibly can. The present boundaries between
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the states are not demarcated with any accuracy and I am doubiful if any of
the Trucial Shaikhs themselves can accurately describe where their territorial
boundaries run... The advent of oil has made these [barren] areas potentially
as rich as areas where there is water and grazing and now the individual
Shaikhs are anxious to claim as much land, however bairen, as they possibly
can. This will give rise to boundaiy disputes between the Shaikhs, even along
boundaries which are fairly clearly defined...some of the Shaikhs have been
gradually losing control and what was considered an integral part of the
Shaikhdom ten yeais or more ago has now become separated and under the
ruler of the Shaikh of one of the nomadic tribes."11
In 1937 the British Political Agent in Sharjah was asked to establish the territories of the
Shaikhs along the coast. The granting of concessions to oil companies by the Shaikhs made
fixing boundaries of the various Shaikhdoms essential. The ruler of Abu Dhabi, Shaikh
Shakhbut bin Sultan was the first Shaikh of the Trucial Coast to recognise the significance
of the territorial limits. He therefore, defined and proclaimed his boundary with Dubai.18
Conflicts arose between the Shaikhs in certain areas. Indeed, these disagreements led to
some clashes for example between Dubai and Abu Dhabi which both claimed Jabal All
and Khur Genadha, a dispute which lasted from 1945 until 1948.
The oil companies began their operations immediately after the World War II.
Security and stability became essential in the Emirates, and the British Foreign Office
therefore began to consider how to resolve boundary disputes between the
Shaikhdoms. Thus, Julian Walker was sent to demarcate and to map between the
Emirates themselves, and between the Emirates and Oman. Walker travelled the
desert and mountainous parts from 1954 to 1955 trying to determine which Shaikh
ruled which bit of land. Making use of information supplied by Julian Walker, the
Research Department of the Foreign Office prepared the first official map of the
internal boundaries in the Trucial States in February 1963. It is important to note that
there was another person who was involved in the Trucial States (U.A.E.) boundary
demarcation especially with its neighbour, the Sultanate of Oman. The Honorable
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Lord Martin Buckmaster spent four years in the field, surveying the Abu Dhabi-Saudi
Arabia border and the boundary between Ras al-Khaimah and Oman.19
It is arguable that what the two men did was to record the situation as they found it,
reflecting tribal loyalties to different Shaikhs. They did not attempt to impose
boundaries and because of that, the map of the U.A.E. finished up looking like a
jig-saw puzzieP°
Another writer Sir Donald Hawley (21) bad the view that:
"Previously, there had been no boundaries between the states, as boundaries
in the European sense were unknown anywhere in Arabia. "
Julian Walker has commented:
"The concepts of nation states, of territorial sovereignty, and of fired linear
frontiers are western ones, which have been imposed on the traditional society
of the Arabian Peninsula".
Such views were held by government officers and Her Majesty's Government
representative in the region. It is interesting to ask to what extent the Shaikhs of the
Trucial States recognised boundaries. The answer lies in historical documents and
some official letters. For instance, Shaikh Sa'ed bin Maktum O.B.E., the ruler of
Dubai, sent a letter dated 12 January 1949 to Mr P.D. Stobart the Political Agent of
the Trucial Coast describing Dubai's boundary with her neighbour Abu Dhabi:
"... We do not have any documents or papers which deal with boundaries...
besides the conflict in respect of boundaries was not expected to take records
and to keep it". (See Appendix F).
Several maps published by the Foreign Office show the Trucial States with their
capitals as sea ports. The boundary lines between the Shaikhdoms were not shown,
which means that the internal boundary between the various Shaikhdoms emerged
only after the discovery of the oil.
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Walker began his work in March 1955 and continued until 1960 but at irregular
periods. He produced a report and recommendations which were accepted in London
by all the Shaikhdom Rulers with only one exception. The ruler of Abu Dhabi, Shaikh
Shakhbut, refused to accept the arbitrations made by the British. What made the
boundaiy questions in the United Arab Emirates extraordinarily complicated was
that the boundaries of the Emirates with each other include not only the seven
Emirates but also their several territories and enclaves.
4.2.2 Conclusion
Internal boundaries between the Emirates resulted from a political tribal conception,
and feelings of ioyalty which concentrated around the Emirates after the collapse of
two tribal confederations. First, the Qawasim federation at the beginning of the
twentieth century: Shaikh Sultan bin Saqr, who ruled Sharjah from 1803-66, extended
his sovereignty to the Gulf of Oman, where he controlled Kalba and Fujairah - Shaijah
was then a relatively large state which included Sharjah town, Ras al-Khaimah, the
inland oasis of Dhaid, and the islands of Abu Musa and the two Tunbs. Secondly, the
collapse of the Bani Yas confederation in 1833, when the Al Bu Falasah section of
the Bani Yas tribe established themselves in Dubai and began to build up their little
town as a trading centre.
In addition, the 1820 treaty gave every small Emirate its independent political
identity. Merchants had been financially supporting the Shaikhs without any income.
The merchants were bankrupted by the collapse of the pearl trade, on which they
depended for their living. When oil was discovered, many Gulf Shaikhdoms and the
Shaikhs became wealthy once more. Hand in hand with this new wealth was the need
to delimit internal boundaries.
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4.3. The Classification of the U.A.E. Boundaries
4.3.1 Introduction
Boundaries appear on maps as thin lines. On the ground they mark the limit of the
State's sovereignty. It is useful to distinguish frontiers from boundaries: a boundary
is a defined line of separation; a frontier is a zone of contact. Located at the interfaces
between adjacent state territories, international boundaries have a special
significance in determining the limits of sovereignty.
The term 'boundary' denotes a line drawn on the map. A 'frontier' is a regia zone,
with width as well as length. The width of the zone may need to be defined, and may
vary from place to place along the frontier. Frontiers were more common features of
the political landscape centuries ago. However, by the beginning of this century
frontiers had largely disappeared and were replaced by boundary lines. 27 Territorial
disputes in the United Arab Emirates can be divided into four types:
1. Inter-Emirate border (border within the union members).
2. Enclave.
3. Boundaries between the U.A.E. and its neighbours.
4. The maritime boundaries of the U.A.E. and the islands.
The foregoing classification should not be held too rigidly because occasionally more
than two parties are involved in one dispute. For example: a dispute about Madha
village was considered to be between Oman and Sharjah, and as an enclave within the
U.A.E. territory. A dispute on Abu Musa island was between Iran, the Emirate of
Sharjali, and an oil company working under the authority of the Emirate of Umm
al-Quwain.
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4.3.2 Natural and Artificial Boundaries
The classic and the oldest classification of boundaries often uses two basic categories,
'natural boundaries' and 'artificial boundaries.' Lines which follow geographical
features such as mountains, rivers, lakes, creeks or bays, coastlines, seas, and marsh
or salt marsh have been utilised in creating 'geographical boundaries.' Such naturally
defined boundaries were useful in the early days of boundary establishment, because
they were generally known and could be recognized. However, major difficulties
between states have arisen, particularly with rivers because although they appear to
be useful boundary features, rivers tend to shift their course. The new course demands
a redefinition of the boundary, which tends to cause friction. However, the position
of uncertainty over boundaries in many parts of east Arabia is largely connected with
the absence of natural boundaries.
Boundaries which do not follow any geographical feature, and which are marked on
the ground by monuments or pillars or any landmark placed by human beings, are
known as 'artificial boundaries.' It will be shown below that in the U.A.E. both natural
and artificial boundaries can be found. In Chapter 6, a full description of the boundary
lines of each Emirate with its neighbours is given. From this description, it can be
concluded that although there are boundaries which refer to prominent physical
features such as the fact that the Dubai-Sharjalh boundary starts with the first point
from the coast at Kliur al-Manrzar (Khur means lagoon) which is a physical boundary
point 29 dividing Dubai from Sharjah, further inland the boundary lines are artificial.
About 70 pillars driven into the ground mark the border points. The last border point
between Dubai and Sharjab at Jabal Nezwa, whilst marked with a pillar, can be said
to be a physical feature since Jabal Nezwa refers to the mountain of Nezwa (see
Chapter 6).
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The same can be said about the international boundaries between the U.A.E. and Saudi
Arabia. On the coast; Ras Kliumais is marked as within the UAE. territory and west of
Ras Khumais including Khur Duwaihin are within Saudi territory, marked by a natural
boundary. On the other side, the southern boundary between the UAE. and Saudi
Arabia, the line starts at a point on the Gulf coast to the east of Khur Duwaihin and
commences in a south easterly direction to Ras AI-Mihradh, then to Al-Ribadh and on
to Umm al-Zummul, where the borders of Saudi Arabia, the U.A.E. and the Sultanate
of Oman converge (see the U.A.E-Saudi boundary section in this chapter). This boundary
line does not follow any physical features because in that part of eastern Arabia the deserts
present no physical features. In the absence of naturally marked boundary sites, the
boundary line is demarcated as an artificial boundary.
It can be concluded that in certain parts of the U.A.E. some boundary lines follow
physical features, and are therefore physiographic boundaries, but in other parts they
are marked by pillars and signboards ion the ground, not following any natural feature.
The U.A.E. thus has both "natural" and artificial boundaries.
4.4 The International Boundaries of the U.A.E.
In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries several important factors directly
contributed to the evolution of boundaries in the Arabian Peninsula the collapse of the
Ottoman Empire in western Arabia; the growth of Arab nationalism; and the concern of
Britain and France to protect their strategic interests such as communications and oil
supplies$° The international boundaries of the United Arab Emirates form the external
frame of the state which gives the shape, size and the area of the state.
The concept of nation states, of territorial sovereignty, and of fixed linear frontiers
are western ones, which have been imposed on the traditional society of the Arabian
peninsula, although alien to the tribes of the region.
Chapter 4	 143
There were several other factors which complicated the boundary demarcation such
as tribal movements and tribal loyalties, the collection of zakat (on crops) and official
letters between Shaikhs about territorial matters. The federal boundaries of the
United Arab Emirates divide into two main parts.
4.4.1 The U.A.E-Oman Boundary
Geographically this section may be divided into six parts according to the six federal
units of the U.A.E. which are bounded by Omani territory. They are: Oman boundary
with Abu Dhabi; Oman boundary with Dubai; Oman boundary with Ajman; Oman
boundary with Sharjah; the Omani enclave, Wadi Madhah (see Chapter 6); and the
Omani outlier Raus al-Jibal, the Musandam Peninsula, bordering the Emirate of Ras
Al-Khaimah.
a.	 Abu Dhabi
This boundary results from a survey of the frontier between the State of Abu Dhabi
and the Sultanate of Oman, and is based on information supplied by Julian Walker.
His description of the frontier line is as follows: the line runs from a point north of
Shaab al Ghaf westwards through the Sabkah Thuwaimah leaving Naqa al Hauz in
Abu Dhabi and then to the north of Husn Siqqiya. It continues in straight lines
westwards to Jizaat Daali which is a wooded area to Ghaf Sanuta, a small group of
large trees. Hiyaira is a small wooded area and then to the top of the highest dune in
the Muhanna group.
From Muhanna the border runs south eastwards leaving Raqaat Yaariba in Abu
Dhabi to a point between Raqaat Al Aradh and Sih Gnaiyyir where it turns south
passing west of Raqaat as Salli to the summit of Naqa Sulaima.
The frontier continues southwards to the dunes of Ranilat Saham and thence to a
point in the sand just north of Shantut (in Muscat). From this point it runs in a straight
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line to a large sand dune 15 miles west of Tawi Al Augan and on to the eastern end
of the dune range of Urq al Rahail. Thence the border runs to a point halfway between
the dunes of Mdairum and Raqaiyat and continues southward in straight lines running
east of Ghadda bul Abbas to a point west of khur Umm al Aush and straight on to al
Ghuwaifah in Sih Awaiyya. From there it continues through astro point Sih a! Haira
and through the centre of the eastern kharimat Gharaidha to the narrow part of
western Sih Saul east of the Sabkha.
The border then runs straight to a point just east of astro point, Naqa Naif it continues
southward following the low sand ridges to Nabgha al Hussainiyaht and on between
Raddat al Hadh to the west and Diaithir to the east to the summit of Naqa Zahar
passing to the west of khur Manahil. From Naqa Zahar the frontier should run in a
straight line in the direction of Umm al Zamul stopping just short of the wells 31 (see
Figure 4.1).
b.	 The Oman border with Dubai and Ajman:
Dubai has one part separated from it, namely Hatta. 32
 It is a classic exciave. There
is an historical tradition story that the Sultan of Muscat offered the Ruler of Dubai a
choice of the Musandam Peninsula or the Wadi Hatta and the Ruler chose the
latter. 33 This historical fact may be true because numerous elders of Hatta still talk
about this story. Lorimer records the transfer of the wadi Hatta after 1870 from
Saiyid Turki, the Sultan of Oman to the Shaikh of Dubai.
Migrating Border Villages: Two maps were produced by GEOprojects of London in
1983 (scale 1:1,320,000), one for the United Arab Emirates and the other for the
Sultanate of Oman. Close examination of the map of the border between the Emirates
and Oman, particularly regarding Hatta of Dubai and Masfut of Ajman. shows
different locations for the villages of Masfut, the enclave of the Emirate of Ajman
and Hatta, the enclave of the Emirate of Dubai. On the Oman map, wadis Hatta and
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Figure 4.1 Map of Oman-Abu Dhabi East Region Boundaries
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Masfut are both outside United Arab Emirate territories, and are located south of
the international boundary of the country in Omani territory. On the United Arab
Emirates map, published by the same company, the two villages are shown within
Emirates territory. It might be thought that the villages are in dispute and that each
national version of the maps is to please the customer, but this seems unlikely because
the villages are enclaves of Ajman (Masfut) and Dubai (Hatta). The boundary here
follows the same alignment in both maps. The reason for the apparent migration of
these villages has been partly explained in a letter to the researcher from
GEOprojects. The reasons given are that the U.A.E. map is dated 1992 and has been
intermittently revised to its present degree of accuracy, whereas the Oman map is a
1983 publication and is somewhat out of date. At the time of the publication, the
boundaries on the Oman map were taken from the best sources available to the
company, which were not very detailed and quite small. More recently, with the
cooperation of the National Survey Authority in Oman, GEOprojects have been
provided with maps depicting the boundary in much greater detail. It is through the
use of such sources that the U.A.E. map shows the situation accurately. The company
explain that the costly process of keeping maps up to date has to be balanced against
actual map sales, and only recently has the Oman map entered into the revision
programme. A major revision is planned for the near future . The villages of Hatta
and Masfut which border Omani territory are discussed fully in Chapter 6, based on
field work by the researcher in the border area between the United Arab Emirates
and the Sultanate of Oman.
Another feature from the Geo-Project map, in connection with the Emirates-Oman
boundary, is the village of Hadf. It lies on the south side of the western side of wadi
Hatta. This wadi is classified in many maps as a Neutral Zone between Ajman
(U.A.E.) and Oman. Whilst it is clearly shown on the Emirates map as a neutral zone,
it has disappeared from the Oman map (see Figure 4.2).
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Figure 4.2 The GEOproject Map and the migrating border villages of Hatta and Masfut
within Omani Territory.
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c.	 The Oman border with Sharjah
Wadi Madha (the Madha enclave) belongs to Oman, but is located in the north-east
of the Emirates surrounded by Emirates lands. It occupies an area of 75 km2, and has
a population of about 2,500. According to Julian Walker's report of 1955, Muscat
claims the whole wadi and it was beyond his competence to define frontiers there. He
noted at the time that Sharjah controls the two villages at the head of the wadi, Nahawa
and Shis, and these are marked accordingly on the 1962 map (see folded Foreign
Office map of the internal boundaries of the Trucial States).()
 However, in an
interview with the researcher, he admitted an error in the location of Nahawa on the
1962 map. In fact, Nahawa should be located within the Omani enclave, not outside
it. This dispute will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 6.
4.4.2 The Oman border with Ras aI-Khaimah
The second Omani outlier within the U.A.E. territory land is the Musandam
Peninsula orRuus al-Jebaal which means heads of the mountains. This Omani outlier
is separated from the main Oman body by the Shaikhdoms of Ras al-Khaimah,
Fujairah and Sharjah.
4.4.3 Geography of Musandam
This peninsula is one of the significant features of eastern Arabia and overlooks the
Strait of Hormuz. Lorimer said: "it may be considered to mark the entrance of the
Persian Gulf and to divide that sea from the Gulf of Oman." Until a decade ago it
was largely isolated from the rest of Arabia, including the Omani mainland itself, not
least because it is poor in natural resources. The economy of Musandam peninsula
mostly depends on the neighbouring United Arab Emirates, although its people still
bold strong allegiance to Sultan Qaboos of Oman. 37 Formerly however, the
al-Qawasim rule was consolidated along the Gulf coast north of Dubai and into the
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Musandam Peninsula in the early nineteenth century.() The Qawasim rulers and the
Sultan of Oman carried on a long struggle to impose their authority on the whole
region. Qawasim strength prevailed during the last part of the 18th century
establishing some communities on Qishm and Lingah on the Iranian coast of the
Gulf. 39
 Geographically, the Shihuh area in the Musandam Peninsula is divided into
two zones:
1. The zone of limestone mountain-range, with wadis directed towards the coast
and filled with limestone debris.
2. The narrow coastal zone, whose extent is interrupted by mountains.
4.4.4 The Conflict between the U.A.E. and Oman
In 1977 a dispute between Ras al-Khaimah and Oman in the Ras Musandani began
on a ten mile coastal strip as far as the village of Rums. The area takes in an important
industrial complex, including a cement plant and a fish-processing plant at the port
of Khur Khuwair.41
According to Robert Litwak, ideas of a Greater Oman have been circulated
periodically by Oman in the past, to include large parts of the U.A.E. territories and
to establish a direct territorial link with Ras Musandam, the vital enclave on the tip
of the peninsula which controls the Strait of Hormuz. 42
 The boundary dispute
between the two parties re-emerged as a source of friction in 1977-78 after differences
over the demarcation of their continental shelf boundary. It followed the start of oil
exploration in the waters adjacent to a disputed area between the villages of Dawra
and Rams in Ras aI-Khaimah. 43 It was reported that at the beginning of December
1977 Sultan Qaboos sent a note to the U.A.E. President, Shaikh Zayed bin Sultan
Al-Nahayyan, complaining that Ras abKhaimah was driffing for oil in an area which
Oman considered part of its territory.
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The Omani reaction, on 12 December the same year, was to send a warship to warn
an oil rig off the disputed area that it was operating in Omani waters. 45 Unconfirmed
reports from the U.A.E. and Oman, quoted by the Financial Tunes 0115 December
1977 said that the troops of both countries had moved to the disputed area of Ras
al-Khaimah.46
According to Cordesman, the armed confrontation between Ras al-Khaimah and
Oman ended like a "comic opera" when the large number of Omanis in the Ras
al-Khaimah forces refused to fight Oman's forces. 47 It should be pointed out that the
U.A.E. army, estimated at 25,000 men is comprised of some 85 per cent of Omanis
and Baluchis who have relatives in Oman and they have natural loyalties to Oman as
their original home and the place where they were born. It was reported that
Kuwait, as it had always done before the establishment of the federation, agreed to
help Ras al-Khaimah to establish an oil refinery at Khur Khuwair in northern Ras
al-Khaimah, the disputed area with Oman. The refinery's output was expected to be
about 100,000 barrels a day, of which about half would be absorbed by Ras
al-Khaimah and the rest exported. 49 The Omanis claimed that an agreement had
long existed that neither party would undertake development in the disputed area
without the consent of the other. The Omani complaint was that Sbaikh Saqr of Ras
al-Khaimah has gone ahead with development of the area without obtaining such
consent (Figure 43)•5)
The situation worsened, and tensions between the U.A.E. (Ras al- Khaimah) and
Oman rose. Celebration of the national day of the U.A.E., to mark the sixth
anniversary of the U.A.E. on 2 December 1977, was cancelled because troops had
been moved north from Abu Dhabi to Ras al-Khaimah.51
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Figure 4.3 Map of oil pipelinefrom Bukha Oilfield (Oman) to Khur Khuwair (United
Arab Emirates).
Source: MEES
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4.4.5 The End of the conflict
His Highness Shaikh Zayed bin Sultan A1-Nabayyan, the U.A.E. President,
accompanied by the Foreign Minister, Ahmed Khalifa al-Suwaidi, flew to Oman for
a one day visit on 29 December 1977 and held talks with Sultan Qaboos. 52 A public
speech on the border dispute was given by Shaikh Saqr of Ras al-Khaimah on 12
March 1978. In an interview with the Abu Dhabi daily newspaper Al Wa/ida, he
stressed that the dispute was "one between borders" and said: "this type of dispute is
not new to the Arab world because colonialism had planted mines along the borders
it drew up." He continued that he had "documents which set matters to rights" and the
issue was now in the hands of the U.A.E. President.53
The next step in the resolution of the dispute was the establishment of three
delegations to visit Oman and to debate the border issue with Sultan Qaboos.
However, the Sultan refused to meet the second delegation which was led by the
Crown Prince of Ajman (the present ruler of Ajman). (M) It was reported that Qaboos
bad told the delegation that the disputed territory was populated by the Shihuh tribe
and had been administered by Oman for centuries. Furthermore, he accused Shaikh
Saqr the ruler of Ras al-Kliaimah of starting to encroach on the territory in 1951 when
be occupied the village of Rams which was now 16 km inside Ras al-Khaimah. 55
 In
December 1979 it was announced that the dispute had been resolved between Oman
and Ras al-Khaimali, and that an aerial survey was taking place, but details have not
yet been re1eased. 56 Furthermore, another official announcement was given by Hi!.
Shaikh Rashed bin Said Al-Maktum, the Vice President of the U.A.E., Ruler of
Dubai, that an agreement had been concluded between the two countries and the
boundary disputes with Oman resolved.57
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4.4.6 Conclusion
It seems that the end of the boundary conflict between Ras al-Khaimah and Oman
was settled to the advantage of Oman. The ability of Oman to follow its claim over
the Musandam border area has been conditioned by the complex interplay between
the internal and external political environments in which it must operate.(:ss)
In 1978 the Omani government tried to pressure the U.A.E. federal government on
the Musandam border issue and the Omanis again took some actions which indicated
that it might revive the Buraimi question. In January, the same year Oman put into
circulation a memorial coin bearing a picture of the Sultan's old palace at the Buraimi
oasis. 59 Furthermore, it was reported that in the same year Oman had assembled
some 300 mechanized vehicles in the vicinity of Buraimi.° The U.A.E. was
considering two major steps to preserve the security of oil supply in the countries
around the Gulf and the balance of forces was increased. The first step was to build
a military airport in the Emirate of Fujairah just south of Omani-beld Ras Musandam
Peninsula. Construction of a military airport would also represent a major move by
the Gulf state to increase protection of the Strait of Hormuz.
The second step was the construction of a 150-mile pipeline, from Abu Dhabi (the
major oil producing Emirate) to Fujairah which lies on the eastern coast of the Gulf
of Oman, in order to divert oil flow easily to the east coast in the event of the closure
of the Strait of Hormuz for any reason. 61 The federal government has tried its best
to maintain stability and security in the region especially with its neighbours. Between
1966 and 1974 Abu Dhabi provided Oman with several hundred million dollars in
direct assistance and gave the Sultan of Oman millions more to help secure the Habus
and the Shihuh tribal loyalty in Oman's Musandam region and in Dibba. 62
 The
U.A.E. has provided aid to Oman as a means of securing its borders ever since.63
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There have been disputes with Oman involving oil exploration by Ras al-Khaimah in
the north, the border of the Musandam enclave with Fujairah, at Dibba in the
north-east, and the boundary with Al-Am,, at Buraimi in the west.
In December 1979 the Omani Foreign Affairs Under-Secretary, Yousef al-Alawi, said
to the semi-official Abu Dhabi daily Al-ittihad that the dispute between Oman and
the U.A.E. had been sett1ed.
The boundaries between the U.A.E. (Ras al-Khaimah) and the Sultanate of Oman
in the Musandam Peninsula were defined to the southwest by an approximate line
between Dibba on the Gulf of Oman and the headland of Al-Qir, north of Sha'ani on
the Gulf. The mountainous character of Musandam explains the name of Ru'us
al-jibal ('heads of the mountains') which is the proper name of the main body of the
peninsu1a.67
The relationship between Oman and Ras al-Khaimah improved as a result of the
agreement signed in July 1991. Natural gas produced at Oman's offshore Bukha field
northern territorial waters of Oman will be delivered to Ras al-Khaimah onshore gas
treatment facility at Khur Khuwair in Ras al-Khaimah for processing and marketing
via a 35 km, 16 inch subsea pipeline. The deliveries were scheduled to start towards
the end of 1993. Ras al-Khaimah extracts small volumes of gas from the SaJeb field
(located in Ras al-Khaimah territorial waters), but this is nearly depleted 69
 (Pigure
4.3). In 1960, Julian Walker followed Lorimer's decision about the coastal extremities
of the boundary of Mu'scati Rus al-Jibal. 70 However, the details of the inland
boundary he had established by his own investigation are as follows:
As Dibba al-Hisn is inhabited byHanbali SIIIhUE, loyal to the Shaikh of Sharjah. and t)ibba
al-Bayah by Shafil Shihuh loyal to the Sultan of Muscat, the line follows the watercourse
which divides the two villages (international boundary between the U.A.E., Dibba aJ-Hisn
of Sharjah and Dibba al-Bayah of Sultanate of Oman). It then turns west along the route
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from Dibba, via Khatt to Ras al-Khaimah, which is regarded as the boundary between
the country of the Shihuh to the north and that of the Sharqiyyin to the south (internal
boundary between Fujairah and Ras al-Khaimah). At the point where the route
reaches the dirah of the Habus the line leaves it and turns north.
The Habus live in the southwestern part of the mountains of Rus al-Jibal. Leaving
the Habus to the west, therefore, the line continues directly northward, traversing the
slopes above Rams, Khur Khuwair, Ghalilah, and Sha'ani, then turns west, enclosing
in the angle a group of the Dhahuriyin, to reach the Gulf at the headland of al-Qir.
Rams is inhabited by the Tinaij tribe, who are Ghafiri and Hanbali, loyal to Qawasim.
Khur Khuwair, Ghalilah, and Sha'am are inhabited by Shihuh who are also Hanbali
and pay allegiance to the Qawasim. However, these coastal connections do not extend
north of al-Qir: beyond this point the Shihuh are Hinawi and Shafli. Thus, the lines
turn abruptly turn westward to leave these Shihuh under the sovereignty of Muscat71.
Figure 4.4 shows the northern boundary of Ras al-Khaimah with Oman on the Ras al
Shaam. Lorimer stated: "It (Sha'am) is the northernmost village in the Ras
al-Khaimah district of Sharja1i."
Ras al-Shaam is the obvious geographical boundary. Walker mentioned in his report
of boundary settlement in the Trucial States of 1955 that Oman tried to claim Shaam
in 1950 and that the Shihuh of Bakha agreed Shaam to be under the administration
of the Shaikh of Ras al-Khaimah. Walker concluded his report of Shaam that Rams
is undisputed Ras al-Khaimah territory.73
4.5. The U.A.E.-Saudi Arabia border and the Buraimi dispute
It is impossible here to give a comprehensive account of the entire Emirates-Saudi
border but it is possible to highlight some aspects of the issue.
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Figure 4.4 The Foreign Office Map of 1955.
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4.5.1 Abu Dhabi-Saudi border
According to a map prepared by the research department of the British Foreign
Office in May 1955, and corrected in July 1962, the Blue and the Violet Lines were
proposed by Britain as the only legal frontiers defining the land boundaries of her
protectorate states in the Arabian Peninsula with Saudi Arabia and Yemen (Figure
4.4). As shown, the Blue Line of the Anglo-Ottoman Convention of July 1929 was the
Ottoman Sanjak of Nejd.74
However, during the intermittent Anglo-Saudi negotiations of 1934-1955, two further
lines were proposed: one by Saudi Arabia called the Red (Haniza) 75 Line of 1935
and the other, proposed by Britain, called the Riyadh or Ryan Line of 1935 as shown
on Figure 4.4 which ran in a straight line from meridian 52 degrees east. This frontier
was offered to Ibn Saud by Sir A. Ryan at Riyadh on 25 November 1935. In 1949 the
Saudi Arabian Government put forward a claim to a further area of over two-thirds
of Abu Dhabi territory as can also be seen from the map. (The brown line represents
the 1949 claim by Ibn Saud, King of Saudi Arabia.) In 1952 Abu Dhabi put forward
a claim to its frontier with Saudi Arabia.
In 1949, Ibn Saud of Saudi Arabia claimed 80% of Abu Dhabi territory (see Figures
4.4 and 4.5), in which most of the major inshore and offshore oil fields are located. It
should be acknowledged that, without the help and support of the British
Government to protect the territories of the Trucial States, and in particular the
territory of Abu Dhabi which stretched from al-Burainii in the east to Khur al-Udaid
in the west, this land would now belong to Saudi Arabia. Without these oil fields, Abu
Dhabi and the U.A.E. would be poor, under-developed Emirates.
In 1949, ARAMCO, a U.S. oil company with the Saudi oil exploration concession,
began sending survey parties into Abu Dhabi territory, reaching as far as Khur
Ghanadha near the border with Dubai, and implictly reducing Abu Dhabi Shaikhdom
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Figure 4.5 The Foreign Office Map ofAbu Dhabi-Saudi boundaries of 1970.
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to a mere 20% of its land area. At this juncture, Edward Henderson (representative
of the Iraq Petroleum Company which held the oil exploration concession for Abu
Dhabi) and Pat Stobart (British Political Officer) drove out to meet the ARAMCO
survey party and warned them to leave Abu Dhabi territory, taking all their equipment
with them (Figure 4.5).(75a) The British defended the Emirate of Abu Dhabi against
Saudi expansionist designs, and acted to the benefit of the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi. It
was therefore with surprise and dismay that many of the Rulers of the Emirates
greeted the British announcement of withdrawal from the Gulf, finding themselves
confronted with the full responsibility of protecting themselves from the dangerous
ambitions of Iran and Saudi Arabia. If the new found wealth from oil was to be
directed into economic and social development programmes, then security and
stability were essential. In addition to the unresolved al-Buraimi dispute and Iran's
claim to Bahrain, the Rulers also faced disputes between the Emirates: Dubai -
Sharjah, Ras al-Khaimah - Fujairah, Sharjah - Fujairab. Some Rulers did not welcome
the withdrawal of the British. The Ruler of Abu Dhabi offered to bear the cost, drawn
from oil revenues, of the British military presence in the area, estimated at an annual
£12 million. Shaikh Rashid bin Said al- Maktum, Ruler of Dubai, was the first of the
Gulf state Rulers to state openly his support for a continuing British military presence
in the area. During an interview reported in The Times, 14 July 1970, under the
headline "Dubai asks Britain to stay", in answer to the question of whether he wanted
British troops to remain in the Gulf, Shaikh Rashid said:7
"Who asked them to leave?... Abu Dhabi and Bahrain, and in fact the whole
coast, people and rulers, would all support the retention of British forces in
the Gulf even though they may not give a direct answer out of respect for the
generalArab view."
The Times of Monday 11 March 1957, included an article entitled 'British Aid for
Trucial Coast of Oman' with a small map of the area. However, the frontier shown in
The Times map meets the coast at Khur al-Duwaihen, leaving the Udaid peninsula to
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Figure 4.7 An accurate map, drawn by the British Foreign Office.
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Saudi Arabia. This was not accurate, as can be seen in Figure 4.6.(76) The Foreign
Office sent a letter suggesting that The Times redraw the map to show the frontier so
as to fit the modified Riyadh lineP Furthermore, the Foreign Office later produced
an accurate map according to the British view as the official version of the Trucial
States boundary (U.A.E.)(78) (Figure 4.7).
It can be seen from the foregoing that some maps published in the press cannot be
considered authoritative on international boundaries. Ideally, an accurate map which
shows the correct boundary line should be published by an official department such
as the Research Department at the Foreign Office, to prevent speculative cartography
in the press (Figure 4.8).
Introduction to Buraimi
Historically, the story of the boundaries conflict began in 1952 when the Saudi
Arabian Government sent a small armed unit to occupy the villages of Buraimi and
Hamasa which at that time were under the administration of the Sultan of Muscat.
The other villages of the oasis were under the administration of the ruler of Abu
Dhabi (see Figure 4.9). Indeed before that time, in April 1935, the Government of
Saudi Arabia claimed most of the Rub'al Khali (the Empty Quarter), and the Khur
al-Udaid on the Abu Dhabi - Qatar boundaryS7) The most important factor affecting
delimitation of Saudi Arabia's boundary with the United Arab Emirates was the oil
interests during the 1930s. The point to emphasise is that after the United Arab
Emirates was established in 1971, the Saudi Arabian government did not attempt to
establish relations with the new federal government but preferred to maintain its
relations with each Emirate individually. The Saudi Government was showing the
federal government that it would not recognize the union until the boundary dispute
with Abu Dhabi was settled. Saudi Arabia's claims to large territories in Abu Dhabi
was always rejected by Shaikh Zayid. 80 In other words, the Saudi intention to
establish diplomatic relations with the United Arab Emirates was conditional on a
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Figure 4.9 Map ofAl Buraimi Oasis, drawn by the Foreign Office.
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settlement of the border dispute. (81) Indeed, King Faisal made it clear that "while his
territorial demands upon Abu t)habi remained unsatisfied he would not recognize
the existence or legitimacy of the U.A.E.." 82 When Saudi Arabia and Abu Dhabi
agreed to hold talks on the territorial issue in 1970, the British government proposed
a new deal which would give Saudi Arabia territory upto the Qatar-Abu Dhabi road
but not the coast itself. Thereafter, the British government suggested that a neutral
zone should be formed across the 23rd parallel to a point 20 km north on the Abu
Dhabi side and 10 km south on the Saudi side. The proposal was accepted by Shaikh
Zayed of Abu Dhabi but rejected by the Saudis. 83 Saudi Arabia asserted claims to
Khur al-Udaid, part of Abu Dhabi since 1871 when Shaikh Zayed bin Khalifa fought
the Ottomans for it. Another step along the road to settlement of the dispute was
the creation of a committee by order of Sliaikh Zayed in July 1977. The committee
was under the direction of the Federal Foreign Minister to study the nation's
boundaries with Oman, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Iran. The committee believed that
the permanent settlement of these outstanding issues would promote a sense of
national identity and contribute to the resolution of the internal boundary disputes
of the United Arab Emirates.
In July 1974 Prince Fahad (the present king of Saudi Arabia) paid an official visit to
Abu Dhabi. An agreement was concluded to define the boundaries of the two
countries. Afterwards, Shaikh Zayed bin Sultan, the President of the United Arab
Emirates, Ruler of Abu Dhabi visited Saudi Arabia. On 21 August 1974 diplomatic
relations were established between Abu Dhabi, the capital of the United Arab
Emirates, and Riyadh the capital of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. In the same month
the agreement was concluded, fixing the boundary of the two countries. Shaikh
Zayed, as federal President and ruler of Abu Dhabi, applied a technique to resolve
his boundaries difficulties with Saudi Arabia. The technique was 'Arab solutions' for
the federation's problems.87
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Shaikh Zayed had agreed to the Saudi claims and the following conversation provides
an interesting memoir on the question quoted:
Faisal: "The whole thing to us is a matter of dignity and honor. The British
evicted us by force and we won't forget that. Our 1970 proposal for Saudi
Arabia's eastern border is quite reasonable."
Zayed: "No, your Majesty. Your eastern boundwyshould be like this (taking
a pencil and drawing a line in the middle of the Gulffrom Shatt al-Arab to
the Strait of Honnuz)."
Faisal: "Now we have a solution."
At the time of signing, King Faisal had declared there was no frontier between the
two states and he had gone on to say to Shaikh Zayed: "We consider your border in
the heart of the Kingdom." Shaikh Zayed replied: "We consider your border to be at
the end of the Emirates." 89 Subsequently there has been much comment and
speculation on the agreement. According to Cordesman, the question was raised
again in 1977 by the Saudi government that Saudi Arabia 'forced Abu Dhabi to move
its border 20 miles further east on the Gulf coast, although it paid Abu Dhabi's ruler,
Shaikh Zayed, some 33 million dollars in personal compensation'?° In an alternative
version, it was reported that the 20 mile corridor had been established in the 1974
agreement, and that the sum paid to Shaikh Zayed amounting to 34.5 million dollars
was a cheque handed over to Abu Dhabi's government for the completion of the Abu
Dhabi-Qatar road through the Saudi corridor.91
Furthermore, it was reported that the Saudi government would not annex the corridor
since the water at Khur al-Udaid was too shallow for shipping? Moreover, it was
reported by diplomats in Abu Dhabi that the Saudi payment was the result of months
of negotiation over the sensitive border issue; clearly the Saudi contribution was
towards the cost of building the 25 km stretch of road between Qatar and the United
Arab Emirates. The new border point between Saudi Arabia and Abu Dhabi named
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Ras Khumays is shown in Figure 4.7. In addition it was reported that a team from the
Saudi Ports Authority had been examining the possibility of building a port at Ras
Khumays near the Qatar and Abu Dhabi borders.93
4.5.2 Maps before and after 1974
In many books, journals and periodicals, the old style boundaries of the U.A.E. are
still printed inaccurately on maps such as shown in Figure 4.8. Several published maps
now show the new United Arab Emirates boundaries with Saudi Arabia, whilst others
stifi show the previous boundaries such as the following map which was published by
the Cartographic and Map section in the Foreign and the Commonwealth Office in
November 1980 (Figure 4.10). It is interesting to note from this map which shows the
internal border lines and the international borders of the U.A.E. with its neighbours
that whilst the western border line was the pre-1974 agreement, the Khur
al-Duwaihen is included in U.A.E. territoiy7t
Whilst some maps show the new boundaries modification between the two countries
after the 1974 agreement, in others the western border point of Abu Dhabi begins
from Ras Kliumays east of Khur al-Udaid. Figure 4.11 shows the U.A.E. boundary
lines both before and after the 1974 agreement. This map is published by the
Petroleum Economist and based on data supplied by Petroconsultants in
Switzer1and.95
It is interesting to compare the official map published by the U.A.E. government with
that from the Ministry of Petroleum and Mineral Resources in 1976, printed by
Hunting Geology and Geophysics Ltd, in England (Figure 4.12), because the latest
map is the only map published by a U.A.E. government department which shows the
accurate boundary according to the 1974 agreement, otherwise no other government
department has published a map of the U.A.E. and the international boundaries of
the U.A.E. shown accurately according to the 1974 agreements. The following figures
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Figure 4.10 Map drawn by Cartographic and Map Section of the Britith Foreign Office,
1980s, showing the inshore and the offshore boundaries of the UnitedArab
Emirates.
/1
	
/	 'I	 .
,//
:
c-.	 '	 0/ -I 0
'.-....	 .n•,	
.ç..-.	 •'\	 \	 INI,
	
/	 \ -'	 N
,
:
	
/
o	
lii
--	 I
Chapter 4
	
169
Figure 4.11 The Petroleum Economist map of the UnitedArab Emirates.
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Figure 4.12 The United Arab Emirates map of the Ministry of Petroleum (1976).
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Figure 4.13 Map of 
the United Arab Emirates published for Dubai Municipality showing
the international boundaries with Saudi Arabia according to the 1974
Agreement.
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Figure 4.14 Map of the United Arab Emirates, produced by the Ministiy ofDefence,
United Kingdom, 1991, showing the international boundaries of the 1974
Agreement.
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(Figures 4.13 and 4.14) show the accurate international boundaries of the U.A.E. with
Saudi Arabia published for Dubai Municipality (Figure 4.13), and by the United
Kingdom Ministry of Defence, 1991 (Figure 4.14)..
The 1974 Agreement between the U.A.E. and Saudi Arabia
This agreement has not yet been made public, and none of it has been published by
either side since the date of signing in 1974. The importance of this agreement is the
resolution of three of the most difficult and controversial disputes: the Al-Burainii
oasis; the area of Khur al-Udaid at the base of the Qatar Peninsula; and the rich
Zararah oilfield in the southern part of the Emirate of Abu Dhabi, all of which were
claimed by Saudi Arabia. The 1974 agreement resolved the longest standing boundary
dispute between the Kingdom and the Shaikhdom. By this agreement, mutual
diplomatic relations at ambassadorial level were established in August 1974, three
years after the establishment of the federation in 1971.
In this thesis the Articles of the agreement are examined with clarity for the first time.
A copy of the 1974 agreement is attached as an appendix. The agreement can be
summarized as follows: Six of the nine villages of the Buraimi oasis namely:
Al-Am, Al-Jimi, Al-Hili, Al-Qattarah, Al-Mutarid, and Al-Muwaigi were
recognized by Saudi Arabia as falling under the sovereignty of Abu Dhabi,
(all the six villages are within Al-A in the eastern district ofAbu Dhabi) while
the other three villages of Sa'ara, Hamasa, Buraimi belonged to Oman. The
revised border of the UnitedArab Emirates and SaudiArabia starts at apoint
on the Gulf coast to the east of Duwaihin.
The agreement of 1974 stipulated in Article 1, that the land boundary which divides
the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia should be determined according to the
agreement's articles, starting from point A on the Arabian Gulf. The geographical
co-ordinates are given as follows:
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latitude 24° 14'58" North
longitude 51° 35'26" East.
Then a straight line extends in a southerly direction to point B and its geographical
location of which is:
latitude 24° 07'24" North.
longitude 51° 35'26" East.
After that it extends from this point directing towards the South East to point C of
which the geographical location is:
latitude 37° 56'09° North.
longitude 52° 34'52" East.
From this point it extends in a straight line towards the south east to point D to which
the geographical location is:
latitude 22° 37'41" North.
longitude 55° 08'll" East.
The boundary extends from this point in a straight line tending to the north east,
leaving Umm al-Zumul to the east, to point E the geographical location of which is:
latitude 22° 42'02" North.
longitude 55° 12'lO" East.
After this, the boundary extends from point E in straight lines to connect points with
the following locations:
Source: The U.A.E. Agreement with Saudi Arabia in 1974. See Appendix A and B.
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From point J the boundary extends to point K the geographical location of which is
24°13'45" North, 55°45' East, and from point K the boundary extends to point L the
geographical location of which is 24°19' North and 55°50' East. Three villages are left
are situated east of point K in Saudi territory. From point L the boundary extends to
the point which meets the boundaries of the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia and
the Sultanate of Oman, to be agreed between three states. The final sentence of
Article 2 of the agreement stipulates: "All these points have been signed by the two
high sides or parties." The Sabkhat Matti Zone was granted to Saudi Arabia.
Furthermore, all the points which are mentioned above were drawn tentatively on
the 1:500,000 map which the two sides signed.
4.5.3 The Zarara oil field question
The Zarara oil field is situated immediately south of Liwa oasis of Abu Dhabi (south
of Abu Dhabi border). It was in dispute due to its location, to be shared between Saudi
Arabia and Abu Dhabi. In the opinion of John Duke Anthony, the Zarara oil field
would be divided between the two states but this opinion is questionable. Less
contentious is the fact that Saudi Arabia would obtain an outlet to the Gulf through
Abu Dhabi in the Kliur al-Udaid.98.
The Journal of the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula reported two stories relating to the
1974 agreement. One said that the Zarara oil field (as it is known within Abu Dhabi's
territories, whereas it is called the Sha'ybah oil field in Saudi territories) would be
exploited jointly, regardless of the new geographical land arrangement which would
put most of the oil field beneath Saudi territory.
The second report, quoted inMEES, suggested that, according to the 1974 agreement,
Saudi Arabia would acquire most if not all the oil-bearing areas where oil is to be
found even if it had not yet been produced. Furthermore, it was reported that Saudi
Arabia would get, according to the agreement, a strip of land in the southern boundary
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area south of parallel 23° (which area includes the Zarara oil field). See Figure 4.11.
Experts believed that the new boundaries between the two countries would keep 90
percent of the Zarara oilfield in Saudi territory. More than that, the report describes
the oilfield of Zarara as part of a widely expanding oil area to the Saudi side named
Sha'ybah. Aramco has drilled seven wells in this area. The oil reserves of these wells
is estimated to be around 1,828 million barrels. 99 Au M. Khalifa°° states that the
agreement called for the oil field to be within the Saudi Arabia territory. This is in
fact the case according to the 1974 agreement. Article 3 stipulates that the Zararah
oil field is totally under Saudi Arabian jurisdiction, and Article 3 continues by stating
that no right is granted to the U.A.E. over the part of Zararah oilfield (known as
Shaybah in Saudi Arabia) which lies within Abu Dhabi's territory north of the
boundary line between Abu Dhabi and Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia, or any company
working with Saudi permission, is allowed to explore and exploit the hydrocarbon
reserves in that part of the Zararah (Shaybah) oilfield, and any operations shall be by
agreement between the two parties in respect of the means of exploitationP°1
It has been reported that the Zararah oil fields were discovered in the 1960s. Since
that time, and after the two wells were drilled by the Abu Dhabi petroleum company,
there has been no further drilling on the Abu Dhabi side of the border, although there
has been some very secretive activity by Aramco (102) on the Saudi side. In addition,
it seems that the explanation for the lack of activity within Abu Dhabi may be because
the state has conceded the field to the Saudis, as part of the price of settling the
Al-Buraimi disputeP°3
From Abu Dhabi's point of view any drilling activity in the south even if not on the
Shay'bah structure would be a sensitive matter. On the other side there is a hesitation
about developing the field over the pipeline route. Whereas the pipe, as mentioned
in the report could go through the small corridor of territory between Abu Dhabi and
Chapter 4	 177
Qatar which Saudi Arabia acquired in 1974.(b04) Moreover, it was reported that the
Zarara oilfleld was given to Saudi Arabia and Abu Dhabi gave up part of its western
territory for Saudi recognition of the United Arab Emirates and Abu Dhabi's rights
to most of the disputed fields in the southwest and the Burainii
According to Peck (106) the position is unclear whether the 1974 agreement stipulated
that the exploration of the Zarara oilfield is to be owned jointly by Abu Dhabi and
Saudi Arabia or to be owned by one country.'° '7 According to the original 1974
agreement text it stipulated in Article 3 that the Zarara oil field belonged to Saudi
Arabia which supports Khalifa's view (b08)•
Another important aspect of the U.A.E. - Saudi boundary is the maritime boundary.
According to Hessah Al-Saif Saudi Arabia granted an agreementwhich permitted
territorial waters not to extend beyond three nautical miles. Article 5 of the 1974
Agreement, which is about islands, granted Saudi rights to Al-Huwaissat island, which
is the only island belonging to Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia recognized U.A.E.
sovereignty of the rest of the islands lying opposite its coast in the Gulf.
Furthermore, the same article stipulates that the U.A.E. consented to Saudi Arabia
constructing any installations which she desired on the islands of Qaffay and
Meka'asib. 110 The distance which separates these islands from the U.A.E. islands is
small, and too tight to fulfil the 12 nautical mile limit: a median line will not give the
island a complete 12 nautical mile territorial sea. The last sentence of the Article
stipulates: "the area joining them with the high seas will be shared between the parties
in respect of the freedom of navigation."1
It can be seen from figures above that the maritime boundary line from west of Ras
Khumays runs to join the Abu Dhabi - Qatar offshore boundary of 1969, and leaves
Huwaisaat to Saudi Arabia whilst the rest of the islands which lie on the east side of
the line belong to Abu Dhabi. In case the agreement is published, some modification
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should take place of the maritime boundary between the United Arab Emirates and
Qatar in Khur al-Udaid, as Khur al-Udaid came under the Saudi government
authority as can be seen in (Figure 4.14). Many Saudi writers state that oil did not
play a role in the conclusion of the final boundary agreement. 11 However, this
argument may be incorrect. Saudi Arabia achieved its demands in gaining Sabkat
Maati located south of Khur al-Udaid, on the westernside of Abu Dhabi, which is rich
in oil, and also Khur al-Udaid which the Saudi ports Authority prepared for building
a port at Ras Khumays. 113 A recently published document reports that the oil experts
in the Gulf confirmed that the Saudi Government decided to invest $9,000,000,000
in utilizing one of its oilflelds located on the border with the U.A.E.. They added that
the mentioned oilfield is Sha'ybah, which lies in the Empty Quarter, in the south east
of Saudi Arabia; that oilfield development will commence in 1994; and that
production may reach 500,000 barels a day by the end of this century. This oilfleld
was discovered several years ago but has not been exploited because of the boundary
dispute between the two countries.114
4.5.4 Saudi Aims with Respect to Khur aI-Udaid' 15)
The question to be raised here is in what ways Saudi Arabia will utilize the maritime
outlet which it acquired under the 1974 agreement which made significant changes
to the Kingdom's border with Abu Dhabi. One possibility is that the Saudis wanted
Khur al-Udaid for oil terminals. Another reason may be for internal security. Were
the eastern part of the Kingdom at risk for any reason, for example were the Shi'ites
(the minority branch of Islam) to stir up a revolution in the Eastern Province, then
the corridor to the sea would play a role in seeking outside help. However, it is also
possible that Saudi Arabia wanted Khur al-Udaid because of the Saudis "aspiration
to be the predominant power in the region."" 6 It seems clear that what the Saudis
got from Abu Dhabi territories according to the 1974 agreement fulfilled an ambition
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which had its roots historically in the al-Buraimi oasis dispute. Shaikh Zayed, the
U.A.E. President, served for twenty years as the Abu Dhabi ruler's representative in
the Buraimi Oasis from where Abu Dhabi derives its drinldng water. On the other
hand, for King Faysal the dispute over Buraimi had a special meaning which is a
reminder of past Wahhabi glories and a pride of honour. However, King Faysal
remembered when the Trucial Oman Scouts and the Royal Air Force evicted the
Saudi force from Buraimi in 1955.(h17) Saudi Arabia lost Al-Buraimi oasis in 1955, but
won Khur al-Udaid in 1974. Saudi Arabia lost the position of dividing Oman from
Abu Dhabi in al-Buraimi in the 1950s being forced to leave the area by the Trucial
Oman Scouts. After 1974 they isolated Qatar from Abu Dhabi, and won a window to
the sea, 15-20 miles in width: Khur al-Udaid, at the southern end of the Qatari
Peninsula, annexed to Saudi Arabia.
It is arguable that the Saudi government wished to dominate the region after the
British withdrawal from the Gulf. This explains its desire to forge an outlet to the
Gulf, in order to put the Emirates under its control. After 1974, relations between
Saudi Arabia and the U.A.E. improved and developed into the area of internal
security.
01129 October 1976 the Saudi Minister of Interior visited all seven member Emirates
of the U.A.E., and a security agreement between the two countries was concluded"9
on 21 February 1982, and published in Abu Dhabi on 27 January 1983. Part one deals
with the border issue between the two countries. The first article states that the two
sides agreed to organize regular meetings between officials of their border posts in
adjacent areas on their border to co-ordinate information and co- operation. The
second article prohibits border patrols from crossing the border of the countries for
a distance of more than 20 km to arrest those who were being pursued, and that the
latter should be handed to the state on whose territory the pursuit began. Article 3 of
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the agreement focuses on methods of extraditing fugitives, and methods of transport
to the nearest post in the State on whose territory the pursuit began. The security
agreement contains eleven Articles but the important ones relevant to the boundaries
administration between the two countries have been mentioned above.120
4.5.5 Comments concerning the 1974 agreement
Many authors have commented on the 1974 agreement without a full understanding
of its provisions. Many interpretations were inaccurate because the terms of the
agreement were not given formal public announcement. It is stifi fully confidential,
and is considered officially to be a national secret. Only in 1990 were versions of the
boundary shown on published maps.
For example, J.B. Kelly wrote:
"Occasional exchanges over the issue took place between Saud.iArabia and
Abu Dhabi between 1972 and 1974, and then in August of the latter year a
compromise was apparently reached between them. What exactly was
contained in the agreement sigued on 21 August 1974 is not certain, for the
details of the agreement were never made public by either side. It would seem,
however, that Zayid gave the Saudis nearly everything they wanted - a corridor
to the sea, west of the Sabkhat Matti, separating Qatar from Abu Dhabi and
affording Saudi Arabia an outlet to the lower Gult a goodly slice of the
western part of his Shaikhdom; and, in the south, the bulk of the Zarrara
oilfield. ,u(121)
John Duke Anthony believes that outstanding disputes were resolved peacefully
between them in the 1974 agreement:1
"According to the formula, the two states acknowledged in principle thatAbu
Dhabi sovereignty would be recognized over six of the villages in the Buraymi
Oasis region previously claimed by Saudi Arabia, that the rich Zararah
(Shaybah) oilfield previously in dispute would be divided between them, and
that SaudiArabia would obtain an outlet to the Gulf through Abu Dhabi in
the Khawr al-Udayd area."1
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Another writer, Mohammed Morsy Abdullah, the director of the Documentation and
Research Centre of Abu Dhabi, wrote the following on the 1974 agreement:
"Finally in 1975 afrontier agreement was signed by both heads of state, which
put a satis'factoiy end to the pro blem."1
Recently, in a new book, John C. Wilkinson (1991) describes the Abu Dhabi-Qatar
boundaries as follows:
"It is difficult to know what has changed since. The map of the U.A.E.
boundaiy published in 1973 by the Minist,y of CabinetAffair inAbu Dhabi
still vely firmly showed it as the Riyadh Line. Negotiations, however, were in
progress and according to Kelly (1980, pp.210-li), a boundaiy agreement
was signed in August 1974 which gave Saudi an outlet on the sea west of the
SabkhatMatti anda good slice of mainlandterritoiy,plus asliverto the south
of the Liwa. Saudi Arabia, in exchange, recognized the U.A.E. and Abu
Dhabi's rights in the Buraimi oasis." ('
Sir Bernard Burrows who was the first Foreign Service Officer to be Political Resident
in the Gulf, in his book dealt with the agreement as follows:
"it is gratifying to discover that in 1974-5 the Buraimi question was finally
brought to a friendly conclusion between the states concerned by the cession
byAbu Dhabi to SaudiArabia of a small area of sea coast east of Qatar in
return for Saudi acceptance of the status quo at Buraimi and the
relinquishment of their claim to it."
It is interesting that he also claimed that the Saudis were using subversive methods
to extend their influence such as supplying arms and money to tribal leaders to win
their loyalty.'
It can be concluded from the quotations above that these authors were unable to
obtain a copy of the agreement, although all of them were aware of its existence. None
of them knew what it contained. Due to the U.A.E. becoming recognized by Saudi
Arabia at the end of 1974 and the exchange of diplomatic relations between the two
countries, the four authors concluded that the dispute between Abu Dhabi and Saudi
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Arabia was settled. However, Kelly seems to have been somewhat better informed
on the issue:6
"A new agreement was apparently reached in the early summer of 1977,
although again its details were not dthclosecL However, an oil-concessions
map put out by the U.A.E. Ministiy of Petroleum in June 1977, without any
accompanying statement or explanation, depicted the Abu Dhabi - Saudi
Arabia frontier as starting on the coast some twenty miles west of the Sabkat
Matti and following a course very similar to that of the original Saudi claim
(the Red Line) of 1935."
Not only, therefore, was the issue raised again in 1977, and therefore was not finally
settled in 1974, but also the absence of information surrounding the 1977 agreement,
Kelly having to base his assumptions on an oil concessions map, suggests that the
matter may not be finally resolved even now (Figure 4.15).
4.5.6 Geographical description of the U.A.E-Saudi boundaries
The modified border starts at a point on the Gulf coast to the east of Duwaihin
opposite to Ghaghah island and runs in a southeasterly direction to Ras al-Mihradh,
then to al-Ribadh and on to Umm al-Zumul, where the borders of Saudi Arabia, the
U.A.E. and Oman converge. Thus, the western Abu Dhabi border was to the east of
Khur al-Duwaihin, or for the description to be more accurate, the western border
point of Abu Dhabi is to the west of Ras Khumays.127
However, the Saudis, in return, got an outlet to the sea, 110 km in length and
approximately 30 km in width, encompassing Ras Khumays and Khur al-Udaid at the
southern end of the Qatari Peninsula 1 (see Figure 4.16). However, in July 1977,
His Highness Shaikh Zayed, the U.A.E. president, issued a decree establishing a
committee under the direction of the Federal Foreign Minister to study and delineate
the federal state borders with Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Oman and Iran. The reason behind
Shaikh Zayed's action was to assert the boundary demarcation between the U.A.E.
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Figure 4.16 Land and maritime boundary between UA.E. and Saudi Arabia agreed in 1974.
Source: Author
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with its neighbours which might "foster a sense of national identity and perhaps, by
their precedent, contribute to the resolution of the U.A.E.'s internal border
disputes".29
4.6 The Maritime Boundaries of the U.A.E.
The international land boundaries of the U.A.E. with its neighbours have been
discussed. This section examines the offshore boundaries of the U.A.E. with its
neighbours, Saudi Arabia, Oman and Iran.
The United Kingdom advised the Trucial States Shaikhs to affirm their rights to the
continental shelf in 1949. Therefore, the rulers of Abu Dhabi (10 June 1949), Dubai
(14 June 1949), Sharjah (16 June 1949 ), Ras al-Khaimah (17 June 1949), Ajman (20
June 1949), and Umm al-Quwain (sometime in June 1949) issued decrees
proclaiming their exclusive rights to their adjacent continental she1ves.'30
According to the U.A.E. Constitution, Article 2 stipulates:
"The Union shall exercise sovereignty in matters assigned to it in accordance
with this Constitution over all territoiy and teiritorial waters lying within the
international boundaries of the member Emirates". (131)
It is clear from the above article that the power to define territorial waters is conferred
on the federal state.
The New Federal Law on Territorial Waters
In late April 1993 the Iranian Parliament passed a law extending the limits of the
country's territorial waters to 12 nautical miles, and asserting its sovereignty over the
Gulf of Oman and certain Gulf islands. Although it did not specify which islands, it
is clear that three disputed islands (Abu Musa, Greater Tunb and Lesser Tunb) are
inc1udedP32
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U.A.E. reaction to the Iranian gambit was as follows. In July 1993, the U.A.E.
government approved a federal law which sets the width of the country's territorial
waters at 12 nautical miles, that of a contiguous zone at 24 nautical miles, and an
exclusive economic zone (EEZ) of 300 nautical miles. The new law, which is to be
submitted to the U.A.E. President, Shaikh Zayed bin Sultan al-Nahayan for final
approval, will allow the U.A.E. to abide by the United Nations 1982 Convention on
the Law of the Sea. The new federal law will replace the laws on territorial waters
promulgated by the individual governments of the Emirates in the federation, but at
the same time confirms that the U.A.E. will continue to recognize the agreements on
oil and economic interests concluded between the individual Emirates and their
neighbours before the federation was established in December 1971. The law also
stipulates that in instances of disputes, the median line between the countries
concerned may be regarded as the boundary.133
An agreement for settlement of the continental shelf boundary between Abu Dhabi
(U.A.E.) and Qatar was signed on 20 March 1969 by both Abu Dhabi and Qatar. The
agreement also resolved disputes about sovereignty on some islands; and on sharing
revenue from the Bunduq marine oi1fie1ds.lM) Several islands which lie off the
western side of the Emirate of Abu Dhabi were in dispute with Qatar: Halul, Das,
Shirauh, Dayyinah, Arzanal', Dalma, Sir Bani Yas, Yasat, Ghaghah, al-Qaffay,
al-Mihayymat, Makasib and al-Ashat. Historically, the question of dispute over
islands started on Halul (1) the largest of these islands. According to Sir Rupert Hay,
"Halul, which in the past has usually been regarded as belonging to Abu Dhabi, is also
claimed by Qatar". 1 Consequently, the British Government chose, with the
approval of the two Shaikhdoms, two British experts, Charles Goult former British
political Agent in Balirain, and Professor J.N.D. Anderson, Professor of Islamic Law
at the University of London to examine the two Shaikhdoms' claims. They concluded
that Halul should belong to Qatar, and the smaller islands to Abu Dhabi. The question
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of two of the islands over which the claims of both sides were judged to be equal were
left undecided.137
The ruler of Abu Dhabi, Shaikh Zayed bin Sultan, signed an agreement with the ruler
of Qatar on 20 March 1969, on the division of the Gulf continental shelf waters and
on sharing revenue from al-Bunduq marine oiffieldS' 39 In addition to the same
subject, under the same agreement between Qatar and Abu Dhabi (U.A.E.), it was
concluded that the island of Dayyinah is part of the territory of Abu Dhabi, which
conforms with Lorimer's opinion: "Daiyinah belongs to the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi."140
According to the same agreement, it was agreed that the islands of al-Ashat and
Shirauh are part of the territory of Qatar.'141
In March 1962, the ruler of Qatar issued a decree that declared his concurrence with
the decision regarding the establishment of Qatari right of ownership over the island
of Halul, noting that the British Government had approved the extension of Qatar's
sovereignty to this island.' The relevant article in the Abu Dhabi-Qatari agreement
can be summarised as follows: The continental shelf boundary extends for a distance
of 115 nautical miles and the boundary line consists of straight line segments joining
four terminal points (A, B, C, D), except for a fifteen nautical mile arc around the
island of Dayyinah which places the island in Abu Dhabi territory and marks its three
mile territorial sea. 142 Point A, the seaward extent of the boundary line is the
trisection point which is equidistant from the mainland of Abu Dhabi, Iran, and Qatar.
Point D is equidistant from the coast of both Saudi Arabia and Qatar. 143 However,
it is important to note that the continental shelf boundary line between Qatar and
Abu Dhabi was not delimited according to the strict application of the equidistance
princip1e.'' That is, point C is the intersection of lines B and D, and not a point
equidistant from Abu Dhabi and Qatar. 145
 Point B was designated to coincide with
the location of the offshore field (Haqie al-Bunduq) and was selected independently
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of any consideration of equidistance principle. (146) According to the agreement both
countries have equal rights of ownership over the al-Bunduq oilfie1d.47
Furthermore both countries have to consult with each other in respect to its
exploitation.' 1 The 1969 agreement stipulated that the development of the
al-Bunduq field shall be carried out by one concessionaire, ADMA (Abu Dhabi
Marine Areas Ltd) and that the total revenues, profits, and benefits from the field are
to be equally shared between the government of the two countries, Abu Dhabi and
Qatar.149
4.7 The Islands Crisis
4.7.1 Introduction
The announcement of British withdrawal from the Gulf also led to another territorial
dispute besides the Buraimi Oasis, over the three islands: Abu Musa, and the Greater
and the Lesser Tunbs (Tunb al Koubra and Tunb el Soughra). The islands were
disputed between Iran on one side, and Sharjah and Ras al-Khaimah on the other
side. The dispute emerged as a serious issue only in the period of the British
withdrawal from the region, even though the islands had been the subject of a number
of negotiations between Britain and Iran in the 1920s and 1930s, and the island has
been the subject of a long standing dispute between fran and Shaijah.°) It was
reported from Iran on 17 February 1971 that Iran's policy in the Gulf was based on
"indisputable ownership of the islands"P 51 In an interview for The Times on 11 May
1971, the Shah of Iran said that Iran was in a position to play a decisive part in creating
the new federation, but if the islands dispute was not resolved to Iran's satisfaction,
"Iranian obstruction could equally block its formation".2
Shaikh Zayed, President-Elect of the new U.A.E. federation, talked to French
Television in November 197
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"Border disputes are an international problem present in more than one
region and in more than one countly. In my view, lack of mutual
understanding between Iran and the Gulf is nothing new. Previously, there
was an Iranian claim forBahrain before the emergence of the pro biem of the
islands. That problem has been resolved and is over. We hope that the lack
of mutual understanding over the islands will end as the situations regarding
the previous problem of Bahrain ended, in a friendly manner and on a basis
offriendship, neighbourliness and religion."
0n4 December 1971, Iran recognized the establishment of the U.A.E. federationS'
On 30 November 1971 Iranian forces occupied Abu Musa island and the Greater and
Lesser Tunbs. The occupation occurred on the day before the federation came into
being. The occupation of the two Tumb islands were reported as one of the reasons
why Ras al-Khaimah refused to join the federation on 2 December 1971. Shaikh Saqr
al-Qasemi, the ruler of Ras al-Kliaimah placed as the condition for joining the
federation, the liberation of the islands. Ras al-Khaimah's ruler, Shaikh Saqr bin
Mohammed al-Qasemi, asked the other Emirates for strong action against Iran. To
understand the response, the history and geography of the islands needs also to be
understood.
The occupation of the islands by Iran created some serious problems to the proposed
federation which was ready to emerge. First, the announcement of the establishment
of the federation was delayed because Iran put the return of the three islands to it as
a price of its recognition of the federation. Additionally, it led to many internal
problems, such as the Shaikhdom of Ras al-Kliaimah refusing to join the federation
on 2 December 1971 unless all the Emirates boycotted Iran culturally and
economically.5
The major problemwas the assassination of Shaikh Khalid bin Mohammed al-Qasimi,
Ruler of Shaxjah, on 25 January 1972 by his cousin Shaikh Saqr bin Sultan al-Qasimi,
in response to the agreement which be signed with the government of Iran in order
to end the dispute of Abu Musa. 156 Shaikh Khalid, ruler of Sharjah, signed the
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agreement with Iran to protect his people from involvement in a war with Iran, but
as a result lost his own life. He was prepared to sign the agreement with Iran on Abu
Musa island whereas Shaikh Saqr al-Qasemi was unwilling for this to happen on
account of Iran's occupation of the two islands. Shaikh Saqr bin Sultan, ruler from
1951, and an Arab nationalist, was deposed in June 1965, and has since lived in exile
in Cairo. Having planned a counter-coup, he succeeded in attacking the palace on 24
January 1972, and on entry murdered the Shaikh for his co-operation with Iran. He
hoped to regain his former position. ) Shaikh Saqr bin Sultan told his interrogators
in Abu Dhabi that he had first planned to launch a coup against Shaikh Khalid after
the British forces had left the Gulf region, but had abandoned the project before they
went. When Shaikh Khalid agreed with Iran to partition Abu Musa Island, however
he determined once more to attempt to achieve itP8
Thereafter, it was announced on 25 January 1972 that Shaikh Sultan bin Mohammed,
the U.A.E. Education Minister and a younger brother of Shaikh Khalid had been
elected as Ruler of Sharjah.9
4.7.2 The Geography of Abu Musa Island
The island occupies a strategic position at the mouth of the Gulf, 69 km from the
Iranian coast and 56 km from Sharjah. It is about 9 km long and 5 km wide, with an
area of 20 km2. The highest part of the island is its centre where it reaches 100 metres.
Its length is about 5 km and its width is 9 km. It is surrounded by comparatively deep
water and offers a good deep- water anchorage. A reasonable supply of drinking water
is available.'60 Abu Musa has about 800 inhabitants. They are of U.A.E. nationality.
There are schools for boys and girls built by the federal government of the U.A.E. as
well as a police station and a hospital which are all located on the Sharjah part of the
island. Iran declined to demarcate the 4 km long boundary across the island separating
the Iranian strategic points in the north from the southern part of the island, including
Abu Musa Village, controlled by Shaah.'160
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4.7.3 The Geography of The Greater and The Lesser Tunbs
The Greater Tunb is situated 59 km south-west of Qishm island and 78 km north-west
of AI-Hamrah island, which belongs to Ras al-Khaimah. It is located to the north-east
of Abu Musa island, 50 km from it. Its area is 9 km 2, and its highest point is 165 feet.
The island has about 700 Arab inhabitants, most of whom are fishermen. There are
two schools, a police station, a health centre and a lighthouseP61
The Lesser Tunb lies about 13 km from The Greater Tunb. The island is uninhabited.
Whilst the two Tunbs are dejure under the jurisdiction of Ras aI-Khaimah, they are
de facto under the jurisdiction of Iran.
4.7.4 Historical Background of the Islands
According to Lorimer:
"The maritime possessions of Sharjah are the islands of Bu Musa and SirBu
Na'air, which are associated with the district of Sharjah proper; and the
island of Tunb, and probably that of Nabiyn Tunb, which are attached to the
Ras-al-Khaimah District. ,u(162)
Further, also according to Lorimer:
Tunb, in English formerly 'Tomb', an island in the Persian Gulf, lying 17
miles south of the south-west point of Qishm island and 46 miles north-west
ofJazirat-al-Hamra, which is the nearestpoint on the coast of Trucia.l Oman.
Tunb belongs to the Shaikh of Sharjah, and is connected with the
Ras-al-Khaimah District of his princzpality". (163)
Sir Rupert Hay, who served in Bahrain as Political Resident for the Gulf from 1953
to 1958, referred to the Abu Musa island as part of the Shaikhdom of Sharjah and
said: "The island of Bu Musa and Sir bu Na'ir, about 45 and 65 miles from Sharjah
respectively, are included in the ShaikJidom"." M He also referred to the fact that a
brother of the Ruler of Sharjah sometimes resides on it as Governor, which reflects
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that the island at that period was clearly under Sharjah rule. In describing the
Shaikhdom of Ras al-Khaimah he refers to the two islands, by saying that:
"The islandi of Tamb and Nabiyu, or Little Tamb, are under the rule of Ras
al-Khaimah, from which they are about 60 miles distant."
According to the recent (1991) publication The Shah and I, it was reported that the
Court Minister of the Shah of Iran asked the British Ambassador in 1969 about the
island of Abu Musa. The Ambassador replied: "It lies below the median line." The
Court Minister retorted: "We are sufficiently powerful to disregard the line." 1 It
can be concluded from this brief exchange that Iran may have recognised Sharjah's
case for sovereignty over the island, but it was a matter of military power in the region
who was able to dominate any part in the Gulf.
Although Iran recognized the U.A.E. on the same day, her occupation of the islands,
especially the two Tunbs, created a dangerous situation for the newly-born federation.
The British government appointed Sir William Luce as special representative of the
British Foreign Secretary to deal with the withdrawal decision from the Gulf, and to
resolve the dispute in order to guarantee stability and security after the period of
withdrawal.
Although Sir William Luce solved the dispute between Iran and Sharjah successfully
with regard to Abu Musa, he failed to conclude a similar agreement over the Tunbs
with Ras al-Khaimah. Shaikh Saqr bin Mohammed al-Qasimi, Ruler of Ras
al-Khaimah refused to enter into any negotiation with Iran. Shaikh Saqr of Ras
al-Khaimah revealed that Sir William Luce proposed that Ras al-Khaimah should
cede sovereignty over the Tunbs in return for annual payment of $1.6 million by
Iran."67 Shaikh Saqr rejected the suggestion, saying: "We rejected this offer and told
Luce we would never give up our land, nor were we ready to enter into deals to sell
our islands."1
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On 6 December 1971 the matter of the conflict of the Tunbs, which were being
occupied by Iran, was raised in the House of Commons. A Member of Parliament
asked Sir Alec Douglas Home, the British Foreign Secretary:
" Wizy, if he could buy off Sharjah with $8 million and an agreement on an
oilfield could Sir William Luce not have had something similar to settle the
claims of Shaikh Zaqur overAbu Musa7'
The Foreign Secretary replied:
"I understand that the landing on the Tunbs was unopposed and peaceful,
but there was an incident later, and that apoliceman and three Iranians were
shot. Sir William Luce tried vely hard to get a successful arrangement with
Ras al Khaimah as he got from Sharjah, but the Ruler of Ras al Khaimah
felt he could not make an agreement. I wish it had been possible. We did oil
we could. ,,(169)
In order to understand the geographical value of the island it is instructive to examine
Iran's aims concerning the island.
4.7.5 Why the islands were important to Iran
The Iranian government's claim to Abu Musa and the Tunbs was based on various
arguments. The Shah claimed that Bahrain belonged to ban, but changed his mind
when he realized that his claim to Bahrain would seriously jeopardize the stability of
the Gulf. Saving face was an important factor in encouraging the Shah to occupy the
islands. According to one British official:
'Advisors to the Iranian Government told us that the Shah did not want the
Islands for militaiy or strategic reasons, despite his statements and much
official propaganda to that effect. Rather, he needed to take them in order to
enhance his image as a forceful and decisive monarch. At the time of the
Bahrayn settlement, we failed to grasp the extent to which the Shah's prestige
had fallen in the eyes of the Iranian people due to his having 'given in' on
that question. He had to do something forceful to regain it, and in occupying
the Islands he did.'170
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It may be concluded that the Shah of Iran used the occupation of the islands as the
price of withdrawing his claim to Bahrain."2 Iran's occupation of Abu Musa may
also have been motivated by a desire to extend its waters to the edge of the southern
Gulf and gain offshore areas with significant offshore oil potential.(:l
The strategic location of the island in the mouth of the Gulf could make it useful as
a base for attacking an enemy. This was what happened during the Iran-Iraq war: the
Iranian navy used Abu Musa as a base for speedboat attacks on shipping and oil
installations 173 (see Figure 4.17).
The economic sensitivity and strategic location of these islands which oversee the
western mouth of the Strait of Hormuz, were brought into perspective when in 1973
it was shown that an average of one oil tanker every fourteen minutes passed through
the Strait of Hormuz past the islands, and that about 17 million barrels of oil left the
Arabian Gulf through this narrow strait daily.174
4.8 The Maritime boundary between Iran and the U.A.E.
4.8.1 Iran-Dubal Agreement of 13 August 1975
The UAE.-Iran boundary line extends for a distance of 39.25 nautical mlles.' 175
 The
agreed boundary line delimits only some parts of the continental shelf between these two
states, namely the area between Iran and the offshore limits of the Emirate of Dubai. The
UAE. (six Emirates) offshore boundary is still unsettled with Iran. This is due to the two
states' dispute over Abu Musa and the two Tunb islands. 176 Figure 4.10, which was drawn
in 1980 by the Cartographic and Map Section of the British Foreign Office, shows that
the only line which is marked by an unbroken line is the maritime line between Dubai
and Iran. The maritime line of the other five Emirates namely Abu Dhabi, Shaijah, Ajman,
Umm al-Quwain, and Ras al-Khaimah is marked with dotted lines.(1Th Dubai and Iran
defined their continental shelf boundary on 13 August 1975.
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Figure 4.17 Map ofAbu Musa Island showing the boundaries between the territory of
Sharjah (UA.E.) and the territory of Iran on the island.
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This maritime boundary as demarcated consists of straight lines and five connecting
fixed points. Point 1 of the agreement coincides with the lateral offshore boundaiy
line between Dubai and Abu Dhabi as agreed in 1968 (see Chapter 6). While point
5 marks the other end of the agreed boundary, it seems to coincide with what Dubai
in 1964 claimed to constitute its lateral offshore boundary line with Sharjah. The
maritime boundaries between the various members of the union of the U.A.E. are
not international boundaries, and the present agreement between the U.A.E. and
Iran defines only the shelf boundary between Dubai and Iran' (see Figure 4.18).
Four Points: One can look at U.A.E. international maritime boundaries from four
different angles. The first one is the maritime border which lies northeasterly of the
U.A.E. on the East Coast and starts from Dibba al-Husn (Sharjah) on the Gulf of
Oman. Moving south of Dibba until it reaches Katma-Melaha on the same coast (a
border point between the U.A.E. and Oman) the second maritime line of the U.A.E.
rises from that place. The third line lies northwesterly of the U.A..E. from Al-Gair
village, on the west coast of the U.A.E., whereas, the line as shown in Figure 6.9 is
marked with an unbroken line, which means that the maritime boundary between the
U.A.E. and the Sultanate of Oman has been defined before the 1980s. Until 1977-78,
the Omani continental shelf boundaries with the U.A.E. (both the Emirates of
Sharjah and Ras al-Khaimah) remained undefined.
From Ras-al-Khumays, which is the western boundary point of the U.A.E. with Saudi
Arabia (see Figure 4.15), the maritime boundary line starts as a curved shape to the
west of Ghagha island (which belongs to Abu Dhabi) until it reached the 1969
Qatari-Abu Dhabi maritime line which is taken as the fourth angle and the last
maritime boundary line of the U.A.E..
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Figure 4.18 Iran-United Arab Emirates (Dubai) continental shelf boundary agreed in 1975.
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4.8.2 The 1992 Crisis
Subsequent to Sharjah and Iran reaching an agreement in 1971, a new conflict blew
up over Abu Musa island in 1992. The Islamic Republic of Iran, different from the
regime of the Shah, pushed the dispute further and further until it reached a
dangerous level through two incidents which occurred in April 1992. It was reported
that early in April 1992, Iran moved to take exclusive control of Abu Musa island,
which it had controlled jointly with the U.A.E. (Sharjah) for the past 20 years. What
appears to have happened on Abu Musa is that Iran had evicted without notice
hundreds of workers from the island, effecting the Iranian takeover of the island. The
Iranian authorities closed the only school and police station on the U.A.E. side of the
island. Iranian officials refused to negotiate with the federal government of the
U.A.E. over the dispute, claiming that its quarrel is with Sharjah and not with the
federation itself, considering that the conflict was between her and Sharjah as an
individual Emirate and that the 1971 agreement was with Sharjah before the U.A.E.
was established, not with the federal government.' 80 In reaction to the Iranian view,
in early May 1992 the U.A.E. Supreme Council reached an important decision to
assume federal responsibility for the international commitments of each individual
Emirate. The U.A.E. thus asserted its federal responsibility for the existing
commitments and treaty obligations of the individual Emirates and undertook to
negotiate with Iran on behalf of Sharjah.'81
The second significant incident occurred in August 1992 when Iran effectively
annexed Abu Musa. The dispute came to a head when Iranian Police officers turned
back a passenger ferry from Abu Musa having held it in port for three days.' 82 The
group were mainly Arab teachers and their families who were contracted by the
U.A.E. authorities, and included U.A.E. citizens. This was the first interference with
civilian traffic there since the 1971 agreement.1
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4.8.3 Comments on the Abu Musa Incident
In response to Iranian efforts to test U.A.E. and Gulf Co-Operation Council
solidarity, the U.A.E. federal government has moved to unite the federation and
strengthen its ties with Oman. In early May an exchange of ambassadors was
announced by the U.A.E. government and the Sultanate of Oman. These
developments may open the way for closer co-operation between the federation and
the Sultanate on a number of issues. According to some western military experts in
the Middle East, if Iran is permitted to swallow Abu Musa, it may not be long before
its ambitions turn to other chunks of territory in the region. 1 According to the
Al-Majalah, strategic reasoning was not behind the recent aggression. The new target
was perhaps to disengage from the last article of the 1971 agreement whereby
revenues from oil produced from the island and its territorial waters will be divided
equally between Iran and Shaijah. The oil which is shared is from the Mubarak oilfield
produces about 40 thousand barrels a day. It was reported that Iran is dissatisfied with
the share of oil revenues which it receives from Sharjah's offshore fields and its action
in cancelling the residence permits of workers on the island was calculated to force a
reopening of negotiations on this issue. 1 Iran takes 50 per cent of the field's
revenue, Sharjah 30 per cent and the two Emirates Ajman and Umm al-Quwain (both
of whom have claims to surrounding territorial waters) 10 per cent each. 1
 The oil
is already a significant income for the Emirate of Sharjah, but more exploration could
take place on the island, or around it, which could give Iran a chance to increase the
amount of oil revenue it already gets from the area.'87
The first public reaction by the U.A.E. Government on the dispute over Abu Musa
was from the Foreign Ministry of the U.A.E. which issued a strong statement on 2
September 1992:
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"What the Iranian officiaLs have done and are doing on the island of Abu
Musa is not compatible with relations between the state of the U_4.E. and
the Islamic Republic of Iran and reflects negatively on the co-operation
between the two countiies."'
It is worth noting that the original agreement signed on 29 November 1971 as a
Memorandum of Understanding between Sharjah and Iran was as follows:
1. The inhabitants of Abu Musa were to remain subject to the laws and legislation
of Sharjah, but Iranian forces were to occupy an agreed part of the island (see
Figure 4.17).
2. Revenues from oil produced from the island and territorial waters, within 12
nautical miles, were to be divided equally between Iran and Sharjah.
3. The Iranian Government was to grant aid amounting to $1.5 million annually
to Sharjah for a period of nine years, or until Sharjah's oil revenues reached $3
million annually.
4. The agreement did not affect Sharjah's claims to sovereignty over the island.
The Sharjah flag was to continue to fly over the police station, and Sharjah was
to continue to administer all parts of the island not occupied by Iranian forces.
5. Iranian forces were to arrive shortly in the agreed area of Abu Musa.
6. The Buttes Gas and Oil Company was to undertake exploration for oil on the
island and in its territorial waters. (189)(190)
Conclusion on the 1992 Crises on Abu Musa island
The dispute between the United Arab Emirates and Iran over the Gulf islands of Abu
Musa and the Greater and Lesser Tunbs remain unresolved. In an interview with
Al-Wasat published in London in September 1993, Ambassador Saif Said Sa'ed,
Foreign Ministry Acting Under Secretary (the head of the U.A.E. committee for
negotiation on Abu Musa island dispute), said:
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"We lost the island as a whole, Iran evacuated the U.A.E. citizens from the
island and established a milita,y base on the island... It seems that the policy
of expansion of Shah Iran and the Islamic revolution are applying the same
policy. ,,(191)
In a interview, published in London in Al-Wasat magazine, Shaikh Saqr bin
Mohammed al-Qasemi, ruler of Ras al- Khaimah said:
"The U.A.E. will continue to resist peacefully and with patience Iran's
occupation of the islands ofAbu Musa and Greater and Lesser Tunbs... The
Foreign Ministiy and the higher authority in our countly deal with the crisis
in a good and objective manner. Our word is one and finn, the islands are
occupied U.A.E. territories and they should be returned to their legitimate
owners. The situation could be escalated through Iran insistence to stay in
the islands as an occupation force. In this case there will be no alternative
but to refer the dispute to the International Court of Justice... Our fellow
citizens and good memories are there in these islands. About 200 families
were made homeless and were forced to leave Greater Tunb."
Shaikh Saqr added:
"The Iranians should reconsider occupation of lands of others by force... We
are neighbours and shared a long histoiy created bygeograhical and cultural
elements and dialogue and understanding should prevail as the only way to
break doubts."1
Iran has appointed Hassan Rezai as the new Governor of Abu Musa Island, and the
U.A.E. has not objected to his appointment. However, were the U.A.E. to take the
case to the International Court of Justice, or to the United Nations Security Council,
there would be international support for the U.A.E. against Iran.
4.9 Conclusion
From all the above discussion it can be concluded that there are major differences
between the map of the U.A.E. boundaries published before 1973 and some new maps
of the U.A.E. published after 1974. According to the Gazetteer, Lorimer mentioned
'Khore Aladeid', a creek on the coast of Abu Dhabi which lies about 180 miles west
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from the town of Abu Dhabi. He continued that the boundary of Qatar is a short
distance to the north of the creek. In addition, the Gazetteer stated that Al-Udaid
was uninhabited and not visited by Bedouins of the interior, other than by fishermen
from Abu Dhabi who spend some months there. Lorimer states that the Al-Qubaisat
section of the Bath Yas tribe from Abu Dhabi occupied Al-Odaid village at various
times and there were four wells which were less than a mile from the place, and a fort
with two towers. 93 Lorimer also mentioned that Trucial Oman extends to the Gulf
of Oman from Khor Kalba to Dibah, and from Sha'am to Khor al-Udaid, the places
named being all included in it. He reported that the boundary between these two
points is the sea, whilst inland its boundaries are more difficult to define. On the
northern part, Trucial Oman it is bounded by a line which runs from a spot between
Dibah and Bai'ah on the east coast to Ras Sha'am on the west coast so it divides from
the Ruus al-Jibal area of Oman to the north.1
Sir Gilbert Laithwaite of the India Office's political department points out that both
sides, Qatar and Abu Dhabi recognized "the Abu Dhabi claim to the district of Aqal
which contains both the Khor-al-Odeid and the Khor adh-Dhuwaihin" 19 which
adds to the previous fact that Khor al-Udaid should undoubtedly be Abu Dhabi
territory. From such historical evidence it canbe seen that the part which was acquired
by the Saudi Government (according to the 1974 agreement became Saudi territory),
was undoubtedly Abu Dhabi territory, but was lost from the largest Emirate of the
United Arab Emirates.
The United Arab Emirates and Qatar now no longer have a common boundary on
the mainland. This would not have been possible without an offshore boundary
connecting the new boundary line after the 1974 agreement. This is why Saudi Arabia
agreed to Abu Dhabi's claims on islands other than Al-Huwaisat which came under
Saudi control. This could be one of the reasons why the full text remained unpublished
for so long, but which now appears in this thesis.
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It is important to recognise that other boundary disputes could loom into sight in
future in any part of the Arabian Peninsula, on land or offshore, between any two
members of the Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC), similar to the latest dispute
between Qatar and Balirain over the Fasht Dibal island and Hawar island, or the
recent conflict between Saudi Arabia and Qatar on Al-Khofus border point. 1 The
Gulf Co-operation Council has proved that it is unable to do anything about this
dispute. Furthermore, the GCC countries face a political problem and they have two
choices. They can either accept the boundary lines drawn up by the British authorities
and accept the countries concerned as their political boundaries; or they can refuse
to accept them, falling back on the old tribal system of recognizing no borders and
accepting no lines in the sand.
The final section of this chapter is concerned with the international boundaries of the
United Arab Emirates including its history. The main subject of the next chapter will
be concerned with the emergence of inter-state boundaries and to focus on the period
which saw the development of the internal boundaries remaining to the present day.
It is interesting that throughout the history of the Trucial States (later U.A.E.)
boundaries have been frequently changed. Some Shaikhdoms have been eliminated,
and others emerged. There were six Shaikhdoms in 1835, five in 1914, six again by
1919, seven by 1937, and during 1952 one Shaikhdom was eliminated (Kalba), and
another appeared (Fujairah). Today the Emirates are seven, all of which belong to
one federation, and fly one flag. There are however some boundary disputes between
these Emirates which are still active. This will be the focus of Chapter 6.
The geo-political map of the United Arab Emirates illustrates how the boundary
arrangement among the union members of the state is complicated. With the
exceptions of Abu Dhabi and Umm al-Quwain, the other five members of the federal
state have numerous enclaves in the hinterland. This is an unusual pattern in any
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political map. The internal boundary history is crucial to understanding this map, and
therefore this fact will be highlighted and explained in more detail in the following
chapter.
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Chapter 5
Julian Walker's Map of Internal Boundaries
5.1 Introduction
For many years, the internal boundary lines of the Trucial States (U.A.E.) were not
shown on the maps of most geographical books because there was little reason to do
so. Until oil was discovered, the Political Agents in the region were not involved in
such issues, and gave the internal boundary demarcation between these states little
thought. The earliest boundary description was officially recorded in Lorimer's
Gazetteer (Lorimer, J.C., 1908-1915, Gazetteer Volume II [Geographical, 1908],
Volume I [Historical and Genealogical, 19151, London, reprinted 1970). However,
no boundaries are shown on the map which was prepared by Hunter in 1917 for the
1908 Gazetteer.
Indeed, the people did not recognize the boundary line in its modern sense. To support
this idea, Julian Walker, who was involved in the boundary demarcation of the Trucial
States, said: "The concepts of nation states, of tenitoñal sovereignty, and of fixed linear
frontiers are western ones, which have been imposed on the traditional society of theArabian
Penhsula." 1 When in 1954 the Shaikhs of the Trucial Coast felt the need for clearly
defined borders, they were involved by the British Agent's assistant of that period, Julian
Walker, on behalf of the British Government, in this process of definition.
5.1.1 Enclaves and exciaves
All but two of the seven Emirates lack territorial homogeneity. Only Abu Dhabi and
Umm al-Quwain consist of one integral unit (see Table 1.1. in Chapter 1 and also
Chapter 6). The other five Emirates have at least one enclave of territory entirely
surrounded by territory over which they have no jurisdiction. The existence of
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multiple enclaves makes internal boundaiy issues in the U.A.E. not only highly
complex, but currently unique. The boundary between one Emirate and the enclave
of another Emirate is neither an international boundary (which in many parts of the
world would imply different ethnicity, different religion, different language, or at least
a different tax regime and therefore excise duties), nor a purely administrative
boundary. Whilst the two sides of the boundary are part of one country, each Emirate
enjoys high degree of autonomy, as in most federal states.
In addition to these internal divisions, there are three exclaves of Oman separated
from the main part of Oman by U.A.E. territory: the northern tip of the Musandam
Peninsula, Wadi Madha (located within Khur Fakkan, the enclave of Sharjah), and
Walaya Mahadha.
5.2 Previous boundary delimitation
As mentioned above, inter-state boundaries emerged in the 1930s. The first map
showing internal boundaries of the Trucial States (U.A.E.) was drawn after reports
on the territories claimed by four of the Rulers had reached London as result of a
survey by the Political Agent in Bahrain, Captain Hickinbotham. 2 On the basis of
this information, Captain Hickinbotham prepared a Memorandum on "Trucial Coast
Boundaries". The map was entitled "Boundaries of the Trucial Sheikhdoms 1937", and
this sketch with known tribal loyalties was redrawn by Colonel Galloway, with the
help of Jasim Kazmawi, the Residency Agent in 1946 in Sharjah. It was the first map
of the internal boundaries of the Trucial States. At the bottom of the map is printed
"Research Department, Foreign Office March 1953", which suggests that printing the
map was originally a low priority, but that by 1953, had become a much higher priority.
The internal boundaries of the 1953 map are shown in Figure 5.1. Those boundaries
marked with bold dashes are those which were well-recognised. Boundaries marked
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with dotted lines were those about which Hickinbotham was less certain (3)
 From
Figure 5.1 it can be concluded that in 1937 the boundary between the Dubai
Shaikhdom and that of its eastern neighbour, the Shaikhdom of Sharjah, was certain
from the coast to Aud al-Matinah and so was marked with bold dashes. From Aud
al-Matinali the line was marked with a dotted line, meaning that the rest of the border
line was not certain. However, it is pertinent to note that in controlling the border as
marked on the map, Shaikh Said bin Maktum of Dubai, Shaikh Sultan of Shaijah, and
Shaikh Sultan bin Salim of Ras al-Khaimah were far from assiduous. The dotted line
to the east ofRas al-Khaimali marked the eastern edge of its territory from Ras Shaam
south of Bukkah to Hasat al-Basrah, and then south leaving Adhin and the Wadi
al-Qur (plus some of the Wadi Ham) to Ras al-Khaimah. The territory to the east of
the line would not have been Sultanate of Oman territory but a jumble of lands
belonging to the Shihuh. However, Fujairah was not currently recognized by the
British Government as an independent Shaikhdom, neither were the east coast
settlements of Dibba, Kalba, Khur Fakkan which were under Ahmad bin Kha1ifa.4
Fujairah had to wait fifty years for British recognition, from the time of the Battle of
Bithnah in 1902 when it won its independence from the Qawasim until 1952.
It can be further concluded from the map that, during this period, only three Emirates
had clear boundaries with their neighbours (their border lines being marked with
bold dashed lines): the Emirate of Abu Dhabi with its eastern neighbour Oman, (the
two villages of al-Buraimi Oasis, Jimi and Huh both were within the Emirate of Abu
Dhabi territories), the Emirate of Ajman, and the Emirate of Umm al-Quwain. The
other boundaries are marked with dotted lines.
The 1937 map (Figure 5.1) shows that the largest Emirates in size in 1937 were Abu
Dhabi and Sharjah (Fujairah then belonged to Sharjah). Dubai was a tiny territory
because Shaikh Said bin Maktum, the Ruler of Dubai, had little control over the bedu
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tribes. (5)
 However, Wadi Hatta (the enclave of the Emirate of Dubai on the border
with Oman) was included with Dubai territory. As can be seen from Figure 5.1, the
boundary line included the city of Dubai on the coast with its hinterland, and Hatta
in the Hajarin Mountains west of Jabal Sumaini. Another conclusion to be drawn
from the 1937 map is that the border line between Abu Dhabi and Dubai is marked
with a bold dashed line running from Jabal All which is to where Shaikh Shakbut
claimed his territory.'6
Dibba on the 1937 map is shown as a complete unit. The situation changed later on.
In Julian Walker's map of 1963 Dibba is divided between three states: Dibba al-Bayya
to the Sultanate of Oman; the middle, Dibba al-Husn, to Sharjah; and the third, Dibba
al-Gurfa, to the Emirate of Fujairah.
In February 1963, Julian Walker supplied the Research Department of the Foreign
Office with sketch maps and information. From this, a new map was drawn. The new
map showed considerable differences in the Trucial States boundaries from the 1937
map. This was the first Trucial State internal boundary map, and it remains the basis
for establishing the internal boundaries of the Emirates. The desire for political
independence was a major issue among certain members of the Qawasim federation,
and is an important factor in understanding the changing of boundary lines between
the Emirates from 1937 to 1963 g. This period saw the independence of Fujairali from
the Qawasim federation recognized by the British government in 1952. Kalba, which
was an independent Shaikhdom in 1936 however, was re-incorporated with Sharjah
in 1952. Hemriyyah also tried to break away from the Qawasim and become
independent, but failed (8) (see Chapter 3).
These movements towards independence within the Qawasim federation affected the
boundary demarcation. The internal boundary of the U.A.E. is a reflection of these
movements and explains why the enclaves emerged in the 1963 map whose aims are
examined in the following section.
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5.3 Aims of the 1963 map
One of the important goals of the 1963 map which fixed the internal boundaries of
the Trucial States (U.A.E.) concerned the oil concessions and the desire to establish
which territory belongs to which Shaikhdom. In other words, the establishment of
precise and clearly defined boundaries between the Emirates had become necessary
in the 1950's when some recognition of the potential oil resources of the area was
possible. Once the Rulers began to grant concessions to the oil companies,
demarcation of the boundaries between the Emirates became essential.9
A second goal was to address the security needs of the exploration teams of the oil
companies in the interior of the area, and in particular to show the oil company teams
whose land they were exploring.
The difficulties of delimitation were illustrated in a paragraph published by The Daily
Telegraph, 19 August 1954:
"For a long time the Foreign Office has been patiently trying to get them
agreed but the lines on the map remain tentatively dotte-L No Ruler will make
concessions when the pencil hovers over an area which he thinks might be
the vely spot to yield a millionaire's revenue......Certain areas of the desert
could then be marked as disputec4 with the understanding that if oil were ever
found there the revenue would be equally sharecL"
5.4 Background to the 1955 survey
In 1945, the Foreign Office in London replaced the India Office in responsibility for
Trucial States affairs, and consequently had to deal with the boundary problems in
the area.
In 1954, the Foreign Office detailed Julian Walker to map the frontiers between the
Sultanate of Muscat and Oman and the Trucial States, as well as the inter-state
boundaries of the Trucial States. Walker was Assistant Political Agent in Dubai from
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1953-55, and was to be the last Political Agent in Dubai from 1970-7 1. Early in 1955,
he began to carry out a delimitation enquiry and survey, and in May of that year
presented a 116 page boundary report in which he was able to recommend a final
decision in 20 out of the 36 areas he had surveyed. In seven areas he was able to reach
only a more limited form of agreement, and in nine cases he found it impossible to
make any recommendation.(:l°)
Before Walker started his work in 1955, Sir Rupert Hay described boundary problems
in the Trucial States in the following terms:
"The bounda,y questions in Trucial Oman are extraordinarily complicated.
Firstly we have the boundaries of the Shaikhdoms with each other. Political
officers have been endeavouring to fir themfor several years..."11
It is also clear that before Walker arrived, many political agents had had some dealings
with border demarcation, including P.D. Stobart (Political Agent from 1949-5 1), A.J.
Wi1ton' (Political Agent from 195 1-52), and C.M. Pine-Gordon (Political Agent in
Dubai from 1953-55) who started the arbitration work by touring the boundary
between the two Shaikhdoms of Umm al-Quwain and Ras al-Khaimah. He was so
disillusioned by his first day's experience in the field (April 1954), that he decided
that it would not be possible for him to carry out the work necessary for boundary
arbitration and abandoned it in preference for his normal office work. In his place,
he delegated the boundary work to his assistant in the Political Agency, Julian
Walker.'3
5.5 Difficulties faced by Walker in his boundaries demarcation
During the survey Walker encountered many obstacles. What maps of the area existed
were far from accurate, and for some areas there were no maps at all. Thus, he had
to make his own maps and he started by climbing mountains to sketch the countryside
around about. A useful book about surveying was a key text for him: Hints for
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Travelleis, published by the Royal Geographical Society (first published in 1854 and
revised in 1865, 1871 and 1937).
According to his report of 1955, the question of sovereignty was another obstacle.
The European concept of sovereignty was unknown in the Trucial States, except
perhaps in the Ruler's control over his own 'capital city'. 14 Furthermore, there were
problems of access. In some areas the Landrover simply could not be driven,
especially in the mountains. He was tempted, therefore, to press on in the easiest
terrain, for as he said: "A fifteen mile frontier in barren desert lookedfar more impressive
than two miles in valueless rugged mountain territoiy, which was less likely to contain cm
oil-field" The geographical features of the U.A.E. (see Figure 5.2) are such that
the eastern region is mountainous but the western region is sandy desert. Worse, in
the mountainous areas flash floods occur the runoff rushing from the mountains down
narrow ravines making surveying additionally hazardous.
Yet another obstacle was the heat of summer, which overtook Walker and his small
team and made travel more difficult. Accordingly, he was trying to hurry to finish his
survey in the cooler months. The most pressing difficulty was the requirement for
speed and progress.
An interesting problem resulted from Walker using elderly bedu who held a
repository of historical information in their memories. Whilst Walker benefitted
considerably from their local knowledge, he found great difficulty in placing the
information in time. To the bedu, everything in the past, whether fifty years before
or a few weeks earlier, was stated to have happened ams (yesterday). To get round
this, he would ask them to dig in their memory to recollect contemporary events in
order to date the event in which he was interested, and record evidence of people
who had been involved.16
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Figure 5.2 A satellite photograph of the northern Emirates.
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5.6 Principles
In his efforts to demarcate the internal boundaries between Shaikhdoms, Walker
applied a number of principles as a basis for boundary dispute settlement. He gleaned
details of the background to the dispute from files held by the Political Agency in
Dubai, and by the Political Residency in Bahrain, and also from Lorimer's invaluable
Gazeteer.1'7
According to the report Walker submitted in March 1955 on Trucial States frontier
settlement, the following principles to establish ownership of a territory were taken as the
basis for internal boundary settlement, listed in approximate order of importance:
1. Control of several years' standing in an area, and tribal recognition of that
control.
2. The collection of zakat (on crops).
3. The allegiance of tribesmen settled in the area.
4.	 Historical evidence: divided into 5 subjects as follows:
a. agreements.
b. zakat.
c. settlement of disputes.
d. past occupation.
e. development and use of territory.
5.	 Ownership of property.'8
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5.6.1 Control of several years' standing in an area, and tribal recognition of
that control
Khur Fakkan is the main enclave of Sharjah on the Gulf of Oman. Walker used the
principle of long-term control over an area in concluding:19
"Sharjah should be awarded the whole area as delineated by Khalid Bin
Ahmed ... Sharjah's claims to the Khur al Fakkan area, as stated by Khalid
binAhmed in l937appear not to be seriously disputed by anyone."
5.6.2 The collection of zakat (on crops).
The payment of zakat is the third pillar of Islam, and is a tithe of 2.5%. Zakat was a
tax on the agricultural produce of the country. In the Trucial States there were two
main divisions of zakat: on dates (or other crops) and on livestock. The former was
more common, and was normally collected annually by the Wali (the Shaikh's
representative in each town). Importantly for Walker, zakat on dates and other crops
had stronger connections with the land than zakat on cattle and other livestock. For
this reason, and also because few Shaikhs collectedzakat on cattle and other livestock,
it was not taken into account in the boundary settlements.'20
Walker was told by tribesmen that receipt ofzakat by a Shaikh implied that the Shaikh
was the owner of the land on which the zakat was paid. Zakat is bound up with the
land in as much as the tribes paid tax on palms and other crops to a Ruler. Thus land
zakat establishes current sovereignty over any area. If the tribal subjects of one Shaikh
move to another Shaikh's territory, the tribes still pay zakat on their non-moveables
(such as wheat crops and date palms) to the first Shaikh. If they transfer their zakat
payment to the second Shaikh, they are admitting that they have changed allegiance.
An example of a Trucial States boundary dispute settlement based on zakat, is that
between Ras al-Khaimah and Fujairah concerning the village of al-Maliariza Masafi.
In his March 1955 boundary settlement report, Walker concluded:21
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"The best logical basis for settlement in afairly well populated area such as
these mountains is the collection of zakat especially on non-moveables such
as wheat and dates. Because of this, I favour Ras al-Khaimah i claim to
sovereignty over the whole of this area."
It became clear that, because the inhabitants of Masafi village were paying zakat to
the Shaikh of Ras al-Khaimah, Walker awarded this village to Ras al-Khaimah.
5.6.3 Tribal allegiance
Another principle used by Walker, listed third above, is tribal allegiance. This is
sometimes complicated, and has several disadvantages. Some tribes, such as the
Mazari, divided their allegiance between Sharjah, Ras al-Khaimah and Abu Dhabi.
Another characteristic of tribal allegiance was tribal flight. This occurred both long
before and subsequent to the establishment of the federation: in 1835, the Qubaisat
tribe, a branch of Barn Yas, migrated to KEur al-Udaid; in the 1960s, the al-Zaab tribe
left Jazirat al-Hamra (the Red Island) just off the Ras al-Khaimah coast in a mass
migration to Abu Dhabi when they disputed with Shaikh Saqr bin Mohammed
al-Qasimi, the Ruler of Ras al-Khaimah over the distribution of the Emirate's
income. 22
 The al-Zaab tribe now have better relations with Shaikh Zayed bin Sultan
al-Nahayyan, the ruler of Abu Dhabi and the President of the U.A.E.. They settled
in the Emirate of Abu Dhabi where one of Abu Dhabi's districts is named by them,
al-Zaab.
Walker examined tribal loyalties, and within his survey he marked each well and palm
tree, and he listened to old men's views on grazing rights and water ownership:
"There were local historians on the Coast who had details to contribute, and
there were elderly bedu whose memories of incidents might be as clear as if
they had happened yesterday."
Then he pencilled in a boundary before finally holding detailed negotiations with the
Rulers concerned.'
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One of the ways in which Walker was influenced by the social life of the people in the
Trucial States, and by the system of tribal loyalties, was settlement of Ras
al-Khaimah's claim to Wadi al-Qur. Walker concludedP
"On the evidence, I consider that the whole area should be awarded to Ras
al-Khaimah ... The local tribesmen, Dahaminah, Beni Kaab and Biduwat,
all recognise that the area is under defacto control of Ras al-Khaimah, as
do the neighbouring authorities - Juma bin Saliman, Wali of Hajarain, and
Sheikhan bin Said, Wali of Marfut."
Walker used historical evidence as a second basis for awarding Wadi al-Our to Ras
a1-Khaimah:2
"The Sultan wrote lette,c to the Ruler of Ras al-Khaimah and carried out
negotiations with him between 1938 and 1946, which indicated that he
regarded the responsibility for the area as being Ras al-Khaimah's."
5.6.4 Historical evidence
There are further examples of Walker's use of historical evidence. For example, Wadi
al-Hilu belongs to Sharjah today, and lies very close to Wadi al-Our. From his
examination of historical records, Walker concluded: "The whole of this area should
be awarded to Sharjah." Under the 1914 (1332 AH) Qawasim Agreement, Wadi
al-Hilu was awarded to Sharjah.
Walker also interviewed some tribal 1eaders:
"At the present time the Shaikh of Ras al-Klzaimah, the Dahwnina of the
Wadis Qur and Manai, and representatives of the Beni Kaab, admit that the
wadi is the territoiy of Shailth Saqr bin Sultan who keeps a Wali at Hassa."
Another example of Walker's use of historical evidence in boundary dispute
settlement concerns Kalba and Khur Kalba. Basing his conclusion on historical
records, Walker argued that:29
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"The area should be awarded to Sharjah ... This area was claimed by Khalid
bin Ahmed, late Regent ofKalba, in his statement of1937. There is no dispute
over the district as a whole, and the Ruler of Fujairah recognises that it
belongs to Sharjah."
Following the completion of Walker's field survey, J.P. Tripp, the Political Agent in
Dubai, sent official letters during 1956 and 1957 to the Trucial Coast Shaikhs
informing them of their Shaikhdom's boundaries.°
Some of the rulers were far from pleased with the settlement and asked for further
investigations. The most serious problems regarding boundaries were between Abu
Dhabi and Dubai; Sharjah and Dubai; Fujairah and Sharjah; Fujairah and Ras
al-Khaimah and the Oman-Trucial States boundaries (see Chapter 6).
The Foreign Office sent the Right Honorable Lord Martin Buckmaster between 1963
and 1967 to find a solution to the unsettled areas. He made some recommendations,
the most important of which concerned the Wadi Madha and Umm al-Zamul which
helped to solve the dispute between Abu Dhabi and the Sultanate of Muscat. 31
 In
1964, Walker prepared a second report on the boundaries question in which he sought
to justify the solutions proposed in his report of March 1955.32)
Many commentators believe that, during the period of British occupation of the
region, from 1820-197 1, in order to protect its interests Britain adopted a 'divide and
rule' policy. Other commentators retort that the British were responsible only for the
external affairs of the area. Whilst the second argument is undoubtedly technically
correct, there were clearly some exceptions when British political officers interfered
in Trucial States' internal affairs. For instance, when disputes occurred (1960)
between the Shaikh of Ras al-Khaimah and the Shaikh ofFujairab, the Political Agent
in Dubai asked for the Trucial Oman Scouts to be stationed in the disputed area in
Masafi village.33
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In attempting to demonstrate the 'divide and rule' policy, Khalifah writes:
"The British official would drive to isolated villages and tribal encampments
and then ask the elders there to which one of the seven rulers, in addition to
the sultan of Oman, they owed allegiance. A consensus on this matter would
prompt Walker to simply encircle such a village or encampment, utilizing
whatever landmarks were available. He would then submit to British
authorities his recommendations as to which of the states this piece of land
should belong. (34)
However, the records also show that at the meeting of the Trucial States Council in
1954, i.e. before Walker's survey, the Rulers of the six Emirates, requested by way of
a resolution to the Political Agent, Mr C.M. Pine-Gordon, discussed the
determination of their respective boundaries.
It is inappropriate to blame all the problems of the region on British diplomacy because
division and splits are a tribal charactetistic. Tribes such as the Mazari are distributed
over more than one Emirate: Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Ras aI-Khaimah and some in the
Sultanate of Oman. This affected demarcation of boundaries. The Na'im tribe lived in
Buraimi, Ajman, Shaijah as well as in Al-Am, making demarcation of the internal
boundaiy veiy complicated, resulting in the emergence of enclaves (see Chapter 6).
Another problem involved recognition, or not, by the British Government of specific
Emirates. Britain never recognized Jazirat al-Hamra and Rams which both signed the
original Truce of 1820, and stopped recognisirig Kalba. Instead, these Shaikhdoms were
annexed to the Emirates of Shaijah and Ras al-Khaimah. Although the aim was not to
create enclaves, tribal loyalties inevitably resulted in the emergence of enclaves.
The internal boundaiy demarcation and the report and the recommendations
prepared by Walker were accepted in London and were agreed in advance by all the
Rulers concerned who agreed not to dispute the results of the arbitration with one
temporary exception. 30 This fact can be seen clearly in letters which were sent by J.P.
ChapterS	 228
Tripp, the Political Agent, Trucial States, in Dubai, to the rulers of the Trucial
Shaik.hdoms, informing them of their boundaries between the Trucial States and the
Sultanate of Muscat. The letter to Shaikh Saqr bin Mohammed al-Qasemi, Ruler of
Ras al-Kliaimah, ended with J.P. Tripp's words:
'!As Mr. Walker has discussed the reasons for these decisions with you, Itrust
that you will accept them as promised in your letter. "
As mentioned above, the 1963 map is still the official map to be used in the U.A.E.
for boundary recognition, and this map was drawn according to sketch maps and
information supplied by Walker. However, before Walker conducted his boundary
demarcation from 1954 until 1960, Sir Rupert Hay described the situation of the
boundary in the Trucial States in the following terms:
"... The points where the boundaries meet the coast can be fired with a
reasonable degree of accuracy, but in the deserts of the interior there are veiy
few data to work on. In the mountains at the eastern end of the Trucial Coast
the territories of Muscat, Ras al Kizaimah, Sharjah and Fujairah are
hopelessly intermingled, and even Dubai andAjman own villages."39
It can be concluded from this report that before Walker's time, to attempt to delimit
the boundaries of the region, the situation itself was complicated by many factors such
as tribal loyalty, the independence movement within the Qawasim federation, and
historical facts. When Walker faced these problems in his survey, the end result was
the political boundary lines and several internal and external enclaves within other
territories, which, to those who wish to see it that way, suggests a policy of 'divide and
rule'. However, Walker's 1955 report to the Foreign Office in London said nothing
about the tactic of isolating villages, even though he reported every simple step and
action that he took, such as that he borrowed alidades, plane tables, range finders,
clinometers and other instruments from the Directorate of Overseas Survey.
Furthermore, if he had been deliberately following such a policy, then that kind of
ChapterS	 229
tactic would surely have appeared within his several reports which have subsequently
been released by the Public Record Office.
At the International Boundaries Research Unit Conference, at Durham in 1991,
Walker explained how the demarcation of the internal boundaries of the Trucial
States was affected by tribal loyalties. He was answering a question about why a village
such as Dibba, the population of which is less than three thousand, became divided
between the Emirates of Fujairah and Sharjah and the Sultanate of Oman. He replied
that when he asked the inhabitants who lived there about their loyalties he found that
there were three groups with three different loyalties: one loyal to the Sultanate of
Oman (Dibba al-Bayya), the second group loyal to the Qawasim (Dibba al-Husn),
and the third group loyal to the Sharqeyyin tribe (Dibba al-Gurfa)P°
From the foregoing, it can be inferred that tribal loyalties were not immutable, and from
time to time such a change could involve the transfer of an entire dirah from one state to
another. According to Walker's 1955 report, it was clear that when he was describing the
location of any area, in most cases he was referring to Lorimer's description of the location.
He was also referring to records and documents going back to 1937 (Bahrain file) and
1946 (Sharjah file) looking at the area at the time it was under each Shaikh's control.
Furthermore, when he prepared his survey he himself asked the Shaikhs who claimed the
area and he recorded their views but his personal decision always came at the end of
the report and headed by the word "Conclusion."
An example serves to illustrate the point. Area number 19 in Walker's report was
Wadi Shauka. First, he referred to Sharjah's Foreign Office file kept in the Residency
dated 19.10.1951, and then he referred to Lorimer's report: "Lorimer reports Shauka
as being in the Ras a! Khaimah ditict". 42 Walker concluded with his decision, which,
in respect of Wadi Shauka, was: "This area should be awarded to Ra a! Khaimah, the
Chapter 5
	
230
frontier between that Shailthdom and Sharjah lying at the foothills just to the east ofAl
Khari. There should be no objection to an announcement of this ecision".43
5.6.5 The application of more than one principle
In the area of Hatta and Masfut, Walker applied more than one principle for settling
the boundary, confirming Hatta to be an enclave of Dubai and Masfut an enclave of
Ajman.
First, he examined the historical facts in Lorimer's Gazeteer. Second, he examined
tribal control over the area:
"Dubai's claim to the area is based on defacto control through a Wall, Juma
bin Salimin, living at Hajarain and collecting zakat from the villages of the
district. This claim is recognised by local tribesmen and authorities (Walis of
Masfut and Wadi Qor, Beni Kaab and Biduwat)i41
It can be concluded from the text that the collection of zakat was a third principle
applied by Walker to award Hatta to Dubai.
5.6.6 Neutral Zones
Walker used neutral zones in cases where he could not reach any solution both due
to lack of evidence regarding on which side certain land belonged, and also in cases
where the two parties had strong titles: "The Ruler of Ajman and the Shaikh of the
Bani Kaab both had strong titles, as in the Wadi Hadf, it was necessaly to create a neutral
zone ". (See Chapter 6)
5.7 Analysis of Walker's map of 1963
Walker drew 32 detailed sketch maps, at a scale of 1 cm to 1 1cm, of the boundaries
of the Trucial States. From those sketch maps, and from information supplied by
Walker, the Foreign Office drew two maps, one for Al-Am and Buraimi Oasis north
to the Abu Dhabi-Dubai boundary, and the other for the northern Emirates. Enclaves
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of the south east coast represented recognition of tribal allegiances. Looking at the
map of the political boundaries of the Trucial States, it may be seen that there are
boundaries between the Sultanate of Oman and with every Emirate in the south east
of the map: Muscat borders Sharjah, Dubai, Ajman, Ras al-Khaimah, Fujairah and
Abu Dhabi. There is also Wadi Madha, the Omani enclave Within U.A.E. territory.
The only Emirate without a boundary with the Sultanate of Oman is the Emirate of
Urnm al-Quwain (see Table 7.1).
There are two kinds of enclave in the U.A.E., international enclaves (between a
U.A.E. Emirate and Oman) and internal enclaves, which are enclaves of any Emirate
lying within the territory of another Emirate.
5.8 Analysis
The emergence of the internal boundaries between the Emirates sprang from the
tribal political idea and the loyalties of tribesmen to the Ruler himself. A second
factor was the collapse of the two strong federations, the Barn Yas and the Qawasim.
The 1820 treaty between Great Britain and the Shaikhdoms gave each small Emirate
a politically independent character. In the 1930s, the oil companies wanted each
Emirate to have its own boundary line so that thereafter the concessions would not
interlock each Emirate with its neighbours.
5.8.1 Population and the area
Historically, the free movement of tribesmen in the desert area had known no limits. The
situation formally changed after the discovery of oil. At the beginning of the 1960s, each
Emirate became bounded by lines, and became involved in border agreements with its
neighbours. However, the boundary lines had little impact on transportation links
between the Emirates, in a country with few highways (see Chapter 7).
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The question to be raised here is, since 1960 when Walker completed his survey on
boundary settlements, to what extent tribal groups still have power? In terms of the
ordinary citizen, tribal identity is still important enough to be presented in official
offices such as government ministries, local administration councils, and above all,
there is a space on the Passport to print to which tribe the passport holder belongs.
Furthermore, in Fujairah the greater number of inhabitants are still tribal, in the sense
that few inhabit cities.
At government level, Abu Dhabi and Dubai are ruled by al-Bu Falah and al-Bu Falasa
respectively, both of which are branches of the Bath Yas. The Barn Yas, which
includes the Al-Nahayyan family, are the most important tribe and have for a many
years exercised control over the following areas: Abu Dhabi, Liwa, Al-Am and other
villages in the Buraimi Oasis, where they have held long close relationships with the
Al-Dhawahir. Sharjah and Ras al-Khaimah are stifi dominated by the Qawasim.
Al-Sharqiyyin have dominated the Emirate of Fujairah since 1952 when it was
recognized by the British Government, and became independent of the Qawasim.
The Emirate of Ajman is ruled by the Nuaim family who originally came from
Al-Buraimi. Umm al-Quwain is dominated by the Al-All tribe.45
5.8.2 Boundary lines and lengths
The 1963 map shows external as well as internal boundary lines. The external border
lines show three incursions by the Sultanate of Oman into the territories of the Trucial
States. The northern incursions, or enclaves, located are called Musandam Peninsula,
the central enclaves are called Wadi Madha, and the southern enclave is called
Mahadah, and is surrounded by Sharjah, Ras al-Khaimah and (Masfut) Ajman
territories. The lengths of the external boundary lines are as follows: the total length
of the international borders is 1,163 km (723 mi). The border with the Sultanate of
Oman runs 513 km (319 nil), that with Saudi Arabia 586 km (364 mi), and with Qatar
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64 km (40 ml). There has been no border with Qatar since the 1974 agreement.'
According to different sources mentioned, the total length of international borders
is 1010 km with two neighbours: the border with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia runs
470 km (around 47% of total U.A.E. land boundaries), and that with Oman 540 km
(around 53% of total land boundaries of the U.A.E.).(4'7) Figures measured by the
researcher with assistance of the cartographer of the Geography Department,
University of Durham, from a map of Dubai produced for the Dubai Municipality
Survey Department with a scale of 1:1,500,000(100 kms) suggest the U.A.E. boundary
length with Saudi Arabia is 450 1cm, that with Oman is 540 km and the total
international boundaries of the U.A.E. is 990 km.
Table 5.1 The internal boundary length of each Emirate
Source: The Physical Geography of the U.A.E., Al-Qarali Lilgaxnih, Dubai, 1991 (Arabic) pp. 16-17.
Although the total area of the Emirate of Dubai is 3,900 kin2, and the total area of
the Emirate of Sharjah is 2,600 km2, Table 5.1 shows that the internal boundary length
of Sharjah is greater than that of Dubai because the territory of Shaijah is distributed
throughout the U.A.E., on the western coast of the U.A.E. as well as on the eastern
coast. Moreover Dubai has just one enclave belonging to it namely Wadi Hatta, but
Sharjah has several enclaves and it borders with all the six member of the UAE.,
including some parts of the Sultanate of Oman. (See Chapters 6 and 7)
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Ajman, the smallest member of the U.A.E. at 400 km 2, has two enclaves belonging to
it namely, Manama and Masfut. The internal boundary of the U.A.E. is best described
as a jigsaw puzzle due to all the Emirates except Abu Dhabi and Umm al-Quwain
having enclaves in the territory of others, claims on neighbours, or shared neutral
zones.
5.9 Conclusion
It may be said in conclusion that the British Foreign Office which replaced the Indian
Government in handling British interests in the area adopted a new policy of
involvement in the internal affairs of the Trucial States after 1947. In 1952, Britain
recognized the independence of Fujairah but considered Kalba to be part of Sharjah.
This step was followed by a demarcation of the inter-state boundaries. This chapter
has shown that the demarcation of the internal boundaries of the Trucial States was
based on a variety of different factors, including historical evidence of tribal loyalty,
and the paying of zakat. From these, the overlapping and the complication of the
internal boundary of the U.A.E. arose. The 1963 map is still the official map in current
use in the U.A.E.. It probably represents a very fair allocation of territories between
the Shaikhdoms.
The demarcation of the inter-state boundaries of the Trucial States paved the way for
the next step which was the federation. In Footnotes in the Sand, Sir Bernard Burrows
said: "As regards the Trucial States the despatch said that I should determine the
boundaries between these states and there was an ultimate objective of achieving some
measure offederation between them."48
For a greater understanding of the internal boundaries of the U.A.E., and in order to
focus more sharply on the detail, the next chapter presents case studies of selected
disputes on boundaries in the U.A.E..
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Chapter 6
Case Studies of Selected Disputes
6.1 Introduction
This chapter discuses selected disputes which have emerged from time to time
between the Emirates before and after the establishment of the federation, most
notably the dispute between Abu Dhabi and Dubai which was finally resolved by the
1968 agreement. This agreement was a precondition for the 1971 federation.
Boundary disputes surfaced actively after independence, and the problems arising
from them, from time to time, threatened the foundation of the Union. Some of these
problems resulted in armed clashes and the deaths of a number of nationals, such the
clash in 1972 between Kalba (the eastern region of Sharjah) and Fujairah, over a
disputed area. A serious incident followed the shooting down, by a Sharjah boundary
guard, of a helicopter carrying a son of Shaikh Rashid, ruler of Dubai from 1958-1990.
The chapter also focuses on the enclaves, which are an unusual but not unique feature
in the boundary problems of the world: one Emirate laying claim to a village separated
from it by the border line of another Emirate. The partition of Dibba in 1955
separated into three parts, is also discussed. The chapter will also deal with Hatta and
Masfut. Although these two villages are close to the Omani border, they actually
belong to Dubai and Ajman and are encircled by Omani territories. Whilst not all of
these territorial anomalies are actively disputed, they give rise to persistent
administrative problems.
6.2 Abu Dhabi and Dubai internal boundary
Before examining the internal boundary between the two Emirates, it is advisable
here to look at the historic role of the Trucial coast in the creation of Dubai.
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Table 6.1 Boundary Disputes in the UA.E: Types ofDispute, The Methods and the
Outcomes of the Settlement
HaluI, al-Ashat and Shirauh awarded to Qatar. Dayyinah
awarded to Abu Dhabi. Both sides have equal rights of
ownership over al-Bunduq oil field and all revenues from
the field are equally shared
Al-Mamzar peninsula was awarded to Dubai in return
Sharjah was awarded a long tract of land. The final
outcome reduced border tension and enhanced
The federal government purchased the orchard and
granted both parties equal rights to utilise its well.
Abu Dhabi threatened to stop economic aid to Ras
al-Khaimah unless it settled the dispute with Oman. The
1991 agreement between RAK and Oman for oil delivery
from Bukha field of Oman to R.A.K for processing at Khur
Khuwair. Delivery began at the end of 1993.
Saudi Arabia got an outlet to the Gulf (Khur al-Udaid
and Khur Duwaihen) and the oil field. In return Saudi
Arabia recognized the federation of the U.A.E. in 1974
and the six villages of Abu Dhabi in Al-Am.
The Agreement solved both their territorial and offshore
boundaries by creating a neutral zone out of the disputed
area near Tawi al- Faqqa and conceded Dubai's
sovereignty over the disputed Fath offshore ollfield.
Moreover any revenues from any further oil found at that
location would be shared equally.
Iran occupied Abu Musa. In return joint administration
by Sharjah and Iran over the island in 1971. In 1992 Iran
annexed the southern part belonging to Sharjah
Iran occupied the islands by force.
Demarcation is in progress by Mr J. Walker.
Officially announced in Abu Dhabi of the agreement not
been published or released.
Source: The Author.
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6.2.1 Brief Historical Introduction
As mentioned above (Chapter 3), in 1833 about 800 members of the Al Bu Falasa
subsection of the Barn Yas tribe withdrew from Abu Dhabi after a dispute with its
Ruler over the murder of Shaikh Tahnun by his brother the ruler Shaikh Khalifah bin
Shakhbut. 1 The Al Bu Falasa established themselves as the ruling family. This
migration marks the beginning of Dubai as an independent Shaikhdom. The
community was ruled by Maktum bin Buti from 1833 until his death in 1852; all
subsequent rulers have descended from Maktum who has given his name to the ruling
family. Dubai was free from Wahhabi influence which greatly affected other parts of
Arabia in the nineteenth century.
The Qawasim was a tribal confederation which inhabited both shores of the Gulf for
many centuries. The Qawasim had established their authority over Trucial Oman
north of Dubai by the eighteenth century, and today provide the ruling families for
both Sharjah and Ras al-Khaimali. The Qawasim were encouraged by the Wahhabi
religious movement. In 1800 certain tribes of the Ghaflri faction, including the
Qawasim, adopted the religious beliefs of the Wahhabies. The Hinawi faction
however, including the Bath Yas (Al-Bu Falah, the ruling family of Abu Dhabi, and
Al Bu Falasa, the ruling family of Dubai) resisted the Wahhabies. The Qawasim,
historically, were rivals of the Bath Yas. Another reason may be that the Al-Maktum
family, the ruling family of Dubai, always operated a liberal, open door policy in order
to encourage trade. Sir Donald Hawley believed that the policy of Shaikh Maktum
bin Hasher, who became ruler of Dubai in 1894, was liberal and enlightened and his
outlook resulted in the rapid growth of Dubai. 2 It can be concluded that Dubai was
for a long time challenging the maritime importance of Sharjah and by the end of the
nineteenth century had become the principal port on the coast and the main trade
centre not only on the Trucial Coast itself but also in the Gulf region.
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6.2.2 The beginning of the boundary dispute
Shaikh Shakbut, Ruler of Abu Dhabi, was the first of the Trucial Shaikhs to grasp the
significance of territorial limits after the discovery of oil. Accordingly, he suggested
that geologists of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company search for artesian wells in his
territories.:3)
6.2.3 The Abu Dhabi-Dubai agreement in 1937
Lorimer placed the Abu Dhabi-Dubai boundary on the coast at Khor Ghanadah,
which favoured Dubai. Abu Dhabi, on the other hand, claimed a point on the coast
at the latitude of Jabal Ali. The first negotiations in the early period to resolve the
problem of boundaries peacefully occurred between Abu Dhabi and Dubai at the end
of 1936. Shaikh Said bin Maktum of Dubai and Shaikh Shakbut of Abu Dhabi failed
to arrive at a resolution of the boundary question, so both Shaikhs agreed to refer
their matter to arbitration. Ahmed bin Khalaf bin Utaibah and Ahmed bin Hilal from
Abu Dhabi acted as mediators between the two Shaikhs. Having deliberated, they
informed Shaikh Said that Shaikh Shakbut accepted their proposal which was that
Hasat Umm al-Jibajib, 10 miles southwest of Jabal Au, should be the point of
demarcation. Shaikh Said informed his kinsmen, the Al Bu Falasa, of the mediators'
proposal. The Al Bu Falasa agreed what the proposal stipulated in general, however,
they requested that the boundary line should run from Bandar Hasyan which is three
miles southwest of Abu Dhabi point, Hasat Umm al-Jibaib. The explanation for the
Dubai modification was that they needed the jetty at Hasian for their pearling boats.
A verbal agreement was reached, establishing that the area west of a line running
from Bandar Hasyan southwards should be Abu Dhabi country and that the area east
of this line should belong to Dubai.4
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Despite the 1937 agreement between Abu Dhabi and Dubai regarding their common
boundaries, a war took place between them in 1945 when Abu Dhabi occupied Khur
Ghanadha, located about 40 miles south west of Dubai. Both sides resorted to their
traditional desert alliances. Al Bu Falah received support from the Awaniir, Manasir
and Alibab (a minor group living in Oman Al-Mn and Qatar), whilst the Dubai group
was supported by the Barn Qitab. Throughout the war, tribal raiding was common?
The war, which continued until the middle of 1948, was the last big land war between
the Trucial States. Both rulers were aware of the potential importance of every square
inch of land, and therefore Shaikh Shakhbut of Abu Dhabi claimed Jabal All, about
twenty five miles north of Khur Ghanadha, whilst Shaikh Said bin Maktum, the Ruler
of Dubai claimed Khur Ghanadah as the coastal boundary between the two
Shaikhdoms. 6 An agreement reached over the land boundary between Abu Dhabi
and Dubai in 1965 through British mediation said that the offshore boundary should
extend north from the boundary on the mainland. Dubai claimed that this meant
geographical north; Abu Dhabi claimed that it implied an extension into the Gulf of
the existing onshore boundary. However it is interesting to note that Britain ruled in
favour of Dubai's interpretation. Dubai's future as an oil producer was threatened
when Abu Dhabi's claim to the area was repeated in 1967 (Figure 6.1)P
In 1966 following the discovery of oil in the area of the Fateh wells, Shaikh Shakbut
questioned the validity of the 1965 agreement and laid claim to the area.8
6.2.4 The Abu Dhabi-Dubai agreement of 1968
On 18 February 1968 the Ruler of Abu Dhabi, Shaikh Zayed Bin Sultan Al-Nahaan,
(current President of the U.A.E.) and the Ruler of Dubai, and Shaikh Rashid Bin
Said Al-Maktum signed an agreement to settle an outstanding off-shore boundary
dispute and on the same day they signed the agreement to form a federation between
the two parties. 9
 The agreement resolved both the territorial and offshore
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Figure 6.1 Map of the Abu Dhabi-Dubai boundary from 1937-1948.
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boundaries of the two Emirates by creating a neutral zone in the contested area (see
Figure 1.1). The 1968 agreement stipulated that the revenues from any future oil
found in that location would be shared equally. 10 According to the agreement the
Fatah oilfleld was recognised as belonging to Dubai. 11 The accord stipulated:
'4s the actual territorial water limit between Dubai andAbu Dhabi Emirates
starts at Ra Hu&syan on the coast, and stretches in a straight line in a
northwest direction across the sea passing to the west of the Fatah wells which
belong to Dubai Emirate; and as both parties wish to reconsider this limit for
the benefit of the two states and their peoples; agreement has been reached
between both parties on the following: First: this limit will be readjusted to
annex to the Emirate of Dubai an area of the seat, lying west of the present
limit parallel horizontally (laige base) and equal to ten idlometres measured
along the coast from the west starting from Ras Hussyan and along as its
main symmetry (small base) to a length equal to the present mentioned limit
in a manner to include this area west of the Fatah wells and stretching
southwest to the coast. ui(12)
Therefore, it can be concluded that the 1968 agreement between Abu Dhabi and
Dubai provided the first practical demonstration in the area of a resolution of border
problems. Moreover, the agreement was the main step to paving the way for the
federation agreement between the two Emirates. Finally, it should be noted that
although oil was first discovered in the Fatah field in 1966, production had been
suspended because of the dispute between Abu Dhabi and Dubai over the area in
which the Fatah field is located. The 1968 agreement to resolve the border dispute
recognized the Fatah field as belonging to Dubai. Thereafter, the Fatah field was
Dubai's only oil resource which provided the financial basis for largescale
development projects which would not have been possible without oil revenues.'13
In other words, one of the main advantages of the 1968 agreement to resolve the
border dispute between Abu Dhabi and Dubai was the recognition of the Fatah
oilfield as belonging to Dubai which is the main factor behind Dubai's development,
especially in the commercial and industrial fields.
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Sir Julian Bullard commented 14) that the agreement moved the border several
kilometres to the west which resulted in a large increase in Dubai's offshore oil
revenues.
Furthermore, it is significant to note that since the establishment of the federation
on 2 December 1971, the provisional capital is Abu Dhabi. According to the U.A.E.
Provisional Constitution, the permanent capital, to be named 'Al Karama', is to be
built on a neutral site on the border between Abu Dhabi and Dubai.' 16 However
nothing has been done to implement the above article and Abu Dhabi remains the
capital of the U.A.E..
6.2.5 The Abu Dhabi-Dubai Boundary Description
Whilst the boundary lines between the two Emirates changed at the coast, as
described in the section above, inland the border remained largely unchanged.
According to Walker's report of the boundary settlement, the boundary line between
the two Emirates ran as follows: from Hasian on the coast to Tawi Ghafur, 17 thence
to Tawi Hafir, thence to Tawi al Eshush. Only the boundary between Hasian and Tawi
al Eshush is demarcated. Tawi Ghafur and Tawi Hafir both lie on the Dubal side of
the line as defined.'8
After 1954 several comments were made by the Political Agent about wells located
on the border area between Dubai and Al-Am, (the eastern region of Abu Dhabi
Shaikhdom). After the survey they concluded as follows:
Tawi Ashush: The tribes that they found around the well were al bu Mahair, Sebayis,
al bu Amin and al bu Rahmah of the Manasir, all subjects of Dubai.
Tawi al Murr: The tribe who live here are the Dhawahir of Hilli subject to the Ruler
of Abu Dhabi. However, five houses were found here of the Dubai tribe.
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Tawi Nakhrah: Whilst it is written in cement that this well was constructed by the
Ruler of Dubai, Shaikh Zayed the Ruler of Abu Dhabi claimed that half the well is
owned by the Dhawahir, and half by the Bani Yas of Dubai to the north.
Tawi at Faqa: This well was constructed in cement by Shaikh Rashid the Ruler of
Dubai. (19) However, the well is located within the neutral zone, according to the 1968
agreement between the two Shaikhdoms. Two police stations have been established,
one on each side. Abu Dhabi and Dubai have each to control the road and the road
traffic from Dubai to Al-Am (see Chapter 7). These wells can be seen from Figure
6.1 which shows on the one hand that Dubai's claims start from the coast (Khur
Ghanadha) until the line reaches Tawi Hayer which is within Al-Am region (Abu
Dhabi Eastern District), and the boundary line which is claimed by Dubai is coloured
in green. Whilst on the other hand, the Abu Dhabi claims extended to Jabal Au (about
20 km from Dubai) to Tawi Misakin in the south, and the boundary line is coloured
red. Both sides having thus raised their claims to include as many as possible of these
water wells, the final decision emerged from the British Government which proposed
a new line in 1952, shown in Figure 6.1 (see Appendix G). The British line is marked
in blue, and starts from Ras Hasian on the coast, and runs south to Tawi Ghafur. Then
the border line passes Tawi Hafir, and Tawi Ashush, Tawi Mualliqah, Tawi Dhulaima,
Tawi Faqqa and finally at the end of the line is Sharaf Salum. Nevertheless, after the
1969 agreement was signed, the area from Tawi Al-Ashush to Tawi Faqqa became a
neutral zone.
6.3 Dubai and Sharjah Internal Boundary
The boundary disputes between Dubai and Sharjah were serious territorial disputes.
The Dubai-Sharjah boundary dispute goes back to 1953 when Dubai made a claim
regarding boundaries with Sharjah (Figure 6.2).(20) The rulers of both Dubai and
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Figure 6.2 Sketch map of the Shaikhdom of Sharjah (excluding the Enclaves) drawn by
the Research Department, Foreign Office in 1959.
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Sharjah accepted the decision of the Political Agent, Peter Tripp, in 1955, after field
investigations carried out by Julian Walker. The decision was that:
"the boundaiypoint on the coast between Dubal and Sharjah is a line running
between Abu Hail and Al-Mamzer to Nahada Amair leaving a! bu Hail to
Dubai and al Mamzer to Sharjah. This line starts at right angles from the
coast and passes halfway between the houses of Hilal bin Huma.id and
Khalifa bin Hasan near Birka well. And thence to Hadib az zanah. From
Hadib az zanah the line shall run southeastwards to Arqub Arqub leaving
Aud Bilalid to Sharjah. From Arqub Arqub the line passes north to the
Ghafat Thamr, south ofArqub Naub, and north of Bida'at to Chilan. From
Chilan the boundaiy continues through Naqdat azzamul to Tawi BilKhabis,
which is divided between Sharjah and Dubai, and then turns south leaving
Jiza'at bin Taabat to Dubai and passing between Arafi andArqub Dhahi an,
the later being in Dubai territoiy. The frontier then passes through Mirial,
Khobal and Qawasir, and to the west of Tawi Maghram and Bedira
Maghram leaving SihAtham to Dubai. Then it continues south toAlAlam
and passes between Bada Hilal which is in Dubai territoiy, and Bada Zigag,
Muwaihi Dazj which is in Sharjah territory leaving R ummaiyah to Dubai and
dividingArqub Salama between Sharjah and Dubai." (21)
However, the boundary demarcation was sometimes uncertain:
"As last minute evidence from both sides has made the position of Tawis
KhawanU Bida'at and Tai uncertain, I am making no award of these wells
yet. The temporwy limit of Dubai territory in this area will therefore run just
to the south of Khawani:j, and the temporary limit of Sharjah territory will
run just north of Tai. "
"Sharjah's temporaly limit shall run just north of Tawi BilKhabis to the east
of Tawi Nezwa to Tawi Mandatha, Rafadah, Khobie and Suweihat. From
Suweihat the temporary limit will run to Khawaiser and by way of Batha
Yidiya to Tawi Yidaiya. From Tawi Yideiya it will go to Tawi Fatimah and
Tawi Husn. From there the limit will run to the north of Khawalid and
Miraiyil to Jebal Raudha. ".
The area which is mentioned above was inhabited by the Bani Qitab tribes who were
subject to the Ruler of Sharjah (see Figure 6.3).
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Figure 6.3 Dubai and Sharjah boundary dispute settlement in 1981, and one of the 72
pillars which marked the boundary line of Dubai-Sharjah.
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'Vubai's temporary limit shall run just south of Tawi Bil Khabis to the east
of Tawi Lehush and the west of Tawi Hibab, and then to Tawi Murraqab
and Fawa. ,,(24)
The areas mentioned above were inhabited by the Bani Yas tribes who were loyal to
the ruler of Dubai.
6.3.1 Dispute between Dubai and Sharjah before federation
In 1969 it was reported that clashes between Dubai and Sharjah took place after an
attack on installations in Dubai by an armed group from the Bani Qitab tribe of
SharjahP
6.3.2 Development of the Dispute after Federation
The first conflict between the two Emirates after the establishment of the federation
came on 21 August 1973 over an artesian well originally drilled by Dubai but sited on
Sharjah's side of the border which led to an armed clash. The UA.E. Defence
Minister, Shaikh Mohammed bin Rashid al-Maktum and a number of Dubai soldiers
flew over the well in a helicopter and fired on Sharjah civilians to prevent them from
drawing water from it. Sharjah forces retaliated and the helicopter was shot down.
Shaikh Mohammed, ofDubai's ruling family, had a miraculous escape. 27 The dispute
between the two Emirates was renewed in 1974 when Dubai began work on a corniche
from the entrance to Dubai Creek up to Abu Hail and tried to expand the corniche
further into the disputed area. Sharjah protested to the Federal Government. At every
protest work would stop for a period, and would resume once things had quietened
down. The dispute deteriorated more and more until it reached a high level of clashes
in 1975 when Sharjah began the construction of a shopping and business complex in
the disputed area. The schemes included a Dh 30 million (iE6 million) residential and
shopping centre in which the French car manufacturer Renault had an interestP
This dispute was complicated further by the fact that the commercial elites of Dubai
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perceived the schemes as a bid by their counterparts in Sharjah to lure away business
firms that were already located in, or were contemplating moving to, Dubai.(:29) This
boundary dispute was a principal reason behind the leadership crisis, when Shaikh
Zayed bin Sultan al-Nahayyan, the President of the U.A.E. threatened to resign as
President of the Union if the dispute was not settled peacefully.'°
6.3.3 The Dispute Settlement
In October 1976 it was reported that the Ruler of Dubai, Shaikh Rashid bin Said
Al-Maktum, and the Ruler of Sharjah, Shaikh Sultan al-Qasimi, "had agreed an
important principle to be announced soon, regarding the settlement of the border
differences between the two Emirates. "(:3 ') The issue was placed before the Supreme
Council of the U.A.E. at a meeting convened on 6 November 1976. After considering
the issue the Council agreed to refer it to an international arbitration committee
composed of members from Britain and France.' 32 The tribunal consisted of two legal
experts from the United Kingdom and one from France. The Dubai government was
represented at the bearing by Fox and Gibbons and the Sharjah government by
Clifford ChanceP3 On 30 October 1981 the international tribunal submitted its
proposal. The settlement lengthens Dubai's coastline by 3.5 km, but inland the new
border cuts back across the old boundary in favour of Sharjah. According to this
proposal Sharjah was awarded a long, thin strip just south of its industrial zone.
Further inland the border was largely unchanged (see Figure 6.3). The Court's
decision after considering all the evidence and the arguments of the Parties was:
"In accordance with the rules of international law applicable in the matter
as between the Parties and for the reasons set out above, the land and the
maritime boundaiy between the Emirates of Dubai and the Emirate of
Sharjah.
On the land, as far as it can be described in words, the Court decides by two
votes to one that the bounda,y commences at the coastal terminus pointA,
the Universal Transverse Mercator co-ordinates of which are 280° 18' 80"
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North and 33° 43' 03" East; thence, following the low water line of the Al
Mamzer Peninsula, to point 1, Universal Transverse Mercator co-ordinates
of which are 2800 12' 50" North and 33° 42' 40" East; thence by a straight line
to point 2, the universal Transverse Mercator co-ordinates of which are 280°
01' 00" North and 33° 35' 85" East, thence by a straight line to point 3, the
Universal Transverse Mercator co-ordinates of which are 279° 88' 20" North
and 33° 39' 65" East; thence by a straight line to NahadaAmair, the Universal
Transverse Mercator co-ordinates of which are 279° 85' iT' North and 330
51'50" East.
The Court further Decides unanimously that the boundaiy proceeds in a
straight line from NahadaAmair toArqub Rakan, the Universal Transverse
Mercator co-ordinates of which are 279° 44' 65" North and 34° 77' 00" East.
The Court further Decides unanimously that the boundaiy proceeds from
Arqub Rakan to Chilah, the Universal Transverse Mercator co-ordinates of
which are 279° 06' 55" North and 35° 27' 00" East, leaving Arqub Alam
(Nauf) entirely within Sharjah, and Tawi Bida'at within Dubai,from Chilah
to Naqdat az Zamul, the Universal Transverse Mercator co-ordinates of
which are 2780 80' 00" North and 35° 96' 25" East, leaving Tawi Tai entirely
within Sharjah; from Chilah thence to Tawi bil KhabL, the Universal
Transverse Mercator co-ordinates of which are 278° 84' 25" North and 36°
14' 75" East, which is' divided between Sharjah and Dubai.
From Tawi bil Khabis, the boundaiy turns south to Mirial, the Universal
Transverse Mercator co-ordinates of which are 277° 23' 80" North and 36°
40' 00" East, leavingArafi entirely within Sharjah and Ji.za'at bin Ta'aba and
Arqub Dhabian within Dubai;
from Mirial to Khobai, the Universal Transverse Mercator co-ordinates of
which are 276° 88' 75" North and 36° 14' 00" East; and thence to Qawasir,
the Universal Transverse Mercator co-ordinates of which are 276° 22' 10"
North and 36° 14' 50" East;
thence continuing southwards, so as to leave Tawi Mghram and Bedirat
Mghram entirely within Sharjah, and Sih Atham and Bada Hilal within
Dubai, toAlAlam, the Universal Transverse Mercator co-ordinates of which
are 274° 87' 95" North and 36° 31'40" East;
and thence by a straight line to Arqub Salama, the Universal Transverse
Mercator co-ordinates of which are 273° 55' 80" North and 36° 76' 40" East,
so as to leave Bada Zigag and Muwaihi DaU entirely within Sharjah, and
Rummaiyah within Dubai."
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The new border agreement lifted restraints which halted building programmes in the
disputed areas since 1976. It allowed Sharjali to develop its industrial zone and Dubai
city was able to expand to the northeast ( (see Chapter 7). Moreover, the United
States Atlantic Richfield Company (ARCO) Dubai subsidiary was able to start
drilling near the Sharjah border, knowing Dubai was still its dient. Also unaffected
by the settlement is Sharjah's ownership of the significant hydrocarbon reserves
discovered north of the border by Amco Shaijah. (37) There is a proposed project for
establishing a tourist zone on AI-Khan area in the Emirate of Sharjah. This project is
funded by the government of Dubai (see Chapter 7).
Figure 6.4 shows the border points, inland according to the 1981 Arbitration between
the two Emirates, while Figure 6.5 shows two of the border pillars from 72 pillars
along the boundary line between the two Emirates marked by numbers.
Much of the tribunal's work was to decide on the validity of Walker's demarcation of
the boundary between Dubai and Sharjah. Essentially, the Walker-Tripp line was
accepted by the tribunal as an "approximation" of tribal influence, and showed to
whom a tribe owed closest affi1iation.39
The tribunal found that the Bani Qitab tribe had closer ties with Sharjah than with
Dubai. Consequently, a large tract of land forming the traditional homeland of the
bani Qitab tribe was confirmed as belonging to Sharjah. On the other hand, a decisive
factor in awarding the Al-Manizer Peninsula to Dubai was that the tribunal looked
at what each side had been doing in the disputed area and found that Dubai had
exercised greater control over the coastal area than Sharjah.40
A principal reason for the delay in resolving the boundary dispute between the
Emirate of Dubai and the Emirate of Sharjah until 1985 was that there was little
political stability in Sharjah, first because of the removal in 1965 of Shaikh Saqr bin
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Figure 6.4 Map of the Dubai-Sharjah boundaries settlement in 1981 (inshore and offshore),
drawn by Cartographic and Map section, Foreign Office, January 1983.
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Figure 6.5 The researcher standing beside one of the pillars in the desert (top), and
beside the last pillar ,zumber 72 at the head ofJabal Nazwa (bottom)
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Sultan (ruler of Sharjah from 195 1-65), and then in 1972 the assassination of Shaikh
Khalid bin Mohhamed (ruler of Sharjah from 1965-72) by Shaikh Saqr bin Sultan.
What paved the way for a final settlement was that Shaikh Maktum bin Rashid, son
of the Ruler of Dubai, took full charge of the Emirate's affairs and high-level
decision-making as a result of his father's illness. Contacts were made between the
two Emirates, not least because the two rulers were from a younger generation, and
they believed it possible to resolve disputes between the two Emirates for the benefit
of the Union.
The Dubai-Shaijah border dispute arrived at a final settlement in April 1985 when
Shaikh Sultan bin Mohammed al-Qasimi, Ruler of Sharjali, and Shaikh Maktum bin
Rashid, Crown Prince of Dubai, signed a boundary demarcation agreement. 41 The
settlement removed one of the longest-running disputes between the Emirates. What
had shocked the Union from the top was the threat by the President to resign. Shaikh
Zayed had taken a personal interest in this border dispute. This is underlined by the
fact that it has been reported that Shaikh Zayed bin Sultan al-Nahayyan (current
U.A.E. President), threatened to decline re-election as President when his term
expired in December 1976, having been elected in 1971. The reasoning behind his
decision, was that he was disappointed and dissatisfied with the attitude of his fellow
rulers in tackling federal problems. He added:
"Would you believe that I have just spent a week among the Emirates trying
to settle insignificant boundary disputes between them?Iwill not continue as
President...the problem is the spirit in which my brother rulers are tackling
the problems which face the federation. ,42)
On the other hand, the settlement of the Dubai-Sharjah boundary dispute led to
co-operation between these two Emirates especially at economic levels. After
resolving the dispute, a master plan for major projects was undertaken by the
governments of the two Emirates (see Chapter 7).
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6.4 The Valley of Hatta and Dubal's Claims
6.4.1 The Geographical Location
Wadi Hatta is the main geographical feature of the southeastern region of the U.A.E.,
with Wadi Al-Qur of Ras al-Khaimah. These two wadis pass through the mountains
and connect al-Batinab in Oman with the inland plains of Ghrif and Mudam.
The mountain enclave of Hatta is 130 km east of Dubai. The road to it crosses a long
stretch of Omani territory. The road also crosses the territories of the Emirate of
Sharjah and Ajman. Leaving Dubai's territory, the road crosses Sharjah's territory in
the Al-Medam area, then the Wilayat Mahadah appears and the border marks and
the signboard are fixed in the ground saying "Welcome to Oman." (see Figure 6.6 and
Chapter 7.)
6.4.2 Historical Background
In the late nineteenth century, according to one report, the Sultan of Muscat offered
the Ruler of Dubai a choice between the Mussandam Peninsula and Wadi Hatta. The
ruler of Dubai chose the latter. 43
 Lorimer records the transfer of the Wadi Hatta as
follows:
"At a later period (after 1870) in the reign of Saiyid Turki, the Sultan of
Oman, in view of his own inability to defend Hajarain against the Naim of
Buraimi, acquiesced in its virtual transfer to the Shaikh of Dubai."
Morsy Abdullah confirms this, saying that in the earlier part of the nineteenth century
the two villages of Hijrain and Masfut were inhabited by the Bidaiwat tribe. In
recognition of the help given to him in 1871 by the Shaikhs of Dubai and Buraimi,
Sultan Turki gave Hijrain to Shaikh Hasher bin Maktum, and Masfut to the Shaikh
of Buraimi. After that the people of Masfut appealed to Shaikh Said bin Maktum
during the 1930s when they faced the problem of other Bedouins raiding settled places
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near their own areas and Shaikh Said advised them to ask Shaikh Rashid bin Humaid
of Ajman instead, since he was related to the Shaikb of Buraimi. Shaikh Rashid of
Ajman went there himself and took over the area. 45 Dubai's claim to the area was
recognised by local tribesmen, and the authorities (Walis) of Masfut and Wadi
Al-Our. Khalfan bin Gharib of the Bani Kaab (a tribe inhabiting Walayah Mahadhah
near Hatta, but loyal to Sultan of Muscat) confirmed to Julian Walker that Dubai
owned all the villages of the Wadi Wayayah up to a point just short of Oman's
boundary post at Wayayah settlement. He also said that Gima village in the Wadi
Gima belonged to Shaikh Rashid bin Said al-Maktum,, the Ruler of Dubai.
Therefore, by the very nature of the case, Hatta in the Wadi Hajrain became Dubai's
enclave and Masfut became an enclave of Ajman (see Figure 6.7).
In May 1959, Shaikh Rashid bin Said Al-Maktum, ruler of Dubai, signed a boundary
agreement with Sultan Said bin Taimur, the Sultan of Muscat and Oman. The maps
that Julian Walker drew, which were approved by the British Government, regard the
agreement as valid and binding on the parties and they recognise the boundaries laid
down in the agreement.' 4'7 (see Appendix H and I: one copy of the Agreement is in
English, another copy is in Arabic).
6.4.3 Boundary description
The boundary line of Hatta runs as follows: from Jabal Mussaya to Jabal Hajarain
and thence eastward crossing the Wadi Qima to the east of the village of that name
and thence to the base of Jabal Gimha which belongs to Dubai. Then the border
crosses the wadi mouths at Hasat al Ghara, al-Akhbab and Lawshaht and across Wadi
Wayaya just to the west of Oman's border post. From there the line meets and follows
the watershed of the range between the Wadis Qur and Hatta, and at Jabal Ghallas
turn south to Jabal Mussaya. 49 Before reaching the Omani border post it is possible
to see the border marked by two pillars one fixed on top of the mountain and the
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other fixed to the lower ground on the main highway from Hatta to Oman, which
shows the symbols of both the United Arab Emirates and the Sultanate of Oman (see
Figure 6.8).
There is an Omani border post (customs-immigration) between Hatta of Dubai and
the village of Wayaya of Oman. Dubai has not built a border post, and appears to have
no plans to do so. Dubai has, in fact, a very good relationship with Oman especially
in trade and housing developments. For instance, the government of Dubai funded
all the road projects linking Dubai City to Shinas in Omani territory on the east coast.
The reason for this largesse was Shaikh Rashid's plan to create a "bolt-hole" exit for
his Emirate on the Gulf of Oman in case of emergency or political crisis which could
occur in the mouth of the Gulf, the Strait of Hormuz. 50 Another reason may be that
Dubai's government was always trying to preserve its close relations with Oman, and
not building a border point allows Omani citizens to feel unrestrained about crossing
the border. A further reason may be to encourage Omani merchants to import goods
from Dubai using this road, into the interior of Oman in order to facilitate
transportation. U.A.E. nationals (i.e. holding a U.A.E. passport) wanting to travel to
Oman through this border post, receive a passport stamp from the Omani
immigration officer, once on entry and once on exit. Several times a month, soldiers
from Dubai's army travel through Oman to Dubai's villages there. In contrast, there
is no U.A.E. passport stamp to show that the traveller entered Dubai territory
(U.A.E.).
From there the line meets and follows the watershed of the range between the Wady
Al-Qur and Wadi Hatta, and at Jabal Ghallas turns south to Jabal MussayaP'
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6.5 Madha Village and Omani Claims
The political map of the U.A.E. shows an enclave of the Sultanate of Oman within
the U.A.E. The enclave is generally shown in the same colour as the main body of
Oman and known as Wadi Madha. On 2 November 1956 Shaikh Saqr bin Sultan,
Ruler of Sharjah, sent a letter to the Political Agent, Trucial States, Dubai, arguing
that Wadi Madha was in the possession of the Qawasim during the nineteenth century
and was only occupied by the Shihuh in contravention of the Sultan's orders. Shaikh
Saqr bin Sultan, the ruler of Sharjah, confirmed that Muscat collected zakat by force
from the inhabitants, which the inhabitants of the Wadi opposed. On 2 November
1956 he asked the British Government to secure a just, fair and peaceful settlement
of this dispute. He indicated his willingness however to submit to the British
Government evidence to prove his rights to the Wadi (see Appendix J)P2
The Sultan of Muscat and Oman, Sultan Said bin Taimur, wrote to the British
Consul-General in Muscat, confirming that when he succeeded his father in 1932, he
found Wadi Madha part of the Sultanate and he confirmed that the inhabitants of the
Wadi were under his jurisdiction and Sovereignty. The Sultan said:
"We shall continue to exercise our long-established sovereignty over Wadi
Madha as we have been exercising same since 1932." (See Appendix K)
When Julian Walker started his investigation in 1954, he found Sbarjah controlling
the two villages at the head of the Wadi Nahawa and Shis, from whichzakat had been
paid for several years. The ruler of Fujairah confirmed this fac t. (M) (See Appendix L).
6.5.1 The Geographical Location
Wadi Madhah is a small enclosed valley in the eastern region of the U.A.E., running
northeastwards from the Hijir mountains (Hijir means rock) towards the bay of Khur
Fakkan.
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6.5.2 The Inhabitants
The Bath Sa'd tribe inhabit the two main villages of Ghunah and Madhah. Hinawi
and Shafii tribes which shows that they were unaffected by the Qawasim. 55 The
inhabitants are quite isolated and it can be seen that they are not affected by the
Qawasim from the type of dress they wear which is the same as Omani people who
live in towns and villages of Oman. The tribesmen of Madhah wear the traditional
Omani dress turban on the head and a dagger on the body. They talk in the same
Omani accent, which is different from the inhabitants of Khur Fakkan of Sharjah and
Qidfa of Fujairah, the two neareast villages of the U.A.E. to Madhah. Furthermore,
the Bani Sa'd tribe have not altered their loyalties regarding the Sultan of Muscat.
According to Julian Walker's report during the demarcation period, he found that
Muscat claims the whole Wadi, and so does Sharjah.
When Walker surveyed the area he drew a line around the enclave claimed by Muscat,
making it clear that this is an unsettled frontier which he claimed to be beyond his
competence to define. 56 Furthermore, Walker avoided doing any work on the Wadi
Madha since his investigation was largely on the internal boundaries of the Trucial
States. The Sultanate of Oman claimed the villages Madha, Ghuna and Hajar Bani
Hamid, whilst the Qawasim apparently controlled Nahawa and Shis? 7 However, the
Ruler of Fujairah confirmed to Walker that the inhabitants of Nahawa and Shis, the
two villages located at the head of the wadi, had been paying zakat for several years
to the Shaikh of Sharjah, and therefore fell under the control of the Ruler of
Sharjah.(:58)
Thus it is not surprising that no settlements were reached by Walker on this particular
wadi. The Foreign office later sent Lord Martin Buckmaster who entered the Wadi
and made investigations there in However, the Buckmaster investigations
did not result in a settlement between Sharjah and Muscat either 60
 (Figure 6.9).
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Figure 6.9 The sign board of Madha Police Station in Wadi Mad/ia.
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Finally in 1969 an agreement was reached between the Sultanate of Muscat, Sharjah
and Fujairah and the boundaries were fixed. 61 The two villages of Nahawa and Shis
located at the top of the mountains beside the Wadi Madhah were given to Sharjah,
whilst the whole of Wadi Madhah went to the Sultanate of Oman (see Figure 6.10).
The Omani government regards Wadi Madbah as an administrative division of
Wilayat Sohar and established a Police Station there in the early of 1980s for security
and order. This means that the wadi is at the present time Omani territory located
within U.A.E. territory.
6.6 Masfut Village and Ajman's Claims
It may be useful to begin by focusing on the geographical location, and the historical
background of the village of Masfut.
6.6.1 The Geographical Location
Although Ajman is the smallest of the Emirates, with an area of only 259 km2, and its
main territory is entirely surrounded by that of Sharjah, it does nevertheless have
small enclaves in the mountains. Ajman's mountain villages are Manama, gardens
belonging to the ruler of Ajman at the foot of the mountains near Dhaid, and Masfut,
close beside Dubai's enclave of Hatta.
6.6.2 Historical Background
Ajman's claim to this area is based on the fact that the Ruler took the village under
his protection in 1947. However, before that period it was recorded that the
inhabitants of Masfut who had been the subjects of the Shaikh of Buraimi, appealed
to the Shaikh of Ajman for protection against the Bani Kaab tribesmen, due to the
fact that the Shaikh of the Bidaiwat tribe of Masfut was too weak to defend Masfut.
Shaikh Rashid of Ajman launched an expedition to Masfut, and built a tower there.
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Figure 6.10 The boundaries and enclaves in the United Arab Emirates, drawn by the
Cartographic Section, Research Department, Foreign Office in Februaiy 1978.
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Shaikh Saqr of Buraimi was not satisfied however and tried to secure the return of
his village through the mediation of the Ruler of Dubai and Shaijah. His efforts failed,
and the Ruler of Ajman declared that he would never withdraw from Masfut.
Furthermore, the Ruler of Ajman claimed that Masfut was the property of his
grandfather which had been ceded to him by the Sultan of Muscat. 62
 Lorimer records
that:
"These villages, Hajarain and Masfut, both inhabited by the .&duwat, seem
to have belonged originally - as the lower part of the Wadi does still belong
to the Sultanate of Oman, but about 1870 in the reign of Scziyid Azzan bin
Qais, an irreconcilable quarrel taking place between the two, the people of
Masfut placed themselves under the protection of the Beni Kàab and the
Naim of Buraimi. ,,(63)
When mentioning Hajarain, Lorimer means the village of Hajarain in the wadi Hatta.
The people of Dubai always call it Hatta, taking its name from the wadi in which the
village is located, in the Oman Mountains which was ceded to the ruler of Dubai by
the Sultan of Muscat and Oman in the 1870s.
6.6.3 Masfut Boundaries
It was reported that the Sultan Said bin Taimur, Sultan of Muscat and Oman, and
Shaikh Rashid bin Humaid Al-Naimi, Ruler of Ajman agreed the boundaries in 1959
between the tribes of the Sultanate (the Bani Kaab) and the Shaikhdom of Ajman
according to the maps drawn by Julian Walker. The boundaries are two separate lines:
The first line starts from the top of Jabal Umm an Nasur which divides the people of
Hajarain (Hatta of Dubai) and Masfut and the Bani Kaab, and goes west to a point
to the south of the head of Wadi Uhalfa, which belongs to Masfut of Ajman. The line
stops at the head of the Wadi Ohalfa. The second line starts from the summit of Jabal
Mezaira to the north of al Mishkal and goes west to the western end of Jabal Mizaira,
and then westwards by Wadi Khrus, which is the wadi which flows between Khtaim
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ar Rahman and Al Jazir. After that the line goes north-west to As Subaigka and Al
Milaina, and these two places await boundary adjustments. From Milaiha the line
goes east to the head of the Wadi Sawaniia and thence to the summit of Jabal Abu
Faraj which is the dividing point between the Bani Kaab (Mahadha of Sultanate of
Oman) and the Biduwat of Masfut.(M) (See Appendix M and N for English and Arabic
versions of the Agreement).
The Dispute regarding the village of Masafi
The village of Masafi is located north of Dhaid on the main Dhaid-Dibba motorway.
At the village of Masafi the road divides. One arm turns left to the north through wadi
Ham towards the plain and the sea at Dibba, the northernmost point of the U.A.E's
east coast. The second arm sweeps south-east through another great valley to the
coastal plain and the town of Fujairah. The village of Masafi is the starting point of
the two arms which run north east towards Dibba and Fujairah on the Gulf of Oman
(see Figure 3.2).
The village of Masafi south of the Qaryat Hafaitat of Ras al-Khaimah is inhabited by
Sharqiyin tribe of the Hafaitat. According to Julian Walker, the inhabitants were
paying zakat to the Shaikh of Ras al-Khaimah but hold that they are loyal to Shaikh
Mohammed al-Sharqi of Fujairah which make the situation very difficult to define.
Shaikh Saqr al-Qasemi of Ras al-Khaimah appointed a Wail as his representative in
the village in 1954. On the other side, as reported by Julian Walker, Shaikh
Mohammed al-Sharqi of Fujairah kept 30 guards in the village to protect his
gardens. In conclusion, Walker recommend:
"There appears to be no necessity for a declaration of frontiers there at
present, and that any decisions made should be kept on the files."
Armed clashes blew up between Fujairah and Ras al-Khaimah over the area of Masafi
and its surroundings, and gun-fire was exchanged in 1972.
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The village is still in dispute between the two Emirates which the Hotel of Shaikh
Hamad al-Sharqi, the ruler of Fujairah remain uncompleted because Shaikh Saqr bin
Mohammed al-Qasemi, Ruler of Ras al-Khaimah ordered a halt to building works
(see Chapter 7). The boundary dispute between Ras al-Khaimali and Fujairah
remains unsettled due to the present ruler of Ras al-Khaimah, Shaikh Saqr bin
Mohammed al-Qasemi, (ruling Ras al-Khaimah since 1948) who is stifi very proud of
his family history and who believes that the Emirate of Fujairah was part of the
Qawasim territories broken away from the Qawasim by the British, and recognized
as an independent state in 1952. A member of the ruling family of the Ras al-Khaimah
Qasemi said:
"I do not think the boundaiy dispute between Fufairah and Ras al-Khaimah
will be resolved any day due to the way of thinking of the ruler of Ras
al-Khaimah who is applying a central control for himself on the Emirate
affairs and no one the in the Emirate has any authority to advise him or to
give any suggestion in any matter, just the ruler himself."6
Another description of the ruler of Ras al-Khaimah's attitude is given in a letter dated
21 June 1957 from D.M.H. Riches, on the staff of the Eastern Arabia Department in
the Foreign Office to the Political Agent:
"There has been no trouble save overRas al Khaimah-Fujairah, about which
the Ruler ofRas al Khaimah has protested vigorously to the PoliticaiResident
and remains sulky and even possibly meditating trouble. This particular
settlement has the added disadvantages that Ras al Khaimah did not
specifically agree to accept a bounda,y, dictated by us, with Fujairah;.... "
(See Appendix 0).
In 1974, the federal government of the U.A.E. established a military base at the village
belonging to the Union Defence Force.
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6.7 The Problem of the Dibba Partition
6.7.1 The Geographical Location
Sharjah's only other east coast enclave is at Dibba, immediately to the south of the
Omani border and at the foot of the huge range of the Musandam mountains. Dibba
is an ancient town, and was once the most important in the region. Today it is divided
into three districts, with Fujairah controlling the southern district, Sharjah ruling the
cental district, and Oman the northern district of Bayah.
In 1955, Julian Walker was involved in demarcating the internal boundaries of the
Trucial States. After his investigations on Dibba there was clearly a disputed area
between Sharjah, Fujairah and the Sultanate of Oman. Walker finally came to a
decision that it was to be divided into three parts:
a. Dibba al-Bayah, in the north, inhabited by the Shafi'i Shihuh tribe ioyal to the
Sultan of Muscat.
b. Dibba al.-Husn, in the middle, inhabited by Hanbali (Wahhabi) Shihuh, loyal to
the Shaikh of Sharjah.
c. Dibba al-Gurfah, inhabited by the Sharqiyyin tribe, loyal to the Shaikh of
Fujairah (see Figure 6.11).
6.7.2 Dibba al-Husn
Sharjah town, the capital, is located on the west side of the Musandam Peninsula,
while three separate enclaves, Dibba al-Husn., Khur Fakkan and Kalba, are located
on the east side on the Gulf of Oman.
6.7.2.1 Historical Background
It was reported that Dibba had historically always been part of the territory of the
ruler of Sharjah. On 9 May 1952, the same year as the independence of Fujairah, Saqr
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bin Abdullah, the Wall of Dibba, made an agreement with Saqr bin Sultan, the Ruler
of Sharjah, declaring:
"I, Saqr bin Abdullah al Qasimi, admit that Dibba and its dependencies
including villages and territories is a part of Sharjah state. I have agreed to
act as Wali on behalf of Shaikh Saqr bin Sultan, not to disobey his orders
and to follow all his advice. I have permitted whoever may wish to witness
this document." (69)
According to Julian Walker's report, the Rulers of Fujairah and Ras al-Khaimah both
regarded Dibba al-Husn as belonging to Sharjah and all the tribes who are subject to
them confirmed this.70
6.7.2.2 The Boundary Description of Dibba al-Husn
Before describing the boundary line of Dibba al-Husn, it may be useful to look at
Lorimer's description of Trucial Oman in about 1905:
"Trucial Oman ertends in the Gulf of 'Oman from KhorKalba to Dibah, and
in the Persian Gulffrom Sha 'am to Khor-al- 'Odaid, the places named being
all included in it; in other words its boundary between these two sets ofpoints
is the sea.. Inland, its frontiers are more difficult to define; but it covers a
considerable portion of the interior of the 'Oman Promontory. On one side
there it is bounded by a line of uncertain course which runs from a spot
between the contiguous villages of Dibah and Bai'ah on the east coast to Ras
Sha'am on the west coast, and so divides it from the Ruus-al-Jibal district of
the 'Oman Sultanate to the north."71
It can be concluded from Lorimer's description that there was just one Dibba during that
period which belonged to Sharjah because he specified the village of Dibba as one
"contiguous" to Bai'ali village (referring to Dibba al-Bayyah). Dibba al-Gurfa had not yet
emerged because Fujairah itself, which today controls Dibba al-Gurfa, had not yet
appeared on any geographical map of Trucial Oman. Since the 1960s, Dibba al-Husn has
had two boundary lines: one is considered an international boundary line with Oman;
the other line which runs south of the village is considered an internal boundary line.
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6.7.2.2.1 Dibba al-Husn boundary with Oman
The boundary of Husn Dibba with Dibba al-Bayya (Omani Dibba) lies at the point
where the Wadi to the north of the town reaches the sea. The boundary, after
following the Wadi through the cultivated area, strikes towards the mountains
following their edge leaving the Sih and the Wadi Fai to Dibba.
6.7.2.2.2 Dibba al-Husn Boundary with Fujairah
Introduction
Fujairah's northern territory includes a section of the port of Dibba and an adjacent
stretch of land. Fujairah, with its share in Dibba, owns a part of one of the most historic
towns in the land. A major battle was fought there in 633 AD, in which the Muslim
forces were sent from Mecca, shortly after the death of the Holy Prophet, to fight the
rebellion against the Calipha in Mecca.
The marble factory on the Masafl to Dibba road belongs to the Emirate of Fujairah.
The southern boundary of Husn Dibba lies at the boundary (a path) between the
villages of Husn Dibba and Sumbrair which belongs to the Sharqiyyin of Fujairah?
Then the boundary continues to the north of Ghurfah and Asashat, and follows the
southern mountain edge westwards to Ayeina. It was decided by Walker that the
boundary between the two Emirates in the Dibba area lay at Soor Shamis.
It was also reported that the boundary between Sumbrair of Fujairah and Dibba
al-Husn was marked on the ground. This fact was confirmed by Julian WalkerP It
was reported that the total population of Dibba al-Gurfa according to the 1985 census
was
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6.7.23 The 1972 Dispute Between Sharjah and Fujairah
6.7.2.3.1 Introduction
The Emirate of Fujairah emerged in 1952 and acquired its formal status when the
British government recognized Fujairah's independence. 75 However, the rulers of
Sharjah and Ras al-Khaimah opposed the emergence of Fujairah on the grounds that
the territory of Fujairah belongs to the Qawasim. 76 The Foreign Office replaced the
India government after 1947 in handling British interests in the region and adopted
a new poiicy of involvement in the internal affairs of the Trucial States. According to
Sir Bernard Burrows, who was the first Foreign Service Officer to be Political
Resident in the Gulf, in the mid-SOs, in response to the question as to why he was
there, said:
'When in 1947 the British Government of India ceased to &ist, responsibility
for the administration of British interest in the Gulf was assumed by the
Foreign Office."
In 1955, the British authorities began to demarcate the internal boundary between
the Trucial States (Emirates) after procuring written undertakings from all the
individual rulers that they would accept the British decisions on the demarcation of
their territories. In the case of the ruler of Sharjah, the undertaking read as follows:
"I, Saqr bin Sultan Al-Qasimi, ruler of Sharjah and its dependencies,
undertake on behalf of myself and mysuccessois that we will not dispute any
boundaries which the PoliticalAgentforthe Trucial States may lay down in
the Coastal area, excepting Fujairah which we consider as part of Sharjah
state."(See Appendix C)
In Julian Walker's map, the Sharqiyyen tribe are shown as concentrated upon two
separate areas, divided from one another by a strip stretching westwards into the
interior from Luliyya town, Zubarah town, and Khur Fakkan on the coast. Fujairah
is the homeland of the Sharqiyyen tribe and they occupy all the coastal ports of the
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Shimailiah district except for Zubarah, Luliyyah and Khur Fakkan in the north and
Kalba and Sur in the southP
6.7.2.3.2 The 1972 Conflict
Less than one year after the establishment of the U.A.E., in 1972 a "bizarre episode
culminated in the outbreak of border fighting between Fujairah and Shaijah." 80 It was
reported on 9 June that 22 people had been killed, 81 and a dozen seriously wounded,
in fighting between Fujairah and Shaijah tribesmen in the eastern region of the
U.A.E.. The Emirate of Sharjah owns three enclaves: Kalba, Khur Fakkan and Husn
Dibba. The beginning of the dispute was when the late Shaikh Muharnmed al-Sharqi,
the Ruler of Fujairah announced, without the prior consent of Sharjab, that he was
to present Shaikh Zayed, the President of the U.A.E. and the Ruler of Abu Dhabi
with a garden in his Emirate's territory as a gift.82
However this decision was immediately contested by Shaijah which claimed that, as
the well that watered this garden had been used for years by Sharjian tribesmen,
therefore, Fujairah had no right to give away the garden and its well, without prior
consultation with Sharjali. Hence, fighting broke out between the two sides and
continued until order was restored by the Union Defence Force supported by units
of Abu Dhabi troops in the disputed are a.' 83 On 12 June 1972 the U.A.E. President,
Shaikh Zayed sent for the Ruler of Sharjah, Shaikh Sultan bin Mohammed al-Qasimi,
and the Ruler of Fujairah, Shaikh Mohammed al-Sharqi and discussed the
implications of the tribal clash with them. Furthermore, the U.A.E. Ministry of
interior issued a statement:
"On 9 June a long-standing dispute between Sharqi and Naqbi tribesmen over
the ownership of a piece of agricultural land.... unfortunately became
aggravated to a point at which there wafighting for two days. Union troops
intervened and restored stability and order. Certain news agencies and radios
have exaggerated the incident and the number of casualties."
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Moreover, the Ministiy declared:
"Four people were killed and a limited number were wounde most of them
slightly. The Union authorities undertake to settle this dis'pute for goocL"
6.7.2.4 The settlement of the 1972 dispute
It was announced on 15 June 1972 that a committee headed by the U.A.E. Prime
Minister, Shaikh Maktoum bin Rashid had been formed to investigate the reasons
for the fighting and to take measures to prevent any future incidents.
On 17 July 1972 it was announced in Abu Dhabi that a final settlement had been
reached in the dispute over land between Sharjah and Fujairah. 87 Finally, the federal
government tried to resolve the issue by purchasing title to the orchard and granting
Sharjah and Fujairah equal rights to utilization of its well. Also it was reported that
in October 1972 the Council of Ministers appointed a Committee comprising the
Minister of Health, Minister of State for Gulf Affairs, and Minister of State for
Financial Affairs to visit Dibba area to mediate in the Sbarjah-Fujairah dispute.89
The rulers of Sharjah and Fujairah finally signed an agreement in 1983 which resulted
in the settlement of the border dispute between them.° However the agreement's
details are confidential, and it has been impossible to acquire a copy of the treaty.
6.7.3 The 1992 Crisis
A more recent incident occurred in November 1992, between the Shihuh tribes who
live in Dibba al-Husn of Sharjah with their relatives on the other side, Dibba al-Bayah
of Oman. According to responsible sources, some tribesmen became involved in a
clash in the boundary area between Dibba al-Husn of Sharjah and Dibba al-Bayah of
Oman, where that tribe are living on both sides of the U.A.E-Oman boundary. The
result of the clash was that one man from Dibba al-Husn was killed, from the Bu
gazeen tribe. Seven others were injured. 91) The dispute was sparked when some
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workers of the road company, who were paving a road in Dibba aI-Bayya of Oman,
entered an area which was very close to Dibba al-Husn of Sharjah, and then clashed
with tribesmen who inhabit the land near the border area. Emirates sources
announced that the boundary clash with Oman was a dispute between the tribes living
on both sides of the border? It is interesting to note that the Shihuh tribe who live
in this area are divided into three parts, one group belong to the Sultanate of Oman
who inhabit Dibba al-Bayali, another group who inhabit Dibba al-Gurfa, and are
therefore tribes of Fujairah. A third group inhabits Dibba al-Husn and consider that
they belong to Sharjah.
6.7.4 Conclusion
From the foregoing, it can be concluded that boundary disputes in the U.A.E. were
connected with tribal conflict which goes back to agreements and treaties between
Britain and these shaikhdoms. For the above case of boundary disputes between
Sharjah and Fujairah it is necessary to recognise that Fujairah had been part of the
Al-Qawasim federation and only later won independence from the Qawasini, and
recognition by the British government as a new Shaikhdom in 1952. Each Emirate
claimed land belonging to the other Emirate, and each side based its claims on
historical facts and tribal loyalties. However Sharjah has stronger claims than Fujairah
due to the fact that Fujairah was once part of the Qawasim federation (until 1952)
which ruled from Sharjah the capital of the Qawasim. Sharjah never recognised the
independence of Fujairah, even after British recognition in 1952. The situation
changed after 1952, affecting boundary demarcation in the U.A.E..
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6.8 The Hadf Village
Hadf Village is located on the south side of the western entrance to Wadi Hatta,
opposite Jabal Raudha. Maps show that this village is jointly administered between
the Sultanate of Oman and the Emirate of Ajman.
6.8.1 Historical Background
Although it is inhabited by the Bani Kaab, subject to the Sultan of Oman, the
inhabitants were paying zakat to the Wall of Masfut who was appointed by Shaikh
Rashid bin Humaid of Ajman. During Julian Walker's survey in 1954, Shaikh Ali of
Ajman told him that about thirty years ago the Naim tribe owned Hadf, but that the
Bani Kaab had since bought all the palms from them. This story was confirmed by
Shaikh Abdullah bin Salim of the Bani KaabP
6.8.2 The Dispute Settlement
After Julian Walker finished his survey, he decided to leave open the question of the
Ajman and Oman's claims to Hadf. Therefore, on any map which shows the internal
boundaries of the U.A.E. there are two letters "AO" which refers to Ajman and Oman
(see Figure 6.9). Julian Walker recommended that Ajman should be granted a
minimum boundary running down the centre of the Wadi from Lisheikhera to
Ghuzlanat. From Ghuzlanat the boundary would run towards the mountains and
should include Jabal Thafda (if not part or all of Jabal Gsaifa and Hadf). Then the
boundary should meet the line of the Wadi at Jabal Mussaya and cut straight across
the Wadi to the mountains between Wadi Hatta and Wadi Qur. It should reach the
watershed of those mountains in the neighbourhood of Jabal Ghallas and continue
westwards along that watershed by way of Jabal Bu Faraj to Jabal Milaiha, and thence
return to Lisheikera. Finally he concluded that the Masfut boundary settlement could
be announced to the Ruler of Ajman. However, the question of his southern boundary
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with the Bath Kaab, which is Hadf, was not decided. (95) Therefore the area at the
present time is still disputed between Ajman (U.A.E.), and the Sultanate of Oman.
6.9 The Emirate of Ajman Boundary
Smallest of the Emirates, Ajman can be described geographically as an enclave
surrounded by the territory of Sharjah (see Figure 6.12). It has remained politically
independent for two hundred years.
6.9.1 Geographical Introduction
Ajman Town lies just 8 km to the north of Sharjah. Ajman is the smallest of the
U.A.E.'s Emirates with an area of 259 km2. Like most of the northern Emirates, it is
a coastal town. Its landward border is entirely with Sharjah.
6.9.2 Ajman and Sharjah's claims on Zora and Bu Athm
6.9.2.1 The claims on Zora
It was reported that Sharjah claims the whole of Zora arguing that her boundary with
Ajman is at the entrance to Ajman creek. On the other hand, Ajman claimed the
western part of Zora with a boundary cutting the island at Khur Ghanatil. The
island-like area of Zora, is about two miles wide by five miles long, and has been
regarded as having great strategic importance for the past two hundred years, due to
its use as a base for offensives against the mainland tribes.
6.9.2.2 The Boundary Description of Ajman
Ajman's boundary was defined in 1956, when Julian Walker examined the evidence
concerning the boundary of this Shaikhdom.
The boundary on the coast between the Emirate of Ajman and that of Sbarjah is at
Bu Athm. It continues as a line running from a point on the coast near the circle of
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white small hills about halfway between the Shaikh of Ajman's tower and Bu Tayarah
well, passing through the circle of small hills and thence southwards through the
centre of Ned bu Athm, passing midway between Ned a! Taraiflya and the Abud
Palms. However on the coast, the boundary between Ajman and Sharjah in Zora was
a compromise settlement. The boundary line starts on the coast opposite the point
from Zora Fauqiniyah (upper), to the mainland. (See Figure 6.12).
The boundary line inland runs from Bu Athni southeast to Darb al Qabarain a
distance of about two miles. From Darb al Qabrain the line runs east to Al Muwaihat,
about one mile and then to Tallah about one mile and then to Maghis. From Maghis
the line runs north east to Tawi al-Hilaiw which is about two miles from Maghis. From
Al-Hilaiw, the line runs north-west to Tawi Mirdif which is about half a mile from
Al-.Hilaiw and thence to al-Zaura al Fauqaniyah and al-Zaura a! Tahtiyah (bottom)
on the Khur of Ajman about one mile from Ajman town towards the east. The
Foreign Office Map of Ajman (Figure 6.12) does not, however, show the boundary
line dividing Zora al-Talitiyah into two parts, the eastern one of Sharjah, and the
western one belonging to Ajman.
6.10 The Boundaries of Umm al-Quwain
6.10.1 The Geographical Location
Umm al-Quwain consists mainly of a town of that name, situated on a small coastal
strip about 30 km long and extending inland about 50 km. It lies some 34 km north of
Ajmari, separated from it by a stretch of Sharjah territory which includes the creek
and village of Hamriyah, and then a long undisturbed sandy beach. The road from the
main Ras al-Khaimah highway runs north-westwards through the new suburbs for
some 10 km before approaching the original settlement on the promontory. This
promontory was once well secured: a line of three strong towers linked by a wail still
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stands across its entrance. At the outskints of the town stands the old fort which is
currently used as a police station.
6.10.2 Boundary description of Umm al-Quwain
Umm al-Quwain has two shared boundary lines, an eastern one with Ras al-Khaimah,
and a western one with Shaijah. Umni al-Quwain has no enclaves within other
Emirate territories.
6.10.2.1 Umm al-Quwain boundary with Ras aI-Khaimah
The line starts on the coast north-eastwards to Jazirat al-Hamra which belongs to Ras
al-Khaimah, between Nad as Salli about half a mile north of Khur al-Madfaq which
is west-south-west of Ras al-Khaimah. From Nad as-Sail the line runs south to the
Zaab mosque and thence east to Ruqeibah, leaving the latter to Umm al-Quwain.
From Ruqeibah the line continues south and passes between Wahilah and Wahalali,
(water wells) the latter falling to Ras al-Khaimah. From that point the line runs
south-east to Mahimdah and to Qahawan which is awarded to Umm al-Quwain.
Further to the south, Rahil is divided equally between the two emirates and the
boundary passes just to the east of Hazza al-Wa'ar and continues south-westwards
towards Raqa a1-Hamir. Although these boundary points between Umm
al-Quwain and Ras al-Khainiah were demarcated by Julian Walker in 1955, they
conformed with the Ruler of Unmi al-Quwain's claims of his state boundary in 1937
(See Figure 6.13).
The boundary has been disputed. However, an agreement defining the border
between Ras al-Khaimah and Umm al-Quwain was signed on 29 May 1994 by the
Rulers and Crown Princes of the two Emirates, His Highness Shaikh Saqr bin
Mohammed al-Qasemi and His Highness Shaikh Rashid bin Ahmed al-Mualla.
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According to an official statement issued through the Emirates' News Agency, WAM,
the two Rulers expressed their thanks to President His Highness Shaikh Zayed bin
Sultan al-Nahayyan, and His Highness Shaikh Maktum bin Rashid al-Maktum, Vice
President and Prime Minister, and to Shaikh Mohammed bin Rashid al-Maktam,
Defence Minister, for the efforts they had exerted to make the agreement
possible.100
The long standing boundary dispute, which was the first to be dealt with by the
Political Agent in Dubai in April 1954, Mr Christopher Pine-Gordon, who failed, was
settled after a one-year survey demarcation on the ground by Julian Walker from
early 1993 to February 1994.(b01)
6.10.2.2 Umm al-Quwain Boundary with Sharjah
The boundary starts on the coast as a line running at right angles from the coast
through the site of the Mirdar bu Salaf well and thence inland to Ghaf Surur, Garhad,
and to the peak of Nad Abraq, thence to Aud Ibahm which is Sharjah territory. The
line then runs to the south of the Tawi Jasim, bin Sabt, Muweilha, and Sirra leaving
Faishegha in Sharjah territory. The boundary continues to Mahadhib and south of
Ghara, and the two wells, Kabir and Misbach are within Umm al-Quwain's territory.
Then the boundary line continues from Kasah, runs south of Hadeiba to Umm
Qubeisat, north of Rugiba to Tabagat, Awaiyin, Ashiew, and then north east of Banan,
Marragh, and Tawi Husain which belongs to Sharjah. Thence the line runs from
Lughalla which is in Umm al-Quwain territory, to the north of Jiza'at Khubaiyat which
belongs to Sharjali. From that point the boundary continues through the middle of
Sih Falaj to the northern edge of Argub Murraqabat which belongs to Sharjah. Thence
the line continues north east leaving Tawi Murraqabat to Sharjah and Haddad to
Umm al-Quwain, to Tawi bin Ghurair. The final section passes through Tawi bin
Ghurair, Faraikh and Chanatir to Hazza Haqf. (See Figure 6.13).
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Figure 6.13 shows that whilst some water wells (tawis) are located within the territory
of Umm al-Quwain, the border bisects other tawis leaving them divided between
Umm al-Quwain and Ras al-Khaimah on the eastern boundary, and between Umin
al-Quwain and Sharjah on the western boundary. Julian Walker used the water wells
in this part of the U.A.E. as boundary markers, a practice previously adopted by the
Bedouin who inhabited these areas.
6.11 Conclusion
Until the 1960s it was uncertain what territory belonged to which Emirate as no extensive
or comprehensive maps of the area had ever been prepared. The boundaries between the
various Emirates were determined by tribal loyalties and their territorial claims were not
defined until the first oil discoveries were made. British Foreign Office officials then spent
several years drawing the boundaries of the Trucial States, as they then were, and an
official map was finally produced in 1962. The differing allegiances that this showed are
clearly indicated by the way that five of the seven Emirates have enclaves within others
and some of them have enclaves close to the Omani border. Oman also has an enclave
within the enclave of Sharjah (discussed in Chapter 7).
When Julian Walker finished his work in the Trucial States in the 1960s as an official
boundary demarcator, he left unresolved some disputed areas, and other areas with
an open decision which meant no settlement was reached during his survey. Some of
these disputes have subsequently been resolved by the Shaikhs themselves as seen in
Abu Dhabi-Dubai agreement. The most important dispute resolved by the federal
government of the U.A.E., was the Dubai-Sharjah boundary settlement in the 1980s.
In the early days of the federation there was also the settlement of the
Sharjah-Fujairah boundary. However, some situations remain unresolved to the
present time, such as the village of Hadf which is disputed between Ajman (U.A.E.)
and the Sultanate of Oman.
Chapter 6
	
287
Having established where the internal boundary lines are, it is interesting to consider
how they affect communications in the U.A.E., and the extent to which they have
impacted on traditional lifestyles. These points will be discussed in Chapter 7.
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Chapter 7
The Effect of the Boundaries on Human Geography
7.1 Introduction
It is important to consider the effects federal borders might be expected to have, and
the extent to which these federal borders are modern, adminstrative creations, and
the extent to which they reflect traditional, tribal borders.
Before examining the effect of boundary disputes on the transportation system,
life-style and some of the projects planned by the government for the benefit of the
inhabitants in many areas, it may be useful to identify which Emirates share borders.
Table 7.1 identifies with which other Emirates the boundaries of each Emirate are
shared.
Table 7.1 Internal and External Boundaries Shared by each Emirate.
Source: The Author.
7.1.1 International Boundaries of each Emirate
Table 7.1 shows that six of the seven U.A.E. Emirates share a border with Oman. The
exception is Umm al-Quwain, which consists of a single territorial unit and no
enclaves (see Table 1.1). The Emirates of Abu Dhabi, Sharjah, Fujairah and Ras
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al-Khaimah each have a long border with Oman. Dubai and Ajman each share a
border with Oman, not as a result of their main cities, but because of Dubai's enclave
of Hatta, and of Ajman's enclave of Masfut (see Figure 1.1).
Abu Dhabi alone now shares a border with Saudi Arabia.
7.1.2 Internal Boundaries of each Emirate
From Table 7.1 it can be seen that two Emirates share borders with just two other
Emirates, namely Abu Dhabi and Umm al-Quwain. These two Emirates consist of a
single territorial unit: Abu Dhabi has a shared border with Dubai and Sharjah; and
the Emirate of Umm al-Quwain has a shared border with Sharjah and Ras a!-
Khaimah. Whilst the Emirate of Fujairah also has a shared border with two Emirates,
namely Sharjah and Ras al-Khaimah, it differs from Abu Dhabi and Umm al-Quwain
because it comprises three territorial units. Three Emirates have a shared border with
four others: Dubai, Ajman, and Ras al-Khaimali. The Emirate of Shaijah shares
borders with all six other Emirates. From Dibba al-Husn at the northeastern
extremity of the U.A.E. on Oman's border, to Khatma Malaha near Kalba on the
eastern coast in the south of the U.A.E., Sharjah is made up of several territorial units.
Thus, the map of the U.A.E. and especially the northern part, looks like a jig-saw
puzzle.1
Although the people of the U.A.E. were constitutionally united into one state as a
result of federation on 2 December 1971, there remain territorial problems in some
parts of the region, particularly in the border area between the U.A.E. and the
Sultanate of Oman. In some cases, boundary disputes within the U.A.E. have been
effectively settled by joint projects which have been planned for the development of
a disputed area between the two sides. Other cases are still in dispute. However,
despite funding from the federal government, some projects still get stopped in
mid-stream because the Shaikh does not want to sign an agreement with his
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neighbour. The result is that federal money is spent uselessly, and the local inhabitants
are the losers. For example, Ras al-Khaimah has not, even to the present day, settled
border disputes with the Emirate of Fujairah.
7.2 Boundaries and Resources
The three oil-producing Emirates are Abu Dhabi, Dubai and to a lesser extent Sharjah.
The other four Emirates, Ajman, Umm Al-Quwain, Ras al- Khaimah and Fujairali, are
not oil producers and most of the boundaiy disputes are associated with them.
Table 7.2: Oil Production ('000 bId) in the UA.E., 1991-1993
Source: Country Profile: UA.E., 1993/94, The Economist Intelligence Unit, London, p.17.
The section below provides a classic case study of how the settling of a long-standing
dispute in 1985 between two Emirates was a major factor in developing the formerly
disputed area to the mutual benefit of both sides.
7.2.1 The development of Khur Al-Mamzar between Dubal and Sharjah
7.2.1.1 Introduction
The first modern school (for boys only) opened in Sharjah in 1953.(2) Pupils would
commute daily from Dubai to attend the school in Sharjah. From a safe event of small
consequence, however, crossing the border later became a highly charged activity.
About a dozen kilometres of sabkha (salt marsh) separate Dubai and Sharjah. This
area remained undeveloped from the birth of the federation in 1971 until 1985. As
can be seen from the aerial photograph (Figure 7.1), a wide zone of land was without
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Figure 7.1 Aerial photograph of the KhurAl-Mamzar and the boundary zone betwee,
Emirates of Dubai and Sharjah from the coast
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buildings, due to the boundary dispute between the two Emirates which was active
until the two Emirates achieved a settlement in 1985 (see Chapter 6).
Long ago, there were two neighbouring villages on the coast between Dubai and
Sharjah, separated from each other by Al Khan creek. On the Dubai side of the creek
was Abu Hail, which has now disappeared. Pieces of old pottery revealing the former
site of the village can still be found in the sandy promontory to the north. In 1846, the
Shaikh of Sharjah built a number of towers at nearby Hamriya to check the expansion
of Dubai Shaikhdom 3 . The district immediately to the north of Dubai's district of
Deira (now part of Dubai City's commercial heart) still bears the name of Hamriya)4
In contrast to the disappearance of the Dubai village of Abu Hail, the Sharjah village
of Al Khan stands unchanged from pre-oil days at the mouth of the creek. On either
side of it the high rise buildings of Dubai and Sharjah have created a modern urban
landscape.
Figure 7.2 shows three lagoons: Al Khan lagoon lies to the east and Al Mamzar lagoon
lies to the west. Al Mamzar lagoon is politically divided in two: Al Mamzar Northern
lagoon to the east belongs to Sharjah, whilst the western part, called Al Mamzar
lagoon of Dubai, belongs to the Emirate of Dubai. The entrance to lagoons from the
Arabian Gulf can be seen at the top of the figure.
7.2.1.2 The Project from Al Khan District to the Dubai-Sharjah Border
The long-running boundary dispute between the Emirates of Dubai and Sharjah was
settled in April 1985 (see Chapter 6), from which time the relationship between the
two Emirates improved. The Al-Maiuzar project is an illustration of practical
co-operation between the two Emirates after they settled their boundary dispute.
The Al Khan project will be the most prominent feature of Sharjah in the year 2000.
The first phase of a multi-million Dirham scheme has been officially initiated by
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Figure 7.2 Sketch map ofAl-Mamzar lagoon drawn by Sir William Halcrow Consultants,
London in 1992.
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Sharjah Municipality at an estimated cost of Dh 32.75 million. The project involves
dredging in the Al Khan lagoon and the entire project will involve the development
of the area along the Shari ali-Dubai road which extends over 8 2
The planning zone will stretch from Al Khan district to the border between Dubai
and Sharjah. (5)
 The project will include residential, commercial and recreational
facilities. Once this project is completed, it will make up an estimated 25 per cent of
the entire area of the city of Shaijah.6
This project is complementary to the Al Mamzar projects undertaken by Dubai
Municipality involving the dredging of two lagoons Al Mamzar of Dubai and Al
Mamzar of Sharjah; the Al Manizar eastern lagoon is located inside Sharjah's
boundaries?
From Figures 7.3 and 7.4 it can be seen that the contractors are building a long divide
in the entrance of the mouth of both Khurs the Al Mamzar of Sharjah and Al Mamzar
of Dubai, and this artificial partition of boulders will serve as the maritime boundary
there between the Emirates of Dubai and Sharjah. The same figure shows that the
southern area is Dubai's territory and the northern area is Sharjah's territory. The
Khur Al Mamzar of Dubai master plans prepared by Sir William Haicrow
Consultants, include design and supervision of a 5 hectares beach park including
buildings and landscaping, at a cost of Dh 72 million. Dh 1 million will be spent in the
preparation of a master plan for the development of approx 500 hectares of land.8
Both projects will result in the development of the area between the two Emirates.
According to the director of Sharjah Municipality the first phase is dredging Al Khan
lagoon for a distance of 5.5 km. The second phase will extend over a period of seven
years and will incorporate the construction of luxurious residential building
complexes, multi-purpose office building, business districts, commercial centres,
parks and green landscapes, recreational facilities and leisure areas (see Figure 7.5).
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Figure 7.3 The artificial maritime boundary between the Emirates of Dubai and Sharjah
in the entrance of the Al-Mamzar lagoon.
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Figure 7.4 The old village ofAl-Khan of Sharjah on the northern side of the artWcal
maritime boundary in the KhurAl-Mamzar
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The project also includes the construction of a canal which will connect the Al Khan
lagoon with the existing Khalid lagoon. The canal will be 800 metres long and 40
metres wide, and is intended to facilitate the natural cleansing of Khalid lagoon.
According to the head of the Planning Department of Sharjah Municipality, the Al
Khan area was chosen for this project because of its strategic location between Dubai
and Sharjah. 9
 The Al Khan lagoon project was not being undertaken in competition
with Al Marnzar lagoon project of the Emirate of Dubai. However, Engineer Sev
Ferrari of Haicrow International has stated that the two projects are being carried
out in harmony (and in the same geographical location), and they will be carefully
integrated to achieve peaceful col1aboration.10
7.3 The Effect of Boundaries on Transportation
The main factor in linking the cities, towns and villages in the U.A.E. is road
transportation. However, disputed boundaries affect roads serving the U.A.E..
7.3.1 Dubai to Al-Am Road
Dubai is located on the west coast of the U.A.E., and Al-Am is the eastern province
of the Emirate of Abu Dhabi, located beside the U.A.E-Oman border. However,
Al-Am is nearer to Dubai than to Abu Dhabi. The road from Dubai to Al-Am used
to be poor in quality. When the U.A.E. University was established at Al-Am in 1977,
many University students were killed in traffic accidents while travelling from
different parts of the countly using the Al-Am to Dubai road.
There was a heavy political agenda behind Abu Dhabi's reluctance to put this road
in good condition. Abu Dhabian merchants wanted to prevent the development of
this road in order to ensure that the people who inhabited Al-Am would buy goods
from Abu Dhabi, using the Al-Am to Abu Dhabi road, rather than from Dubai, using
the Al- Am to Dubai road. The Abu Dhabi traders became angry in 1985 when the
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federal government paved the new road from Abu Dhabi to Dubai which made the
transport of goods from Dubai (the major trading centre in the Gull) to Abu Dhabi
much easier, strengthening the competitive position of Dubai's traders in the face of
Abu Dhabi's traders.' 1
 Another example of competition between the two Emirates
took place a few months before federation. Abu Dhabi merchants pressurized their
ruler to levy a 10 per cent surcharge on all items not imported directly into Abu Dhabi.
This move was designed to displace the leading position of Dubai in supplying the
Emirate's local market. Shaikh Zayed, the ruler of Abu Dhabi, subsequently
rescinded the tariffs in accordance with provisions of Article 11 of the Federal
Constitution calling for the abolition of all customs duties on trade among the union
members. 12 This retraction occurred after the establishment of the federation. Its
effect was clearly favourable to the Emirate of Dubai. Abu Dhabi's merchants were
far from pleased with this move.
73.1.1 Introduction
Al-Am is the eastern province of the Emirate of Abu Dhabi. The Al-Nahhayan family
owned farms in Al-Am, and the ruler of Abu Dhabi appointed his brother as his
representative in this region. Al-Am itself is the chief town of the Abu Dhabi Emirate,
part of the large oasis known historically as Al-Buraimi and which is now divided
between Abu Dhabi (U.A.E.) and Oman (see Chapters 2 and 4).
At the time of federation the importance of Al-Am derived from the U.A.E.
University, situated in the city centre. As the only university in the U.A.E., students
from the other Emirates have to travel in order to attend. The city is linked by many
roads with Abu Dhabi, but the most important road link is the Al-Am to Dubai road.
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73.1.2 Border post on the road
Before discussing the impact of internal boundaries on the road, it is important to
recognise the neutral zone between Dubai and Al-Mn located between Tawi
Al-Faqqa to Tawi Al-Ashush. This neutral zone is 18 km long and 1 km wide. 13
 The
Abu Dhabi-Duba.i border had been a source of friction between the two Emirates for
many years before federation. The issue was finally settled in 1968 by the creation of
a neutral zone. Al-Faqqa village is divided between the Emirates of Dubai and
Al-Mn. Both Emirates established a police station on the border line to control the
road and vehicle movements between Dubai and Al-Am. Regarding the design of the
road and its quality, the plan was prepared by the same consultant for both Dubai and
Al-Mn. The plan was that the road was to have looked the same on both sides of the
village. Figure 7.6 shows, however, that at the Al-Faqqa police station on the Dubai
side the road is divided into three lanes, and after the police station, the road is divided
into two lanes, where it enters the Al-Mn district of the Emirate of Abu Dhabi (Figure
7.7).
Another symbolic feature of the effect of different federal administrations on the
Dubai to Al-Mn road is the road signs. From the Dubai trade centre to AI-Faqqa
border point, all the signboards within Dubai's territory are painted green; after
Al-Faqqa all the signboards are painted blue until the road reaches Al-Ain city centre.
Such symbols serve to emphasise territorial distinctions between the Emirates
(Figure 7.8).
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Figure 7.6 The Dubai-Al-Ain road and Al-Faqqa Police Station on the Dubai side.
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Figure 7.7 Sketch plan of the Dubai-A1-Ain road on the Al-Faqqa border point.
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Figure 7.8 The green sign board of the Dubai-Al-ain road in Dubai's territory (top) and
the blue signboard on the same road in Al-Am territory after crossing
Al-Faqqa border point (bottom).
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7.3.3 Dubal to Hatta Road
The mountain enclave of Hatta, 130 km east of Dubai, forms part of Dubai Emirate.
However the mountains around the village of Hatta belong to the northern part of
the Oman range called the Hajar Mountains (hajar means rock) (see Chapter 6).
From Dubai to its Hatta enclave, the road crosses many political boundaries, internal
and external (see Figure 7.9). From Dubai there is Al-Hibab village roundabout
where there is a police station which belongs to Dubai Police Force. The road
continues to Al-Medam roundabout in Sharjah, with a Sharjah police station. The
road then crosses a long stretch of Oman territory called Welayah Mahadha, A large
signboard beside the road announces "Welcome to Oman" (Figure 7.10), indicating
that this is Omani land. Within the Omani territory the Omani government built two
big camps: one belonging to the Ministry of the Interior to control the road; the other
is the residential house of the Wali of Mahadha (the Sultan's representative in this
state).14
As the road leaves Omani territory, another signboard announces "Goodbye,
Sultanate of Oman". The road enters the territory of the emirate of Ajman, where
there is a police station belonging to Ajman. Finally, the town of Hatta appears. In
the town centre there are several government departments which belong to Dubai.
Beyond Hatta, the road continues to Al-Wagaga village where there is an Omani
border control station built and financed by the Ruler of Dubai.' From the
Al-Wagaga border post to Welayah Shinas (Oman) on the Gulf of Oman the road is
also financed by the Ruler of Dubai.
Another project financed by the Ruler of Dubai is the road from Dubai to Al-Aqr
costing Dh.380 million (63 million), and from Al-Aqr to Seeb, the entrance of
Muscat, costing Dh.680 million (113 million). The work was completed in 1984.(16)
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Figure 7.10 The federal flag of the United Arab Emirates drawn on the mountain by the
Al-Mezairih village people of the Emirate ofAjman after crossing the
boundary point of Wilayat Mahadhah of the Sultanate of Oman on the
Dubai-Hatta road.
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It is worth considering why the Ruler of Dubai was prepared to finance the Dubai to
Hatta road as far as the Omani capital, Muscat. The answer may be that he was taking
care of any potential emergency situation by building the road from Dubai's enclave
Hatta to Muscat on the Gulf of Oman as an alternative route to his Emirate possibly
as a strategic escape route. The road can also be used by allied military forces to reach
the Emirate of Dubai within 4 or 5 hours, instead of having to round the Straits of
Hormuz would clearly take far longer. 17)
 Another motive was probably commercial,
paving the way for Omani traders to buy goods from the Dubai market and
transporting them to Muscat.
According to an official in the U.A.E., during the Gulf crisis in 1991, when the Iraqis
invaded Kuwait, the Omani government established a checkpoint on the Dubai to
Hatta road at the entrance of the Walayat Mahadha. Travellers' passports were
checked. U.A.E. citizens were allowed to travel on this road to the enclaves of Hatta
(Dubai) and Masfut (Ajman). Travellers not holding U.A.E. passports were turned
back to the U.A.E.. The official also confirmed that the federal government paid the
Omani Sultan a huge amount of money to remove this checkpoint from the road
linking the enclaves of Hatta (Dubai), Masfut (Ajman) and Wadi al-Qur (Ras
al-Khaimah) with the main U.A.E. territory.
7.3.4 Khur Fakkan to Al-Jaradiyya Road
There is a small plot named Al-Jaradiyya located south of Khur Faldcan,' 18 some 2 km2
in area on the main paved road which links the east coast from Khur Fakkan to Kalba
The plot remains undeveloped because it belongs to the Sultanate of Oman and two
families from Al-Shuhuh are living there who are loyal to the Sultanate of Oman.
In 1978, the U.A.E. federal government was contracting a road to link the town of
Kalba (Sharjah), through the Emirate of Fujairah, with Dibba on the east coast. The
road would have gone through the Omani territory, which was less than one kilometre
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in length. The road had to be stopped at the beginning of the Omani kilometre and
restarted at the end of the Omani area. The Omani government, in a bid to protect
its sovereignty, refused permission to the U.A.E. federal government to undertake
the construction work even though the area was geographically situated in the middle
of U.A.E. territory and miles from Oman, and despite the fact that the land was of
little significance to the U.A.E. but it is of great significance to Oman, and which
directly lies on the south eastern enclave of Madha. The road has, however, recently
been completed and the one kilometre stretch paved.'19
7.3.5 From Fujairah to its Enclaves in Oman
One of the border posts between the U.A.E. and the Sultanate of Oman is Khatmat
Milaha on the Gulf of Oman and to the north of this point is the town of Kalba, one
of Sharjah's enclave's in the eastern region. To the south of this point is Walaya
Mahadha of Oman. However, further to the south is U.A.E. territory again. A track
turns back into the mountains leading to Fujairah's villages of Wadi Mai and Wahalla,
and eventually by a tortuous route, back onto the main Dubai to Oman road at Hatta.
7.3.6 The Western Coast Road from Abu Dhabi to Ras aI-Khaimah
As has been mentioned before, six Emirates are located on the western coast of the
U.A.E., whilst the seventh is located on the eastern coast on the Gulf of Oman. A
long stretch of desert coastline separates the cities of Abu Dhabi and Dubai, some
160 kilometres apart. The road linking the two Emirates is now the busiest in the land,
for these two neighbouring Emirates are the main centres of population and
economic activity in the U.A.E..
Saih Shuaib was a border post between the Emirates of Abu Dhabi and Dubai, that
is, between the capital of the federation, Abu Dhabi, and the northern Emirates.
Before 1971, there used to be a customs checking point and passport control. The
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border post was removed after federation in 1971, and today only a small watch room
remains. Beyond Saih Shuaib, Jebel Ali Port (Dubai) is only a few kilometres distant.
The road continues to Dubal city centre.
From Dubai to the Emirate of Sharjah, 12 km of sabltha (salt marsh) is crossed by a
modern highway called Al-Ittehad (Union Road). Border pillars are planted to the
right of the road in the area which divides the two Emirates, called Nahada Amir (see
Figure 7.1). From Sharjah, the route continues to Ajman along the coast where the
city of Ajman lies about 8 km to the north. After reaching Ajman the road crosses
into Sharjah's territory again which includes the creek and the village of Hamriyah.
The effect of being totally surrounded by the territory of Sharjah, effectively makes
the Emirate of Ajman into an enclave.
The Emirate of Umm al-Quwain lies some 34 km north of Ajman. From Umni
al-Quwain city to the main Ras al-Khaimah highway the road nrns north-westwards,
through the new suburbs, for some 10 km before approaching the original settlement
on the promontory. At the beginning of the village stands the old fort, currently used
by the police. The road north from Umm al-Quwain enters the Emirate of Ras
al-Khaimah at the Wadi Batha and a pair of bridges carry the traffic over this wadi
which nms inland to Falaj al Mualla (Umm al-Quwain). Some kilometres north of
the wadi a pair of preserved watch-towers dominate the landscape from the heights
of a line of dunes to the east of the road. These were the inland defence of the village
of Jazirat a! Hamra on the coast of Ras al-Khaimah.
In summary, the main highway from Abu Dhabi, the capital of the federation, to Ras
al-Khaimah enters five other Emirates, cutting across internal boundary lines. The
only Emirate left out is Fujairah which lies on the east coast of the U.A.E. on the Gulf
of Oman. In crossing these Emirate territories, the highway cuts across internal
boundary lines between the Emirates, even though these lines are artificial creations,
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for all territorial boundaries are in some measure artificial. (20) This highway has the
potential to reduce the relevance of the internal boundary between the union
members because many of the regular travellers from the northern Emirates (Ras
al-Khaimah, Umm al-Quwain, Ajman and Shaijah) are government employees,
working for example in the Air Force, in oil company headquarters, and in the
government Ministries situated in the federal capital of the U.A.E., Abu Dhabi. They
travel daily along this main highway, ignoring border points: the traveller feels that
the journey is all within one state.
7.4 Traditional ways of life
The U.A.E. is broadly divided into two geographical regions:
1. The Hajar mountains, the mountainous backbone of the Northern Emirates, to
the east and the north east, without oil deposits.
2. The desert region, to the west and south west, with oil deposits.
Subsequent to federation, the oil companies located their headquarters in the main
cities of the country. All the government departments based themselves in the federal
capital, Abu Dhabi, and the commercial capital, Dubai. Many of the villagers
therefore emigrated to the main cities on the western coast of the country. In other
words, there was a tribal emigration within the Emirates from the east coast (the
mountainous region) to the west coast where the six Emirates are located. 21
 The
minority of people who stayed in their old villages to spend the rest of there life
working their farms in the wadis, became too old to move and leave their villages in
which they were born.
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7.4.1 The Enclaves of Hatta and Masfut
7.4.1.1 The enclave of Hatta
As was mentioned above in Chapter 6, the enclave of Hatta is 130 km east of the
Emirate of Dubai of which it is a part. It is the major settlement in that area. The oasis
of Hatta has been developed by the government of Dubai with many new villas
(Figures 7.11 and 7.12) and an attractive Hatta Fort Hotel in a garden which is
becoming a tourist attraction. The government has constructed asphalted streets,
clinics, mosques and shops, and supplies water and electricity. The people of Hatta
enjoy full communication with the Emirate of Dubai, with the Dubai Municipality,
Dubai Police, and Dubai telecommunication facilities. Merchants from Dubai own
many gardens with luxury villas built at the foot of a rocky hifi and many gardens in
Hatta are using new technology water irrigation systems (see Figure 7.13). The
gardens are, however, only for temporary residence, usually confined to the holiday
season, when some Dubai families visit the Hatta oasis for their holiday.
7.4.1.2 The Ajman enclaves of Masfut and Manama
Although Ajman is the smallest of the Emirates, with an area of only 259 km2, and its
main territory is completely surrounded by that of Sharjah (see Figure 1.1), it does
nevertheless have two small enclaves in the mountains: Manama in the centre of the
U.A.E. territory, and Masfut in the south eastern region, close to the Omani border.
Masfut borders Hatta, both of which are now linked by asphalt roads to the main
Dubai to Hatta highway. A wadi runs through the middle of the village. A group of
villagers called Bedaiwat inhabit Masfut, and own farms and palm gardens there.
There is a big difference between the development of the enclaves of Hatta and
Masfut, for the gardens in the latter are poor with ordinary houses, and the irrigation
system is still traditional.
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Figure 7.11 View of a luxury villa built in a farm in Hatta Village (Dubai's enclave) (top),
and a view of the National Bank of Duba4 Hatta branch (bottom).
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Figure 7.12 Private villa built on a farm belonging to a family of Dubai in Hatta village
(top) and another house built in M'àsfut village, the Enclave ofAjman near
Hatta (bottom).
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Figure 7.13 Old water irrigation system (Al-falag) in Nahwa, the Enclave of Sharjah at
the head of the Wadi Madha, of the Sultanate of Oman (top) and the two
white pillars marks the border of the village of Nahwa of Sharjah (bottom).
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7.4.2 Enclave within an enclave
Wadi Madha is an Omani enclave located in the northeast of the UAE. south of
Khur Fakkan of Shaijah. It has no outlet to the sea. Geographically Wadi Madha is a
drainage basin lying within the Hajar mountains (see Figure 7.14). The inhabitants of
this Wadi are called Madhaniyyen (named after the Wadi) and Shuhuh, of the Bath
Sa'ad tribe, who are the inhabitants of the village of Ghuna; and Barn Haniid who
inhabit the village of the same name, Hajar Barn Hamid, and Madha (which gives its
name to the Omani Walayali of Madha) and Hajar Bani Haniid.
The inhabitants of Madha live relatively isolated, and do not want to be affected by
their neighbours, the Qawasim. They remain loyal to the Sultanate of Oman?3
A curious feature of the political geography of the U.A.E. is that there is another
enclave within Oman's Madha enclave, belonging to the Emirate of Sharjah.
This Sharjah enclave is located in the mountains, within the Omani enclave of Madha.
Its villages of Shis and Nahwa (the total area of each village is about 1 km2) can
only be reached by taking a four wheel drive vehicle and heading inland through
Madha (see Figure 7.15). Just before the end of the Omani track, deep down in a
wadi, this track stops at the fringe of a village surrounded by terraced palm groves
and gardens. The wadi ends in deep rock pools just below the village and there is an
interesting falaj system, running from the pools, and also emerging from the rocks
above the village and crossing through it (see Figure 7.13).
According to Julian Walker's 1955 report, the two villages of Shis and Nahwa
belonged to Sharjah:
"Sharjah is in de facto control of the two villages at the head of the wadi,
Nahawa and Shis, from which she has been taking zakat for several yeais.
The Ruler of Fujairah confirms this."
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Figure: 7.14	 The Omani Enclave of Madha
Showing the Nahwa Enclave Belonging to Sharjah
Source: Fieldwork
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Figure 7.15 The main road (rocky road) to the village of Nawha at the top of Wadi Madha
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In fact there was quite a strong dispute over the Wadi, involving some deaths in 1956
and 1957.() The British Foreign Office sent Lord Martin Buckmaster to carry out
further investigations between 1963 and 1967, to resolve unresolved areas. Wadi
Madha was included in Buckmaster's program. 2'7 However, his investigation did not
result in an immediate settlement between Sharjah and Muscat. Only in 1969 was
an agreement finally reached between the Sultanate of Muscat and Sharjah fixing the
boundaries.' 29 Figure 7.13 shows the boundary which divides the territory between
the two villages of Nahwa and Shis of Sharjah on the one hand, and the Omani
territory of Wadi Madha on the other. The border is marked with two white pillars
on the top of the mountain (Figure 7.13).
There are several significant contrasts between the lifestyles of the inhabitants of the
two villages of Shis and Nahwa at the top of the wadi Madha, and the people of Khur
Fakkan which belongs to the Emirate of Sharjah. First, they get their electricity supply
from an independent electrical generator installed at the entrance of the village of
Naliwa. It is a small generator, because there are not more than 12 houses in the village
of Nahwa. Second, the village has anAmeer, or Shaikh who is appointed by the ruler
of Sharjah as his representative in this enclave. At present he is Khaifan Al-Ha'aj,
whose name is written on his house wall (see Figure 7.16) with some words in Arabic
which mean: I Love Sharjah. Third, the people of the villages of Nahwa and Shis are
agriculturalists and they own gardens, depending on the falaj system. The younger
generation of Nahwa and Shis villages are employed in U.A.E. government
departments in Khur Fakkan town, which is their nearest U.A.E. territory. To reach
their work, they have to travel along the Omani track until they reach the asphalt road
of the centre of the Walayat Madha of Oman and from that point to Khur Fakkan of
Sharjah or to the town of Qidfa or Murbah of the Emirate of Fujairah.
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Figure 7.16 The main electric generator which supplies electricity to the village of Nahwa
(above), and the house ofAmir (Shaikh) Khalfan Al-Haaj, the representative
of the Ruler of Sharjah in the village of Nawha. His name is printed on his
house (below).
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However, it was reported recently that His Highness Shaikh Sultan bin Mohammed
Al-Qasemi, the ruler of Sharjah and its dependencies (enclaves or territorial units
which belongs to Sharjah), ordered the building of Low Cost Housing such as that
financed by the government in some parts of Sharjah's other enclaves: the villages of
Wadi al-Helu, Nahwa, Shis, and Dibba al-Husn which are situated in the eastern
region of the Emirate of Sharjah. (30) It may be concluded from this that the Emirate
of Sharjah wants to strengthen its position in these villages which are separated from
it by the territories of other Emirates and in the case of the two villages of Shis and
Nahwa which are separated from it by Omani territory. It is probably the case that if
the inhabitants of these villages do not receive facifities from the government at least
equal to the inhabitants of the cities, then the villages will be abandoned. Empty
villages could lead to a difficult political situation, because it is harder to justify the
maintenance of sovereignty over barren land when initial claim to that sovereignty
was based on the political loyalties of the inhabitants.
7.5 Boundaries and Local Government
This section examines the effect of boundary disputes on several projects which have
been undertaken by the local municipalities, and financed by the local government
of each Emirate, and some projects undertaken by the federal government and
designed by the Ministry of Housing and Public Works. Some of these projects have
been halted or even cancelled because of boundary problems.
7.5.1 The Dispute on the Hotel in Masafi Village
The village of Masaui in the middle of the Hajar Mountains range is an important
place for Fujairah and there are some gardens there. Masafi is connected to Fujairah
by the Wadi Hamm, 31 whose population of 1,000 was a cause of frequent conflict
between Fujairah and Ras al-Khaimah (see Chapter 6). In 1969, the Ruler of Fujairah,
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signed an agreement with Al-Jasmi Contracting Company to build an hotel in the
village of Masafi. When the building was nearly finished, the Ruler of Ras al-Khaimah
ordered the work to be stopped, claiming that the building was being built on his
territory. The building remains unfinished in 1994 (Figure 7.17).
An inhabitant living on the Masafi side of the building reported that the building is
still in dispute between the two Emirates. He said that Ras al-Khaimah claims its
territory to extend as far as the road. It was reported that armed clashes occurred
between Fujairah and Ras al-Khaimah jfl 1972 over Masafi village and its
surroundings, and gun-fire was exchanged. 32)
 A settlement has still not been reached.
Boundary disputes between the Emirate of Ras al-Khaimah and the Emirate of
Fujairah remain unresolved (see Chapter 8).
7.5.2 Wadi Al-Our Dam
Wadi Al-Qur is the southernmost part of Ras al-Khaimah territory (180 km south-east
of Ras al-Khaimali). In former times it was an important route through wadi Al-Our
to the Gulf of Oman, however the lower reaches are blocked by an Omani border
post. The middle reaches of the wadi Qur can now be easily reached by an asphalt
road from Hatta, the enclave of Dubai (see Figure 7.18).
In 1988 the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries planed to construct new dams in
the mountainous areas of the Emirates in 1988. One of the locations was in the Wadi
Al-Qur. The dam at this wadi cost Dh.3 1 mlllion.' 33 It is 23 metres high and 250 metres
long. The Al-Mulla contractor company started the work but when it reached its
mid-stages, one of the Ministry of Agriculture officials pointed out:
"Since Omani territo,y was very close to the dam downstream, water could
not be allowed to pass underneath it. Hence it is the only one which has a
'positive cutoff', meaning that its clay core is impermeable." ('
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Figure 7.17 The hotel of the Shaikh of Fujairah in the village of Masafi which is the
project stopped by the Ruler of Ras Al-Khaimah
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Figure: 7.18 The Location of the Al-Qur Dam in Southern
Ras Al-Khaimah Territory Close to the Oman Border
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The Omanis objected to the U.A.E. government and after fruitless negotiations
between the two parties, work stopped at the site in 1991 and has not restarted
(Figures 7.19 and 7.20). One of the villagers who owns a farm on the Omani side in
Aswad town of Omani territoiy, said:
"We are happy that the work has been stopped because we will not benefit
from this dam and the benefit is going just to one side which is the farms of
Huwailat of Ras al-Khaimah and the level of the underground water in our
territoiy will drop down and the taste of the water will become salty, we would
like it to go back to normal, aft erthe rainfall the wadi isflowinguntil it reaches
,,(36)
our area.
7.5.3 Disputes over Motel and Police Station
Another example of a halted federal project is the Masfut Motel in Masfut on the
main Hatta-Masfut road. This project was planned by Ajman Municipality and
financed by the Ruler of the Emirate of Ajman. However, the project was stopped by
the Dubai government in 1982 under the pretence that this motel was built on Hatta
territoiy of Dubai. The building still exists but in poor condition 37 (see Figure 7.21).
The same can be said for the Masfut police station which was built close to the motel.
This project which was financed by the federal Ministiy of Housing and Public Works,
consists of a residential section, offices and a mosque. The project has been stopped
by Dubai on the pretence that this station which was planned to be for Masfut village
of Ajman was built on Hatta territory of Dubai. The unfinished building still exists on
the right side of the main Hatta-Masfut road (see Figure 7.22).
Chapter 7
	
328
-	
l•.
•	 -	
:. .	 .
Figure 7.19 The signboard of the Al-Qur Dam construction shows the names of the
construction company, Al-Mulla, and the consultant company, Halcrow. The
board was removed in 1992.
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Figure 7.20 View of WadiAl-Qur dam in the village of Huwailat of Ras al-Khaimah. The
project was stopped by the Federal Government due to Omani intervention
(top). The bottom shows a view of the cement foundation of the Al-Qur Dam.
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Figure 7.21 The motel of the Ruler ofAjman in its enclave of Masfut.
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Figure 7.22 The police station ofAjman in Masfut built by the Federal Government. The
project was discontinued (top and bottom).
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7.5.4 Dispute over the Petrol Station in 1992
One of the recent projects which was disputed was the work on the petrol station
which was being built by ADNOC oil Company, in Al-Khat village on the Ras
al-Khaimah Airport road (Figure 7.23),() formerly a romantic little place at the foot
of rocky cliffs. Here sweet water springs flow from the foot of the mountains filling
rock pools and nurturing palm groves and old watch towers brood over the springs
from the rocks above. The petrol station project started in the early part of 1992 for
Shaikh Sultan bin Saqr bin Mohammed al-Qasemi, who is the second son of the Ruler
of Ras al-Khaimah (40) (see Figure 7.24).
The Ras al-Khaimah Airport road to the village of Khat has on its right side the village
of Habhab belonging to the Emirate of Fujairah. However, the boundary disputes
between Ras al-Khaimah and Fujairab are not settled yet. The Masafi building was
being built and financed by the Ruler of Fujairah but the work stopped in 1969 when
the Ruler of Ras al-Khaimali claimed the area as his territory. The Ruler of Fujairah
accordingly stopped the work on this petrol station in late 1992, and the situation
there is the same today.
7.6 Conclusion
The political map of the U.A.E., showing internal boundaries between Emirates with
their enclaves and territorial units, looks like a jig-saw puzzle. To reach some parts
of some Emirates, it is necessary to leave the Emirate, cross the territory of one or
more other Emirates, and only then re-enter the territory of the first Emirate. The
Emirates of Abu Dhabi and Umm al-Quwain alone are made up of a single territorial
unit: all the others are made up of several territorial units.
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Figure 7.24 The petrol station of Shaikh Sultan bin Saqr, Ruler of Ras Al-Khaimah (top).
This project was not continued because of the intervention of the Ruler of
Fujairah. A similar design of a complete petrol station in another part of the
Emirates (bottom).
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However, in most places much of the time, the boundaries between Emirates are
barely perceived. Only when the boundary becomes the subject of a dispute does the
boundary itself impact on the lives of individuals.
History demonstrates that boundary disputes can be solved, and agreements can be
signed by any two (or more) Emirates which are in dispute, provided that there is the
political will to achieve this. Equally, the settlement of boundary disputes eases
political relations between former adversaries. There remain unsettled boundary
disputes in the U.A.E.. This chapter has given examples of planned projects which
have been shelved or not been completed, simply because of the absence of
agreement between Emirates in dispute. The problem underlying the dispute
between Ras al-Khaimah and Fujairah over the location of some projects was that
these two Emirates did not settle their boundary disputes, such as the dispute over
the village of Masafi. Similarly between the Emirates of Dubai and Ajman over their
enclaves of Hatta and Masfut.
It is clear that boundaries and jurisdictional disputes among member Emirates have
affected the developing infrastructure of the federation although the extent of this
must not be exaggerated. The effect of boundary conflicts on the federation was
expressed by His Highness Shaikh Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahayyan, President of the
U.A.E., when, dissatisfied with the attitude of his fellow-rulers, he asked:
II Would you believe that I have just spent a week among the Emirates trying
to settle insignificant boundary disputes 71 (41)
In 1976, in a speech relating to internal boundaries disputes and their effect on the
development of the country, the U.A.E. President said:
"I spent nearly a week in the northern Emirates in an attempt to settle some
border disputes of minor consequence, yet they are a source of conflict among
the member-states. ... I can say, with both bitterness and sorrow, that their
disputes often involve a few tens of metres, and do you believe that we have
not been able to build a hospital on a piece of real estate because two
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Emirates claim sovereignty over it? Abu Dhabi, for one, had territorial
dzsputes with neighbouring countries such as Saudi Arabia, Qatar and
Oman, but they were resolved through undeitanding,flexibility and brotherly
discussions." (42)
It can be concluded from the above that the federal government of the U.A.E. is trying
its best to solve border disputes between the Emirate members. In some cases, the
federal government has failed because of intransigence on the part of some Emirates'
Shaikhs. The need for flexibility in resolving border disputes should be emphasised,
as well as the need for political will to reach a solution. Without solutions,
development projects may be delayed indefinitely. With agreements, projects can be
used in confidence-building.
It was shown how the tense situation between the Emirates of Dubai and Sharjah
improved simply because they came to an agreement in 1985 and settled their long
standing boundary dispute. Since then, there has been co-operation between them in
various fields both financial and political. Boundary agreements benefit the parties
concerned. The border settlement between Dubai and the Sultanate of Oman is a
good example of an external boundary agreement over the Dubal enclave of Hatta,
which is surrounded by Omani territories. The result of an agreeable settlement was
the road extension, built and financed entirely by the government of Dubai, from
Dubai to Seeb, the entrance to Muscat, Oman's capital.
As it is people who travel, be they merchants from Dubai, students studying at Al-Am,
or relatives visiting family in an Emirate enclave, it is ordinary people who benefit
from the settlement of boundary disputes. People also benefit from the establishment
of social services (such as hospitals and police stations) and commercial services (such
as shopping and office complexes). When boundary disputes obtrude, it is ordinary
people who lose out. For the people of the U.A.E., the boundaries between the
Emirates reflect past and current political loyalties, and represent administratives
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divisions. However, the UAE. internal boundaries do not identify for individuals
areas of inclusion and exclusion, which is more the case with the U.A.E. external
boundaries. Oil wealth has brought mobility to the people of the U.A.E., reflected in
the migration to the east coast. The people want mobility: passenger and commercial
transport, commerce and social fluidity, facilitated by boundary settlements.
Boundary disputes obstruct these processes, and therefore represent an out-dated
agenda.
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Chapter 8
Summary, Conclusion and Recommendations
8.1 Summary
It is not surprising that the British withdrawal from the Gulf threw not only
inter-Emirate boundaries into question, but also the international boundaries
between the Emirates and their neighbours. Chapter 4 showed how the dispute over
Abu Musa Island was raised again in 1992, and how the Buraimi dispute between the
U.A.E. (Abu Dhabi) and Saudi Arabia also represented a threat to the survival of the
U.A.E.. Saudi Arabia withheld its recognition of the newly established federation
until 1974 when the two parties were able to arrive at an agreement over their dispute.
This agreement involved the exchange of territoiy (part of southern and western Abu
Dhabi) for political recognition.
Since the establishment of the federation, the U.A.E. has been threatened by external
powers on a number of occasions: by Saudi Arabia in 1971, and by Iran in 1971 and
1992. The Union has also had to face internal threats which have blown up over
boundary disputes. The coming of age of the state has been a process of learning from
history that it is better to stand united than to fall divided. The international world of
geo-politics is unforgiving, and the people and rulers of the Emirates do well to move
together towards greater unity.
Historically, boundaries between these small Emirates did not exist as boundaries in
the European sense, and were unknown in Arabia. 1 When the rulers began to scent
money for oil, granting oil exploration concessions to British companies concentrated
their minds wonderfully on demarcation of boundaries between the Emirates. The
emergence of these small Shaikhdoms (later Emirates) and their enclaves dates back
to 1820, when the British government concluded treaties with eight Emirates. In 1914
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this number was reduced to five, and finally raised to seven. 2 By these treaties the
British government recognized these Shaikhdoms as political ufl ts, and each unit had
its territory to be delimited. These changes resulted in the reduction or enlargement
of the size of some Emirates (see Chapter 5). Moreover, Chapter 3 highlighted the
history of the Shaikhdoms as a principal reason for the emergence of internal
boundaries: in the Qawasim section many towns became centres of movement
towards independence, particularly Ras al-Khaimah in 1921, Kalba in 1936 and
Fujairah in 1952. In other words, the issue of independence is a key pointer towards
understanding the shifting internal boundaries in the Trucial States (later the U.A.E.).
When oil was discovered in 1937, the oil companies wanted to negotiate concessions
and needed to know the extent of the territory effectively controlled by each Shaikh.
It was not clear how much hinterland was then under the control of each Shaikhdom
(see Chapter 3). Inter-Emirate boundary demarcation became essential to shape the
territory of each Emirate and to what extent the oil company could explore. Boundary
demarcation was placed in abeyance by the Second World War. However, by 1954-55,
the British had begun to demarcate the boundaries, having first obtained written
undertakings from all the individual rulers that they would accept and observe the
British decision made following Julian Walker's investigations.
We have seen how the political map of the U.A.E. reflects complicated territorial
distribution, for instance that the village of Dibba is divided into three parts:
1. Dibba al-Husn of Sharjah.
2. Dibba al-Gurfa of Fujairah.
3. Dibba al-Bayah of Oman.
Kalba and Khur Fakkan are Sharjali's enclaves on the east coast stretch into Fujairah's
territory. The villages of Manama and Masfut are Ajman's enclaves. Masafi village is
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disputed between Ras al-Khaimah and Fujairah. Wadi Madha is an Omani enclave
within U.A.E. territory. The village of Nahwa is Sharjah's enclave within Oman's
Madha enclave: an enclave within enclave. Hatta is Dubai's enclave on Oman's
border. The Musandam Peninsula is Oman's enclave and divided from Oman by
Sharjali (Dibba al-Husn), Fujairah, and Ras al-Khaimah's territories. Citizens of the
five Emirates with enclaves cannot reach certain areas belonging to their respective
Emirates without crossing the territory of one or other Emirate. To reach Hatta
(Dubai's enclave on the Omani border) from Dubai City, citizens of Dubai have to
cross the territory of Sharjali, then Welayat Mahadha of the Sultanate of Oman, then
Masfut of Ajman before finally arriving at Hatta (see Chapter 7).
Many commentators urge the removal of internal boundaries between Emirates. One
commentator said: "... the best resolution of internal frontier problems in the U.A.E. is
to have no frontiers at all.3
His Excellency Taryam Umran Al-Kaleej, editor-in-chief (second President of the
National Assembly since the federation establishment in 1971) asked the rulers to sit
together and from the map of the Emirates "... scratch off all the lines and marks, to
be one nation u(4)
However, this simple idea may not be so helpful. For, unless all the rulers were willing
to relinquish their powers and responsibilities, the geographical features of each
Emirate would overlap into the others. This would cause new problems. For instance,
were the government of the Emirate of Dubai to want to build a military base in its
enclave of Hatta, which borders the village of Masfut of Ajman and some villages of
the Sultanate of Oman, without the boundaries being marked by lines on maps and
by pillars and signboards on the ground, the project could not be carried out. Projects
can be brought into effect only where the area has a clear boundary line and it is
agreed by the other Emirates which border that area, or share the same village or
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wadi, such as Tawi al-Faqqa which is shared between the Emirate of Abu Dhabi
(Al-Am) and the Emirate of Dubai: these two Emirates have each built their own
police stations on land respectively belonging to each. Another example is Tawi
Nazwa (Nazwa water well) which is the last border point between the Emirate of
Dubai and the Emirate of Shaijah. At the head of the Nazwa mountain stands a highly
conspicuous pillar to indicate the territoiy of each Emirate. Projects can be carried
out there without dispute.
A further objection to the removal of the internal boundaries would be the frustration
of the ruler's authority. The political system of the U.A.E. relies on internal boundary
demarcation showing the extent of rule by, or dominant influence of, an individual
Emirate. To support this idea Shaikh Rashid Bin Said al-Maktum, Vice President of
the U.A.E., Prime minister, and ruler of Dubai (from 1958-1990) told a Kuwaiti
newspaper:
"A unitaly state means no borders, therefore no Rulers. It means elections, it
means putting finance, revenue and decision- making in the hands of a
central Government.... ui(s)
That was Shaikh Rashid's reaction to the historic Joint Memorandum which was
drawn up by two Assembly members and two Cabinet Ministers. The Emirate of
Dubai has in fact settled all its boundary disputes: with Abu Dhabi (inshore, 1968;
offshore, 1969), with Iran (1974) and more recently with Sharjah (1985).
Two main articles of the Memorandum stipulate stronger federal control over
individual Emirates, and that boundaries between them should be abolished.6
Shaikh Rashid, however, was accurate in identifying that full unity of the seven
Emirates, abolishing the inter-Emirate boundaries which show the limit of each
Emirate's territory, points to loss in position of the rulers. In the context of Arabian
Peninsula society, this would be hard for a ruler to accept.
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Taking the argument a stage further, problems would arise in the circumstance of
secession. Were the internal boundaries abolished and then two or three Emirates
wished to secede from the U.A.E., it is unclear how the shape of the new state would
be drawn. This kind of development would be certain to lead to conflict, precipitating
potential disaster. Something akin to this almost happened in 1978. Shaikh Rashid of
Dubai threatened to break away from the U.A.E. and to establish a separate union
between the Emirates of Dubai, Ras al-Khaimah and Umm al-QuwainP This plan
was, however, unanimously opposed by the big regional and western powers
concerned. Shaikh Rashid's plan to form a separate union was also discussed in June
1978 at a meeting with the British ambassador to the U.A.E., David Roberts, when
the Ruler asked whether the United Kingdom would recognize a breakaway union
of Dubai and the other two Emirates.:s) The British view relayed to Rashid from
Whitehall, was strongly supported by the United States, Saudi Arabia and Iran. The
U.K. urged Rashid to heal Dubai's rift with Abu Dhabi. He was advised that any move
to break up the U.A.E. could "put the whole future of Shaikhly rule in the Gulf in
doubt". 9 This rift between Dubai and Abu Dhabi was the most serious upset since
the federation was formed. In such a case, were a new union to be formed from the
U.A.E., how could the boundary of the new state be drawn, especially since there is
a large gap between the first member, Dubai and the second, Umm al-Quwain, with
the territories of the Emirates of Sharjah and Ajman between them?
It is paradoxical that at the same time as there are calls for the removal of internal
boundaries between the seven Emirates, tribalism as a characteristic of the region in
the past is becoming stronger by the day, and the status of a person or a family depends
increasingly on which tribe he belongs to. In other words, there are calls to cancel the
internal boundaries between the Emirates while there are internal boundaries
between the families and groups within individual Emirates. Instead of removing
internal boundaries, it would benefit the U.A.E. considerably were tribal preferment
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in government employment and promotion removed in favour of appointing the
person best qualified for the job.
Before the establishment of the federation, each Emirate, large or small was a
formally separate political entity with its own flag, passport and geographical
boundaries. Subsequent to federation, there is now only one passport, one flag and
one external international framework for the federation consisting of the external
international boundaries of the U.A.E.. This framework is the line of protection for
the seven individual Emirates.
The internal boundaries should be taken as a defining factor for identifying the
territories of each Emirate. The most important function of the geographical
boundaries within the U.A.E. is to specify the enclaves of each Emirate, especially
where some of these enclaves are situated in Omani territory, and conversely where
some Omani enclaves are located within the U.A.E. territory. In such cases, it would
be impossible to abolish these lines, for scratching them out would lead to many
problems, and possibly armed conflict. Claims to new territories can occur between
the Emirates, and with the neighbouring Sultanate of Oman, which shares borders
with six of the seven Emirates. 12 (see Table 7.1)
Were the federal government of the U.A.E. to abandon the internal boundaries
between the territories of the Emirates, the first thing to be considered is that this
process could lead to the disappearance of some Emirates territories and to the
expansion of other Emirates at the expense of other Emirates territories. In other
words, abolishing the internal boundaries as a measure of an Emirate's form or shape
will lead to the policy of expansion by the other Emirates and by the Sultanate of
Oman. Because the unclear boundary lines which form the shape of each Emirate
will encourage other Emirate to annex some parts of the territory of other Emirate
or may encourage Sultanate of Oman for example to annex very small villages which
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bordered its territory. The U.A.E. faces an historic choice: either the borders drawn
up by the British are accepted by the Emirates as their political boundaries, or they
totally reject them, falling back on the old tribal system recognizing no borders and
accepting no imaginary lines drawn on sand. If this second option were ever taken up,
the entire political map of the U.A.E. would have to be redrawn.
It can be concluded from the above that to resolve each boundary dispute, marking
each boundary with lines on maps along with the signatures and approval of the parties
concerned, is better than the simplistic removal of all internal boundaries.
8.2 Conclusion
Internal boundaries in the U.A.E. create administrative and developmental
difficulties. The problem is worse for the Emirates constituted of more than one unit
(all except Abu Dhabi and Umm al-Quwain). The Emirate of Sharjah probably has
more problems of government and administration than any other Emirate because
whilst the main city of Sharjah is on the west side of the Musandam Peninsula on the
Arabian Gulf, three separate enclaves, Dibba Al-Husn, Khur-Fakkan and Kalba are
located on the east coast on the Gulf of Oman. Sharjah is the one U.A.E. Emirate
which has borders with all the others, as well as with the Sultanate of Oman.
The U.A.E. federal government has played a positive and successful role in the
resolution of several boundary disputes left over from pre-federal days. Although
some cases of border disputes remain either unresolved (e.g. the internal boundary
between Ras Al-Khaimah and Fujairah), or just recently resolved (e.g. the internal
boundary between Umm Al-Quwain and Ras Al-Khaimah, which was resolved in
early 1994 and the boundary agreement signed between the two Emirates 01129 May
1994), the U.A.E. has largely successfully coped with these problems, and solutions
to many major disputes have been reached. The boundary dispute between Dubal
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and Sharjali is an example. In 1978, the boundary dispute between Abu Dhabi and
Sharjah over the Al-Gharif plain was resolved, the agreement being signed late the
same year.10
On its National Day (2 December), the United Arab Emirates celebrates the
anniversaiy of its foundation (2 December 1971) when a new page in the history of
the area was turned. The past 22 anniversaries have witnessed the gradual emergence
and development of the U.A.E.. As political perimeters with administrative, not
political, meaning, the internal boundaries within the Emirates have little significance
for the citizens who find themselves within a unified state, living in one territory,
under a single flag, of a single nationality and facing a shared future.
On the other hand the internal boundaries are of deep significance to the Rulers
(Shaikhs), some ofwhomwho imagined that if they individually stood firm theywould
get what they wanted, refusing to accept the proposal of adopting Walker's
inter-Emirate boundary demarcation.
Day by day the younger generation of the U.A.E. are understanding more fully the
meaning of the federation and warming to it. Also the youth of various parts of the
U.A.E. are participating in sports activities to a high level representing the U.A.E.
The U.A.E. University which was established in 1977 is also playing a major role in
promoting closer union between the Emirates, as the students from various parts of
the U.A.E. introduce each other in the U.A.E. University campus.
8.3 Recommendations
1. There needs to be a Federal Boundary Comniission the status of which would
be equivalent to that of the Federal Supreme Court. Funding for this Corn-
mission would be drawn from federal resources, and the Commission would
meet in federal government accommodation. The work of the Commission
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would be both reactive and pro-active: helping Emirates to resolve disputes,
and working systematically to finalise all internal and international land and
maritime boundaries.
The cost of preparing aerial photographs, field surveys, documents and
conventional maps would fall under the Commission's budget head, and the
costs of negotiations in the case of disputes should be paid by the parties
involved in the dispute. If the two parties reach a fair and final resolution after
successful negotiation, the federal government could pay the costs of a team of
observers; and by providing border patrols, especially on the border points with
Saudi Arabia and the Sultanate of Oman.
Agreement on borders is desirable in order to remove the possibility of border
disputes in the future. The same applies to issues such as land ownership,
planning permission and infrastructure. Accordingly, each Emirate should
make it a priority to clarify its boundary lines by establishing a committee with
a membership of professionals and experts such as lawyers, geographers,
surveyors and historians. The final reports would be sent to the Supreme
Council for approval. Parties to border disputes should conclude an agreement
and jointly sign it. A cartographic company should be contacted to translate onto
maps and the ground what the agreement's articles stipulate.
This latter procedure was carried out bilaterally in April 1985 between the
Emirates of Dubai and Sharjah. Furthermore, in 1983 an agreement was signed
between the rulers of Sharjah and Fujairah which resolved the boundary
problem between the two Emirates. A similar agreement was reached between
Sharjah and Ajman in 1983.
The Emirates either side of a boundary should give thought to what agreement
is likely to support both the government and the U.A.E. citizen, with loyalty
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being owed to one flag and to one president. Inter-Emirate boundaries should
not be permitted to interfere with the social, economic and infrastructural
development of the U.A.E., with highways linking together all the Emirates and
roads linking the towns. This factor has had a positive effect both in bringing
together citizens from different regions, and by helping to extend some services
to mountainous and desert regions. In other words the highways network cuts
across the inter-Emirate boundary lines, linking the east region with the west
and the north with the south.
The remaining boundary disputes within the U.A.E. should be resolved so that
the people may live peacefully within one union under one flag. Each Emirate
should recognise its boundary lines and observe its boundary agreement signed
with its neighbours for the sake of the preservation of the mother nation of each
Emirate, the United Arab Emirates. It is better to have boundaries than to be
without them, for without them there would be no peace.
Negotiation to resolve border disputes should be dealt with by younger Shaikhs
not the older Shaikhs for many reasons:
a. The younger Shaikhs are educated and are eager to embrace new ideas,
whereas the older generation Shaikhs are too rigid and narrow in their
perspective.
b. The new generation Shaikhs realize that, in order to establish services such
as schools, hospitals and parks in disputed areas, they need first to be able
to resolve boundary disputes. Local inhabitants cannot benefit from
federal projects in disputed areas.
c. The older generation Shaikhs are extremely reluctant to accept ideas or
solutions which are for the benefit of their territories' inhabitants. The
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most traditional Shaikhs are Shaikh Mohammed Al-Sharqi of Fujairah
and the present Ruler of Ras al- Khaimah, Shaikh Saqr bin Mohammed
al-Qasemi.'1
This explains why some disputes between Ras al-Khaimah and Fujairah remain
unresolved, as in the case of the dispute over Masafl village. Although Shaikh
Hamad of Fujairah is from the younger generation, Shaikh Saqr of Ras
al-Khaimah is from the old generation (he has ruled Ras al-Khaimah since 1948
to the present day).
In contrast, all the boundary disputes between the Emirates of Sharjah and
Fujairah were resolved in an agreement signed in 1983, due to the
understanding reached between the two rulers of the younger generation. They
co-operated together for the benefit of their people. The same thing can be said
about the resolution of the long-standing boundary dispute between Dubai and
Sharjah in 1985, due to the understanding of Shaikh Sultan bin Mohammed
al-Qasemi, ruler of Sharjah and Shaikh Maktum bin Rashid Al Maktum, Crown
Prince of Dubai (present Vice President of the U.A.E. and ruler of Dubai from
1990).
2. Article 9 of the Provisional Constitution of the U.A.E. should be enacted
without further delay. This stipulates:
"The Capital of the Union shall be established in an area allotted to the Union
by the Emirates ofAbu Dhabi and Dubai on the borders between them and
it shall be given the name 'Al- Karama'."14
The federal government should pay the expenses of technical studies and
planning for the construction of the capital. If the result of the study was positive
then construction work should begin as soon as possible and the provisional
headquarters of the Union in Abu Dhabi should be transferred to the new capital.
Sumrnaiy, Conclusion and Recommendations 	 351
Alongside the development of a new capital, there also needs to be a relaxation
of the expectation that members of the Federal Consultative Council will do
and say only as required by the ruler of their respective Emirates. Progress and
development can be sustained only through the creative tensions that arise from
diversity and plurality.
3. The boundaries between Emirates have traditionally represented social boun-
daries between tribal units. If the U.A.E. is to move into the future as a
federation, these social boundaries need to be weakened. For example, there
should be a special co- operation in the wedding system in the Emirates to
facilitate inter-marriage between men and women of different Emirates. This
needs support from government departments so that, for instance, a man from
the Emirate of Fujairah can more easily marry a woman from Ras al-Khaimah.
Mixed weddings may have several advantages:
a. They draw together the people of the U.A.E..
b. They support the loyalty to the federation and make the relationship
between the families of more than one Emirate with tied contact, so that
future children have relatives from two Emirates and not just one.
c. Where there is a disputed area between any two towns or villages involved
in mixed marriages, the federal government will step in to ensure that
fighting does not break out between the villagers or the tribes who live
within the territories of the two Emirates. Indeed, the good practice
among many younger Shaikhs is to marry women from other Emirates.
For example, the wife of the present ruler of Fujairah is of the ruling family
of Dubai, and the wife of the present ruler of Ajman is of the ruling family
of Abu Dhabi.
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4. By occupying much of the U.A.E's east coast, the Emirate of Fujairah is in a key
strategic location. Facing the open waters of the Gulf of Oman and the Indian
Ocean. rather than the landlocked Arabian Gulf, Fujairah is outside the
strategic bottleneck of the Straits of Hormuz. In addition, it is close to the major
international shipping routes, yet with easy access to the rest of the Arabian
Peninsula by road, by air from its recently opened international airport, or by
shipping lines from its modern port. It would not seem inappropriate, therefore,
were the U.A.E. federal government and the Gulf Co-operation Council
(G.C.C.) to research the possibility of extending the oil pipelines from the state
of Kuwait, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and the state of Qatar, along with the
pipelines from the oilfields of the U.A.E., and linking together to cross through
the territory of Fujairah to the Gulf of Oman.
What is proposed is an alternative oil and goods transport route, avoiding than
the Straits of Hormuz, through the territory of Fujairah. There is plenty of space
as its coasts extend along the Gulf of Oman for a distance of 90 ki1ometres.
This location gives the Emirate a very special strategic importance. However
this recommendation may need close co- operation from G.C.C. members and
it needs carefully researched attention.
It may be concluded that the political map of this area is unique in the political
geography of the world. Within each Shaikhdom or Emirate there are fragmented
parts of territories distributed here and there. With the partial exceptions of Abu
Dhabi and Dubai, each of the Shaikhdoms are tiny entities in area, in population and
in natural resources. Federation in 1971 caine as an appropriate method for resolving
this situation, despite some negativism regarding the boundaries which the U.A.E.
inherited from a history dating back to 1820. The preservation of the internal
boundaries of the U.A.E. is unavoidable as they serve the unity and political stability
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of the U.A.E. as a country because these internal boundaries give each Emirate their
official identifying geographical shape, and with the Sultanate of Oman (we have seen
that the territories of the Sultanate of Oman take the form of pockets in the midst of
the U.A.E. Also we have seen that Omani territory lies between Khur Fakkan of
Sharjah and Fujairah (Wadi Madha), while Omani boundary lines intersect with those
of Abu Dhabi at Al-Am and Buraimi, with Sharjah and Fujairah at Dibba, and with
Ajman and Dubai at Masfut and Hatta).
When boundary lines of each Emirate are undisputed with other Emirates it means
that the political stability of the U.A.E. as a country is preserved and if any boundary
dispute should occur between any two Emirates due to unagreed settlement, this kind
of conflict is a source of trouble which might lead to the disintegration of the union.
The federal government should play an active role in solving any border dispute which
could occur at any time.
These positive steps may effectively contribute to the strengthening of the federal
structure, and make boundary disputes between the members of the Union a thing
of the past.
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Appendix A
English Version of 21 August 1974 Agreement between the United
Arab Emirates and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
His Excellency Brother Zayed Bin Sultan Al-Nhayyan President
of the United Arab Emirates. Date 3 Shaban 1394 H
(corresponding to 21 August 1974).
Your Royal Highness,
I am pleased to refer to chapter three of article five of the boundary agreement signed
between the two states on the 3rd of Shaban 1394 H (corresponding to the 21st of
August 1974).
I would also like to point out to your excellency that the understanding of the Kingdom
of Saudi Arabia regarding the mutual sovereignty over the whole area which links,
according to this agreement, the coastal waters of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia with
the international waters does not include the potent natural resources which lay
underneath the water surface and the seabed. Such resources shall remain under the
ownership of the United Arab Emirates alone and be excluded from the mutual
sovereignty.
Thus, if the understanding of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia regarding this issue
matches that of the United Arab Emirates, I recommend that this letter, together with
your excellency's response to it, be considered an agreement to determine that issue,
and be annexed to the above mentioned agreement.
please accept my best, truthful and respected regards,
Faisal bin Abdul-Aziz Al-Saud
King of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.
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His Majesty King Faisal Bin Abdul-Aziz Al-Saud, King of the
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Date 3 Shaban 1394 H,
(corresponding to 21 August 1974)
I am pleased to refer to your Majesty's letter dated the 3rd. of Shaban 1394 H
(corresponding to the 21st of August 1974) which reads as follows: "Your excellency
Shaikh Zayed Bin Sultan Al-Nhayyan, President of the United Arab Emirates,
Your excellency,
I am pleased to refer to chapter 3 of article 5 of the boundary agreement signed
between the two states on the 3rd. of Shaban 1394 H (corresponding to the 21st of
August 1974). I would also like to point out to your excellency that the understanding
of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia regarding the mutual sovereignty over the whole area
which links according to this agreement the coastal waters of the Kingdom of Saudi
Arabia and the international waters does not include the potent natural resources
which lay underneath the water surface and sea-bed.
Such resources shall remain under the ownership of the United Arab Emirates alone
and be excluded from the mutual sovereignty. Thus, if the understanding of the
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia regarding this issue matches that of the United Arab
Emirates, I recommend that this letter, together with your excellency's response, be
considered an agreement to determine that issue, and be annexed to the above
mentioned agreement".
I am pleased to inform your Majesty that the understanding of the United Arab
Emirates regarding the right of ownership of the natural resources mentioned in your
Majesty's letter matches that of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.
Please accept my best, truthful and respected regards.
Zayed Bin Sultan Al-Nhayyan
President of United Arab Emirates
His Majesty King Faisal Bin Abdul-Aziz Al-Saud, King of the Kingdom of Saudi
Arabia, and His Excellency Shaikh Zayed Bin Sultan Al-Nhayyan, President of the
United Arab Emirates , in accordance with the principles of the Islamic tolerant law
which is followed by the Islamic nation, and proceeding from the spirit of Islamic
solidarity which overshadows the Arab Peninsula, and on the basis of the peoples and
the established relations of neighbourhood between the two states, and urged by the
wish of the governments of the two states to determine the land and sea borders
between them once and for all under the auspicious of Islamic and Arabic brother-
hood, the two parties agree on the following:
Article 1:
The land borders between the state of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the United
Arab Emirates shall be the line which will be determined in accordance with the items
of this agreement.
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Article 2:
1. The land borders between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the state of the
United Arab Emirates shall start from point A on the coast of the Arabian Gulf,
situated on the Latitude line 24° 14' 58" North, and on the longitude line 51° 35'
26" East.
2. The land borders shall extend from point A in a straight line to point B which
lies on the latitude line 24° 07' 24" North, and on the longitude line 51° 35' 26"
East.
3. The land borders shall extend from point B in a straight North-East line until
point C which lies on the latitude line 22° 56' 09" North, and on the longitude
line 52° 34' 52" East.
4. The land borders shall extend from point C in a straight Northern-Eastern line
until point D which lies on the latitude line 22° 37' 41" North, and on the
longitude line 55° 08' 11" East.
5. The land borders shall extend from point D in a straight Northern-Eastern line,
leaving Umm Al-Zumul east of point E which lies on the latitude line 22° 42'
02" North, and on the longitude line 55° 12' 10" East.
6. The land borders shall extend from point E in a straight line that reaches the
following points which geographically lie on:
Point Latitude line-North Longitude line-east
F	 23° 32' 11"	 55° 30' 00"
G	 24° 00' 00"	 55° 34' 10"
H	 24° 01' 00"	 55° 51' 00"
I	 24° 13' 00"	 55° 54' 00"
J	 24° 11' 50"	 55° 50' 00"
7. The land borders shall extend from point J to point K which geographically lies
approximately on the latitude line 24° 13' 45" North and on the longitude line
55° 45' East.
8. The land borders shall extend from point K to point Lwhich geographically lies
approximately on latitude line 24° 19' North on the latitude line 55°50' East.
9. The land borders shall extend from point L to the meeting point of the borders
between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and the
Sultanate of Oman, which will be agreed upon between the three states.
All the above-mentioned points are initially posted on a 1:500,000 map, attached to
this agreement and signed by the two contracting parties of dignitaries.
Article 3:
1. Hydro-Carbonic material located in Al-Shayba-Zararah field shall be owned by
the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.
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2. The United Arab Emirates shall agree and observe its obligation of not to carry
out any search, drill for, invest or to profit from the Hydro-Carbonic material,
or give permission to do so, in the part of Shayba-Zararah field which lies north
of the border line.
3. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, or any company or establishment working under
its name, shall be authorised to carry out search and drilling operations and
invest and profit from the Hydro-Carbonate material in that part of Al-Shayba-
Zararah field which lies north of the border line. Any agreement regarding the
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia's carrying out of such operations shall be agreed upon
at a later time.
Article 4:
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates shall observe their
obligation of stopping any drilling and investing or granting permission to do so the
hydro-carbonate material in that part of their regions in which the hydro-carbonate
field primarily extends inside the region of the other state.
Article 5:
The United Arab Emirates shall recognise the sovereignty of the Kingdom of
Saudi Arabia over Huwaisat island, and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia shall
recognise the sovereignty of the United Arab Emirates over all islands which
lie opposite to its coasts on the Arabian Gulf.
2. The United Arab Emirates shall agree to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia's
establishment of any general purpose installations wished by the Kingdom on
the islands of Qafay and Makasib.
3. Representatives of the two contracting parties shall determine, in the shortest
time possible, the Sea borders between the region of the Kingdom of Saudi
Arabia and that of the United Arab Emirates, and between the islands that are
under the sovereignty of each state on just basis which secures a free and direct
link between the regional waters that belongs to that part of the region of the
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia which lies adjacent to the region of the United Arab
Emirates and the regional waters which belongs to Huwaisat island mentioned
in the above paragraph, in a way that secures the possibility of navigation
between the deep international waters and that part of the region of the
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia mentioned above.
Each contracting party shall have the mutual sovereignty over the whole area which
links - according to this chapter - between the regional water which belongs to the
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the international waters.
Article 6:
A specialised international company, selected by the two states, shall assume the
responsibility of surveying and determining the locations of the points and the border
lines on the ground as explicated in article two above, and shall prepare a map,
showing the land borders between the two countries and the date which accompany
such a map, which will become, after being signed by the two contracting parties of
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dignitaries, the official map that shows the required borders and shall be attached to
this agreement.
Article 7:
A joint technical committee, consisting of 3 members from each state, shall be
organised in order to prepare the specification for the required tasks of the company
mentioned above and to post the points and border lines between the two countries
in accordance with the items of this agreement and to supervise the execution of the
these tasks and to study its results.
Article 8:
Each state shall keep a copy of the two produced copies of this agreement.
Article 9:
This agreement shall become effective at the time of signing it.
Article 10:
This agreement is written in Jeddah in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in the 3rd of
Shaban 1394 H, corresponding to the 21st of August 1974.
First Party
Zayed Bin Sultan A1-Nahayyan,
President of the United Arab Emirates.
Second Party
King Faisal Bin Abdul-Aziz Al-Saud,
King of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.
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Appendix B
Arabic Version of 21 August 1974 Agreement between the United Arab
Emirates and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
J L_ J-L_	 JI	 -
I L 'J I	
L)
j JL>JI	 W,. iJ	 UI ,. (	 )
• gj ::t. O y	, 	 r i	 r	 ..
;__JI	 JI;LU
	 iI4jJlqjIç,j	 )jI,
JI LJL	 1JI	 JI L.JI	 A)I	 1L6	 J,0JI
L9- > tLIii	 ;,i.	 ;J!	 JI-5L'I
-.JIt.ThiJ	 )LJI U	 ('_•
jUt L
	
I	 JI	 t	 JI
L4?iI./L.JIU'iL
3 L4Q!, LL ), 1 JY? ,_JI?-L
•	
.••) 1& ¶•
I	 I;	 - I I	 • • -I	 V t	 ¶	 tJ
AppendbB	 373
)TId -3-s Cr U' LJ . )J	 L3
I	 I	 I
6
-Jit	 JtA4>4 i_jJI UI ,. r)	
—
LJ!_r	 ü1-.-.1	 -
	
:r— ;Lit di çJ	 )i--	
-'	
j__jI
r' j ' ' 1k	 1UJIJ.,	 JiI LJt -'JL
	
'L.tJJ. ;i
	 jIa--j
_____J,.J	 444	 )LJt LL	 -JI	 JI	 UU•.	 J1JI
	
31iI	 '^j	 Jc)
L;;34
	
•	
-3	 ' Y t	 I JJ 1_
I dL4	 J 1J I	 j.i
J UJI	 L,	 J'	
c,
	
"	 p	 Jt	 (I
• 1 J i_	 J.
ii	
-L
	
r
JI	 JL'fl	
r '
	 L7	 .
AppendixB	 374
i,-___	 I L :r J—z L.0 lJ )LJ	 I
i_J I .:IL
-	
jT i 1	
•'	 •__ I;	 II _..J -- L ;a-,
;JJIJI.3L-1lLJ,.
t1) ' I5	 .4;J L\A1,
LLiI,4t,4 L4 ;,.JI	 J)L'II
L._4. 4	 ;..; W	 j I __;	 e
L4 i L4 l 	 Jt	 Jj
I 1_:-' I
	
;. N.. ''	 ji;
*	 I	
' 
I. L.J I	 LJI	 I	 I
Li	 LiI
p4!.,	 ZLJt J.fl,.... J.L	 JI LpJI
J	 ; ,
t	 I;LI
h .kiJ1	 ; i.4J	 I	 , t. '	 , '	 I	 I	 LJ I	 I ..	 i I
$	 ;,;:iI	 iJI J.-L_.
0	 /	 4,
' L.	 '1 t	 t	 'A	 _.J 1.
r a	 J,.JJ
C r)k & . - -
0	 4,
•	 T t
	 I £.
Ti	 JJLI
• ,•
AppendfrB	 375
1,i	 (-')	 ç'.P	 rL-—'1I	 •..L
	L. 	 "1	 a	
.	
I
•T	
-t	 oT
1
cp	 /	 6
	
' L_.	 i 'r	 r y
A	 ti	 J,iiLL
iLLJI .,/
	 '-r'	 JLJL,fl	 ;;2t..L& L1	 -
I 
V	
Jtt4)&sZJI (.i)
0
I	 I	 t I
	 •	 I
	
. a	 I
4	 ()Uj	 j,pJI -
— !7	 L1	 L_. — 1JDJ......J $ ..k-	 i
	a 	 /	 0
..	 r.	 •.	 TI	 fl
..	 -t	 .	 It	 ••	
••
	
It	 t
..	 et	 •.	 rt	 r	 •-
••	 a.	 IL	 H	 a
0	 /
£	 1	 tb	 I	 (J) ..6Z )
	
.Jl -- (Cc)	 L3
1%	 (J)	 Jl	 i,.°..	 i.,
j	 •i I	 JI • ( J) j• j.
	
$	 j )J %	 •
, t._ 'Ii ;J,	 .1,..._J$	 I	
-t, ••'	 ;.k; Li11	 J I .c..3 (J)
	
•	 i t J i I	 Li ji 'I I	 . J I,	 .	 I
— .	 $	 I_p. *J1$..; .L4	 d	 iJ	 t&J I
	• 	 _rsL_.ut	 .AJ$	 UI'1 I 41 •f
i W t ;..U1
LU	
. ç j,j —	 I) Jl4 LI	 L4i	 Jt
• 1..
AppendLB- ____________________________________
376
JJl fr,L	 LiJ!	 ;t	 itLI i ji
&Lr-'
JI1JJ/	
'jls. L4Jl,)L_Iy¼14j
• .i, ._..J I -i- J L	 5 ii (d,	 J I)
J..ih;	 ,i z	 i	 d.AJ I
I)	 I!iJ	 ii	 I	 __	 I
I .I:i	 U1 %J -
	 3	 .L	 L ,,	 a...J 1	 J L.	 CE 1
L J) -JI ;;j.J
;L.JI
II.iJI	 j..sJI)L'JI	 JI J.AJI ZLJI ,.
-	
-siiIt	 ii.	 JIiJi
,_'IJjI 4I J	 IJJI	 L4JIJI j7j.
;._.i;.ji ;.L.JI
L.-	 )' ;	 I	 I 2^5J I ;., L :J	 L. ' Jj .I
.aJ Z.,aJ I .	 I	 L.	 .	 I	 I z1J I
I	 I	 t.4L Li	 LUJ	 - 'j I
Ll I	 I	 I	 J I a --.	 J I	 L •'iI	 ,
LIL4.
,11i;	 u.J I	
.., ) i	 I	 .LJ I	 I Lt.,
4J I	 I .	 I	 I	 I	
r	 I L.l I
I	 I	 'i I • Lii ji	 jl I 3 I i&J	 LI ,i il J L.a.
t	 -iIJ	 L.1
I	 I	 Lii	 I	 I	 1.iJ r'	 :;i-UI	 QjI .JI 4I
AppendirB	 377
-__!"%aL.JIr...	 Jo.ik	 t_	 3jH J.JI;..,L..JI
. L_.J I ; . U
4L	 M4 çIJiJI LLJ
j....L	 L.	 2.Jt	 .S-	 j	 I	 u1bI ;LJI	 j,JI
LJI
• L 4J JS	 ..s L ' t a .L,	 jJ	 , . 11	 J
.L_____1I;j.Jl
1JJ	 J	 '
,	 T,JI
__ tJ ; U I
J)	pAJI 
—'JiL
;UI
.1	 fL	 J_i•AaJ% ;.LIJ 4I
.., -__JtLJI
i;,,	 Jt	 _J( ;L1- a. J	 r
•;	 -I	 V t r
	
I,	
-	
1,_i I •
J_,_._•	 I	 j—	 JT , I
I	 I ____ I	 -	 I	 I - , L ' I	 •
AppendLB	 378
Appendix C
F0371/114648
Trucial Shaikhs' undertakings to accept the Arbitration of the
Political Agent dated 4 January 1955.
1.15
P.PPENDIX I
Truciol Shajkhs' undertakings to accept
the Arbitration of' the Political Agent
(a.) Rae al ithaimah
9th Jarnad al Awal - 14th January 1955 - from the
Ruler of Rao c]. Khaimah to the Political Agent, Dubai:
'After compliments,
I have received your esteemed letter regarding
boundaries, and I have the pleasure to inform you
that I agree to the arbitration between us, the
l0o755	 Ruler of Sharjah and the Ruler of Umm al aiwain.
I will accept your decision in this and I highly
appreciate your efforts which are in the interest
of all.
S!.QR BIN MOHAMMED
Signed and sealed"
(2) Umm al Qawain
"I undertake on behalf' of myself' and all my
successors as Rulers that I and they will not
dispute any boundaries on the coast which the
Political Agent for the Trucial States may lay
1087/55
	
down as those of the Stae of Urnm al Qawain.
Dated ,thjs Thursday the 13th of January 1955
correspon,ding to lftbh Jamacl al Awal 13714 H
3igned: AHMED DIN R.SHID AL MUtJLA"
(3) Ajman
"I undertake on behalf' of myself and all my
successors as Rulers that I and they will not
dispute any boundary lines which the Political
1087/55	 Agent for the Trucial States may lay down as those
of the Stnte of Ajman
Dated this day Monday the 10th January 1955,
corresponding to the 15th Jamad al Awal 13714 H
Signed RPSHID BIN HUUi'JD
Ruler of' Ajman"
(14) Sharjah
(a)	 "I, Saqr bin Sultan al Qasimi, Ruler of Sharjah
and its dependencies undertake on behalf of myself
and my successors that we will not dispute any
boundaries which the Political Agent for the
Trucial States may lay down in the coastal area,
exceptin Fujairah which we consider as part of
Sharjah State
Dated on the night of Monday 15th Jamad al
Awal 13714 H"
/ (b)
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(b) "C. M. Pine Gordon, Esq.,
Political Agent, Trucia]. States,
Dub a i.
After conliments,
With much pleasure I received your letter of
lO87/5L.	 8th November 195L1. enclosing a note about boundary
arbitration between us and other Shaikhdoms.
I agree to your arbitration on the boundary
between us and the Government of Ras a]. Khaimah.
Usual ending,
SAQR BIN SULTAN
Ruler of Sharjah and its
dependencies"
Cc) "In accordance with the current conversations
between us concerning the frontiers in dispute
between us and the Ruler of Dubai, and your
request for authority to settle the matter as you
see fit, we are sorry that as yet we have reached
0253/12/52	 no solution of the matter of the frontiers
Therefore we did authorise Her Majesty's Government
to settle the matter
Signed: SAQR BIN SULTAN
Dated 5 7. 1371'
(5) Dubai
(a) Translation of letter dated 18th March 1955 from
the Ruler of Dubai to the Political Agent, Dubai:
"After compliments,
I, on behalf of myself and my successors, as
Rulers of Duhai, undertake that we shall not object
to any decision which you decide in the matter of
frontiers between us and the Shaikhdom of Sharjah
on the coastal side
Sealed: SAID BIN MPJPUM"
(b) Translation of a letter dated the 10th Renadan
1367 corresponding to the 17th July, 19L18, from Shailth
Said bin Maktum, 0.B.E ,
 Ruler of Dubai, to C. J. Pelly,
0.B.E., Political Agent, Bahrain:
'After conliments,
With regard to H.M.G.'s sugestion that I. should
signify my agreement to their arbitration to
0256/7/LL3	 delineate my boundary with Thu Dhabi, I write to
inform you that I agree to H.M.G.. 'a suggestion as
I know that they will administer Justice and, equity,
I bind myself and my successors to accept their
award in this arbitration which should be carried out
by you, the Political Officer, Trucial Coast and His
ExcelJ.ency the Political Resident.
Usual en(9in"
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Appendix D
F0371/126932
Document showing British Aid for the Trucial Coast Shaikhdoms.
\ BRITISEI AiD FOR TRUCIAL 62
\ —' - .COAST 0F OMAN
•
MARKET GARDENS AND SCHOOLS
From Our Special Correspondent
This urg iclo wets ierittrn tIsv'i,i' recent tisit so the ursa.
Forming purl of Arabia's south
eastern approaches is a territory knowi
collectively as the Trucial Coast 0
Oman. It stretches front the base 0
he Qatar pcnutsttla casiwards along h
heel of the Persian Gulf as far as Rb
ci Khaimah and across to the Gulf 0
0mm and the Arabian Sea through
corridor over the rugged sheer nioun
hues sometimes known .us the Wruicri
Hujar. Inland, the borders with Sand
Arabia sweep westward from th,
Burainti Oasis to he juncture of Qata
and Saudi Arabia.
Thu name Trucial Co.iut is a weslerr
innovation dating back to the late nine
teenhlt century when the British Govern'
cheat made treaties with the rulers 01
the various atatea along that coast lute,
Under those treaties, which tull operate,
the British Government undertook Ic
protect the states and hqndle all matters
..	 iauC"	 ,.
ARAOtA "..	 /
relating to their foreign allaire, leaving
the rulers with absolute internal control.
but bound to prevent piracy and the
slave trade and to abstain from hostile
acts at sea.
To-day the Trucial coast is made up
of seven states, D j bai, Aba Dhabi,
Sharjah and Kelba, Uisvm al Quwain,
Ajman. Ras al Khaiinah, anti Fuijairah.
All are very jealous of their indepen-
dence. and border disputes ire constant.
At least three limes a year the rulers
meet tn what is known as the 'I ruicial
Council. At present these meetings are
very informal and indecisive, but it is
hoped that from them will emerge one
day the federatioo of the Trucial Coast
states.
Except for exireune eastern parts at
Ras at Khaimah. the territory is (or the
most part desolate, arid, and flat.
Moving sand dunes are contnton in the
interior, while the coast line is m.sde
into a maze of treacherous swamps by
innumerable creeks which meander far
inland with the high tides. Road travel
ii. any part of this territory is hazardous.
and is undertaken only by the sturdiest
of tour-wheel drive vehicles
Economically the area is poor. l.iti
us a perpetual struggle for euistencc, and
here is much uundernourishitwnt. In
Dibai. the largest and by comparison
the most tlourishiitg of the settlentuinis of
the Trucial Coast. an average of only II)
sheep are slaughtered daily for sale. The
town has an cstvnatcd population of
30.000. The people live matnly on nec,
lish. and dales. Salty brackish water is
drunk from open wells and outbreaks of
epidemics of such diseases aa sntaltpoc
are not uncommon.
LITTLE EMPLOYMENT
Apart from a little fishing, boat build-
ing, aitd seasonal date harvesting, there is
no occupation in this area to provide
employment. With news of wealth and
work farther north in the Gulf. the
Omanis of the Trucial Coast began to
leave their homes in search of their for.
tuneS. Now about half of the territory's
estiuttated 80,000 people are belicveui to
have left for such places as Qatar,
tiabrein, and Kuwait. In one respect this
is a good thing, for the men abroad line
cheaply and send money to their families
at home. On the other hand, this mass
ntigruueiumn. which one hopes is outly
icitiporary, has cracked the whole
siructlire of the Beduiut mode of life.
The coasi.ul tsiwits are gradually
becoutuing tttore crowded, dirtier, and
more disease ridden, while the healthier
open spaces of the desert inland are being
ubandoerd.
At Dibai cit aged, ragged boatman,
reflecting on his country's plight, lifted
his facc skyward and with a sigh Said:
"Allah is generous: one day they will
find oil and we shall all be rich." One
wonders whether this old man's hope,
which is shared by almost all the
Onianis of this coasi, will ever conic
irur. For several years now ihe search
• I for omi has gone on. One dry wcll after
another haj been abandoned. A bore
• is being drilled near Abu Ohabi, and in
• Sharjah ii seisntic survey is being done.
Land cuncesaioits for oil prospecting
have been acquired front all the rulers.
Several oil-shore coitcessiorts have also
beeit acquired and preparations are
being made to drill in the waters around
Des shied. In return the rulers are
receiving ye.iuly concession fees—not
exorbitant by Persian Gulf standards—
and in the meantime the people simply
Wait.
In xii .ultentpl to infuse a more progres-
sive and active spirit md generally to
impiavo conduiions. the British Govern-
nicnt have vttruaducesl a Trucial Coast
Duuvotopntettt Plan. Origin.ihly devised
as a llvc.ynar prolect, ii was estimated to
cost £500,000. The territory, being
neither a coloity nor a protecioraie4
conies uitder the Foreigti 010cc. Because
of this the circiuttstanceu of he scheitie
are Unique.
AGRICULTURAL SCHEME
Perhaps the Oust courageuus feature
of the plan is 1hz pilot agricultural
schcitue at Ras ii Kttaiittali. There, at
he (unit of the itiasuivr range of ntoun.
tains that run along the sututhern cOast
of Arabia, an attempt is being miiadc to
prove hit the red sail washed down
irons Itte ni,amuntains is arabic. The water
level is omtty about 2$ft. down and the
proving plots are now producing vege-
tables of a remarkably high grade.
Interest in the scheme is keen, and praise
for the products is generous. Response.
however, has so far been poor. Only
one farmer has come to the plain to Join
lie young Engtishntan in charge of the
schetime. The nest st:p is the selling
up of an .igricuttural 'training school.
A piiiilaiy school haS been built in
Sharjah and it is intended to build a
tcchutivat s,'himol them to serve hr whole
territory, as well as a further eight pi'i-
mary schools elsewhere. Dispensers
are buiuig lraiitnd to serve in clinics.
Two diupens.tries have already becti set
Lip. one in Ilarainti. atid one at Ras al
Khaimti.uh and three musrc are to be
opened Muon.
A considerable aniount of money has
also been spent on the Barainii Oasis.
front which Saudi Arabian forces were
ousted about 18 months ago. When it
was reoccupied it was found that lie
water ch.uitnels, known as Eu/nj.
which cummutect vitliugcs and gardens to
the unumun spring . Iiciids, otten several
ttiitcs .uw,iy, had been neglected. The
sh,ummuiels hive now been repaired and
the provision of uv,iler pvntps is being
Co it sub r cut.
SVFRY SURVIVI!S
Idurainti. mo5t 01 which talt within
the territory ol lie ruler of Aba I)h.ibl,
is to-day quiet and peaceful.	 'I lie
mucaic,t .iuudi turccs jun several hun-
dred ivies away. .iiud with the rentoval
of Saudi influence the stave trade mule
through Buraiuiti has fallen into disuse,
Slavery, as distinct from the slave
trade, i5 still known in the Trucial Coast
status. 'fhe right of manumission of
slaves is still exercised by the British
Political Agent, after a slave is seen
clutchntg the Union Jack flag pole and
alter he sIr she has stated a reasonable
canse for manumission. Usually the
grievance is ill treatment or a threat of
sale by the master. Alter manunisssion
the slave invariabty returns to the
master's house.
To protect the frontiers of this remote
territory front any further intrusion, the
rruciih Coast Scouts, who played a
proilntuemtt part in the Buraimi operativn.
ire bniuug maiitt;uiiiud. The force to.day
is of battalion strengih and is made tip
at voluinteers, niaiuuly Beduin, front iii
lie seven states. 'the contmandiutg
ntflcer us I.iuuuienant .Cobonel Erie F.
Iohaon. 0.8.0., f.t.C. All his 22 otltcers
ire Uriiush, secosided to the force froiti
he British Aritty. it is controlled autsi
said for by the Britush Governmenl, but
las the (mill suupport of the rulers, mild,
udging by the eagerness of the volvo-
eers, the ntatuurtty of the people as well.
The reittoteutess of the Trucial Co.ust
its not insulated it front Middle East
ttulicics. Cairo radio propaganda is
isheneut to, but ettthusiasm is weak,
hese people are iruue friends who look
uw,uruls Brut.itn sir help, guuidjnce, and
liujtectucuit.
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Appendix El
FO 371/98365
Letter from Petroleum Development (Trucial Coast) Ltd. to the
Foreign Office, London dated 18 July 1952 shows the factor behind
boundary demarcation in the Trucial States as the discovery of oil.
on.
merMaid. I	 BCNTLZr. SLcaae P14MM..
—	 f1'fl?t
PETROLEUM DEVELQPMENT (Trucial Coast) LTD.
T14.MMMMIMI TELEX	 214 OXFORD STREETIi.d.ao PETRIRAQ.	 LONDON
On14M. PETRIRAQ. LONDON	 LONDON. W.I
No.6099	 18th July, 1952.
The Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs,
	 ________________
Foreign Office,
S.W.l.	
LE Lo%)j
Sir,
Trucial Coast Boundaries
We have the honour to say that in November 1951 we asked
that, if possible, a limited demarcation of the boundaries between
the Shaikhdoms o Sharjah — A.jman — 1.1mm al Quwain for a distance
inland of 25-30 kms. from the coast should be undertaken. We should
be glad to know rhetlier it has yet been possible to define any of
those inter-Shaikhdom boundaries.
This Company intends to carry out further geophysical
operations in the near future probably in the territory parallel to
the mountains running North and South approximately through Jabal
Faiyah.	 It appears, therefore, desirable that the inter-shaikhdoin
boundaries should be defined inland from the coast for a distance
greater . than the 25-30 ions, originally envisaged and we would now
suggest that a demarcation should, if possible, beV carried further
inland to, say, the approximate dividing line between Oman and the
Trucial Coast Shaikhdoms. It should, also, embrace the boundaries
between Ras-al-Ihaimah and 1.1mm al Quwain and Sharjah and Dubai.
We may, later, find it necessary to ask that the Dubai-Abu Dhabi
boundary be carried further beyond Al Ashush.
In submitting this request, this Company realises the
difficulties inherent in boundary delimitation on the scale a8ked
for but feels that it may be preferable to attempt to define the inter-
state limits at this stage rather than to have to do o later at a time
when we might have selected, as a result of our forthcoming operations,
a drilling site in territory the ownership of which would then be
undetermined.
/contd........2
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Appendix E2
FO 1016/195
Letter from D.N. Lane, British Residency Bahrain dated 25 July 1952
to the Eastern Arabian Department Foreign Office, shows the main
reason behind boundaries demarcation in the Trucial States,
the discovery of oil.
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FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.
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Sarell, in his letter to Sir Rupert Hay,/c//	 No. HA 1089/2 of the 12th Deáember, indicated that,unless major difficulties arose, we did not wish the
details of the definition of the boundaries between
the Trucial Shaikhdoms to be referred to us.
	
The
oil company, however, have asked us if it has yet
been possible to define any of these boundaries, and
we should therefore be grateful if you could let us
have some information on what progress has so far
been made.
2.	 The Company also tell us that they intend to carry
out further operations in the near future, probably in
the territory parallel to the mountains running north
to south, approximately through Jebel Faiyah.	 They
have suggested that the boundaries should be defined
inland from the coast for a distance greater than the
25..3O kilometres originally envisaged - in. fact, as
far as "the approximate dividing line between Oman
and the Trucial Coast Shaikhdoms". 	 They also want
the Ras al Khaimah - Unon a]. Qaiwain and. Sharjah-Dubai
boundaries demarcated, and say they may later ask
for the Dubai-Abu Dhabi boundary to be carried beyond
a]. Ashush.
3.	 The first of these suggestions, at least in the
extreme form proposed, would seem quite out of the
question at the moment, and there may also be
objections to the others.
	 But on the whole we are
inclined to agree with the Company that it is better
to define boundaries at this stage than to wait until
drilling sites have been Oelected in territory which
may be disputed..	 We should therefore be grateful
if you could also let us have your views on their
latest suggestions.
-
CD. N. Lane)
C.M. Pine-Cordon, Esg .., O.B.E.,
brain.
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Appendix F
F0371/1016
Letter from Shaikh Said bin Maktum, Ruler of Dubai to Mr B.D,
Stobbart, Political Officer in Trucial Oman dated 12 January 1949
(Arabic).
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Appendix G
F0371/1016
Letter from John Wilton, Political Agent, Trucial States dated 30
March 1952 to the British Residency, Bahrian.
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O26/1l/.	 -, .,P.1itical Agency
'crucial States,
152.
Please refer t. mt letter O26//S2
if 12th March.
	
2.	 I have arrarige with Heniers.n if
Petr.leum Devel.pnient(Trucial C.ast). ti g.
•ut next Thursday, April 3rá, t. put c.ncrete
plintha at the starting psint if the Duai
Alu Dhai .unáary in the .c.ast at Hasian, an
at the punt where the .unayy cr.sses the
c.astal ria. The •ther punts are wells,
which cann.t .ve
 far, an wiu1 nit mive
at all with.ut the haikh affectel drawing
.ur attenti.n t. the matter, arii it is laii
ó.wn which sue .1 them the biunlary runs,
si they sh.u]A create nu prullem In future.
"
'-L4-C.	 ( A.J. Wiltun )
C.M. Le Quesne Es .,
British Residency,
Bahrain.
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Appendix H
F0371/157030
Boundary agreement between Shaikh Rashid bin Said AI-Maktum,
Ruler of Dubai and Sultain Said bin Taimur in May 1959
on Hatta enclave bordering Oman (English version).
Reference: -
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In the Name of Allah the compissibiatthe Mrc1fUl
The Sultan Said bin Tainrnr, Sultan of Muscat and Oman, and
Shaikh Rashid bin Said bin Maktuin al Falasi, Ruler of Dubai and its
dependencies have agreed over the frontiers of the Sultanate tri'Ues
(and they are Bani Kaab and Washahat) and the State of Dubai as follows
according to the maps that Mr. Julian Walker has drawn:
The line starts from Jebal Umm Nasin' and goes north east by
the watershed between the Wadis which flow south towards Wadi Sa'aban
Shia, Wadi al Qahf I and al Fai (Al Paj) which belong to the Bani Kaab;
and the Wadis which flow north to Hatta and Qima and. belong to the ±
Biduwat of Hajarain and Dubai, to Alam Hasat al Qara which divides the
territory of the Bani Kaab from that of Dubai.
Prom Alam Hasat al Qara the line goes to
	 Quun al Afar
and Jebal Bidi al Jimh which is the dividing point between the Bani
Kaab, and. the Biduwat of Hajarain and th Washahat. From Jebal
Bidi al Jimh the line goes between Mushabba and Si.thaila and thence
due north to the centre of the chain of mountains which lies between
the Wadi Hatta and the Wadi Qor leaving Suhalla Sagha and. Sarakh
to Dubai and Mushabba to the Washahat.
Signed: Said. bin Taimur 	 Signed; Rashid bin Said
xa
	 bin Maktum
L1.th DhuJ. Qâd.a 1378
	 10th Dhul Qada
1378
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F0371/157030
Boundary agreement between Shaikh Rashid bin Said Al-Maktum,
Ruler of Dubai and Sultain Said bin Taimur in May 1959
on Hatta enclave bordering Oman (Arabic version).
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Appendix J
FO 371/126932
Letter from Shaikh Saqr bin Sultan, Ruler of Sharjah to the Political
Agent, Trucial States, Dubai dated 2 November 1956, claiming Wadi
Madha as belonging to the Qawasim.
/	 S1IRTE
Noveiber 2, 1956
The PoliticaJ. Agent, Trucial Stotes,
Dubai.
After complinents,
You will recall tbat I racntioned to you, before I left on my
journey to the Middle East, my concern at the state of affairs in
the Wadi ad.ha, where the Museatis have usurped my rights by force
of arms.
I shall be obliged if you will inform His Excellency the
Political Resident that I sin distressed to find on my return no•
amelioration in the situation there. The fact that I have not so far
attempted to recover my rights there springs only from my desire
always to follow the advice which His Excellency gives me, and I
main confident that the absence of any iiiipruvenent in the situation
in the Wadi Mad.ha since my departure does not mean that Her
Majesty's Government had decided to lot my case go by default.
As is well known to Her Maj ist," s Govrnuent the Wadi was in
possession of the Qawasism durLn thc n.Lneteentli century and, was
only occupied by the Shihuh in cuntravention of the Sultan' a orders.'
You will recall that v/hen neotiations over the Vladi broke down
in l9t2 (Arabic year 1362) thc question was left pending, it being
agreed that neither Uuset, tiu Qawasim nor the Shihtth should
control the arcs durina the inturi.. 	 Ivi', iuscat broke this
agreement Oucl started to collect Zakat rmic1 when the inhabitants
of the Wadi opposed. this, uo1 force to	 press themi, The jimore
recent history of Mu5eat t a arLitaty anti uailatcial actions in the
Wadi are wcll knovin tu 11cr iIctj cty' Guiamcnt,
How, I ask Her hiejesty' s Govermmiont to secure without delay a
just, fair and peaceful aettic.mant of this dispute, and I as
ready to submit to Her biaj caty' a Govcivaent evidence which proves
my rights to the Wadi. I look for a favourable re.ly from His
Excellency the Political Resident, so thiit justice aiay be done
and my rights restored..
Usual Ending.
(Shaikh Saijr bin Sultan)
Ruler of Sharjah,
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FO 371/126932
Letter from Said bin Taimur, Sultan of Oman to Major F.C.L.
Chauncy, O.B.E., Her Britannic Majesty's Consul-General, Muscat
claiming Wadi Madha as Oman's territory.
35
THE PALACE, MUSCAT
PIDE1'iTIAL	 Decenber 20, 1956
My dear Friend,
Please refer to your letter Ho. 511L/58 dated the
15 th December 1956.
In reply to your above-mentioned letter we wish to
point out that when vie eucceeded our father in February 1932
we found Wadi lIadha part of our Sultanate and its inhabitants
are our subjects and up to this day they have been under our
jurisdiction and Sovereignty like alç, other part of our domain
therefore we cannot entertain the claim ±oade by the present
Shaikh of Sharjah (who succeeded to the Shaikhdom in 1950) or
recognise any right in that Wadis
We shall contLiue to exercise our long established
sovereignty over VIadi I1adha aa our predecessors did and as
we have been exercising sae since 1932.
We regret to say that we huve itothing further to say
in the matter ao the whole affair of the Shaikh t
 s claim of
the ?ladi and the inhabitants thereof is beyond our knowledge.
Yuur sincere friend,
SJLI1) BI TAIIU1.
Major F.C.L. Chauncy, 0L.E.
Her Brit annie 14a. j esty' s Consul-Gene-mi,
IiIus cat.
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Appendix L
FO 371/114648
Julian Walker's report of March 1955, Internal Boundaries
Settlement in the Trucial States, confirming that Nahwa and Shis
villages in the Wadi Madha are under Sharjah's control.
0AREA NO. 12: WADI M?LDHA
(a) Muscat claims the whole wadi and is at
present in de facto possession of
Madha, Ghuna and Haarain
(b) Fujairah claims the Jaraidiya
(c) Sharjah claims he whole wadi
P.s Muscat ciciims the whole area it is beyond my
competence to define frontiers there. The pointeand
events of the dispute are fully covered by files in
the Dubai Agency (1o813/5 L , 10813/55).
Sharjah is in ce fcto control of the two villages
at the head of the wadi, Nahawa and. Shis, from which she
has been taking zakat for several years. The Ruler 'of
$ujairah confirms this.
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F0371/14934
Boundary agreement between Shaikh Rashid bin Humaid, Ruler of
Ajman, and Sultan Said bin Taimur in 1961 on Masfut enclave
bordering Oman (English version).
I,
r
I iathid bin Iluaiaid19 nhul Qado,3ald bin Tuiiiiu.rL Dhul 4a'da 1378
Rëferënce—	 -	 -- 	
- I-- I •-	 1.---.-
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In the naxpe o God the O1aYou1:I and fle'cifl
The Sultan Said bin Taimur, Sultan of Muscat and Oman,
and Sliaikh flaehid bin Humaid a]. Naini Iuler of AJman bave
agDeed over the frontiers as follows between the tribes of
the Sultanate (The Beni Kaab) end the state of Ajman
accovdin to the maps drawn by Mr. Julian Walker. The
Frontiers are two separate lth8:-
The first 1in starts from the top af Jabal Tarn an
Ilesur which divides the peoi,le of Ilajarain and Ltasfut and
the Bani Kaab, and goes west to a point to the south of
the head of Wall Glialfa, this Wadi b3].a1glng to lasfut.
The line stops at Vie lie ad of the ubov ;intione3. Wadi
Gha].fc.
¶fhe second line starts from the oummalt of Jaba].
Mi.zaira to the north of Al Lish1cal amid goes west to the
waitorn end of 3abil izo1ra, and then westwards by Wadi
Ichurue, which is the Wadi hiCh flows between Ithtaim ar
Rehnian and Al Jazir. After that the line goes north-west
to As Subalgka an. A]. Milaina, and these two places await
frontier adjustment, From Lillaiho the line gs east to
the head of Wad! aainia end thence te the sumoit of
3mbal Abu Faraj wl4eh is the dividiii point between the
Dan! Kaab and the ]3iduwat o Ifit.
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Appendix N
F0371/14934
Boundary agreement between Shaikh Rashid bin Humaid, Ruler of
Ajman, and Sultan Said bin Taimur in 1961 on Masfut enclave
bordering Oman (Arabic version).
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COPYRIGHT - NOT TO BE IID PHOTOGRAPHICALLY WITHOUT PERMISSION
\ ;/
p.
r -'-
• 	 S4)—1 ----	 LI .J
	
J-J L-J	 r	 -'i----
tJ Q iLLJ	 JI
	
y .L	 JJ 4J1 LJJ) 4J_b, i ^
j_Jl J_AI	 L. L.o WI	 -iII
ç I .JI £JI_. LLI 4JI ç IJ ui$ t j- '-- i- çr-.J#
.o-^ J!hLaJc4cr5	 I-.
Lu_j;
J 4J;	 JI .c o L ,_ _	 J.JI J4-M, Ji L,_&
L.3I ó-JI L,—	 L1_.t	 i..4...J$	 I-.. J—, WI
(L1JI, UJI ci) Lj	 L_JIiJ.....g,Lj.JI,
-iJ--t--Lrlj _3I	 Lø_.Ir...JlcJi,JIj JI L,JJI 	 L,.)iL,>
•J— $ 4 _.	 W1,_b,iJI.;
rvA 'H_jj.%(
*A-JI,.flA
Appendic N
	 406
Appendix 0
FO 371/126932
Letter from D.M.H. Riches dated 21 June 1957 to Mr Harold Beeley,
Assistant Undersecretary, Foreign Office, London.
t:Jo4;)
C0NpIDIAL
TRUCIAL STATES BOUIWARIES
[Flag A)
	 You will be interested in Babrain despatch No. 71 of
May 2L in EA 1086 and re].ated papers.
2.	 Practically all the inter•Trucial States boundaries
(but not those near the frontier of . Muscat or between the
States and Muscat) have now been determined and notified to
the Rulers concerned.
L Plag B]
3. There has been no trouble save over Ras al Khaimah -
Fujairah, about which the Ruler of Ras al Khaimah has
protested vigorously to the Political Resident and remains
sulky and even possibly meditating trouble. This
particular settlement has the added disadvantages that
Ras al Khaimah did not specifically agree to accept a
boundary, dictated by us,èFujairah; and contains a
• (potential) oil sharing arrangement which might conceivably
be used against us in the event of a renewed arbitration
over Buraimi (see Mr. Simpson's minute of May 3 in —/1).
/
L4 .	 Nevertheless I am convinced that the action taken was
correct and we should continue to put through every boundary
settlement, attribution of islands, etc. to the limit of our
capacity.	 It is a me]azholy reflection that we could have
settled all these questions without difficulty before the
Second World War but did not do so.
5.	 I should like to send the attached draft despatch to
Babrain.
(D. M. if. Riches)
June 21, 1957
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Appendix P
F0371/140135
Letter from M.G.G. Man, Acting Political Resident, Bahrain, to
Shaikh Rashid bin Said Al-Maktum, ruler of Dubai, 13 August 1959.
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